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ABSTRACT:
This exploratory inquiry into fraud and its control examines
insurance fraud as one type of business-related crime. Insurance
fraud is defined as the manipulation of loss circumstances and
reports (including to whom, what, where, when and how losses
occur) in order to claim insurance benefits that otherwise would
not be forthcoming. Since false claiming can be usefully
conceptualized as rule breaking committed through or mediated by
conventional insurance transactions, the study of such behavior
is appropriately focused on the interaction between insurance
activities, fraudulent behavior and fraud control. Transactions,
rather than individuals or organizations, provide the empirical
context for this inquiry.
Data were obtained from a number of sources. In-depth
interviews were conducted with insurance claim personnel,
claimants, and public and private fraud investigators. Cases
were reviewed as part of field site visits with a private
investigative agency and a state-run fraud bureau. Secondary
sources--e.g. trade journals, claim association proceedings,
criminal indictments, newspaper articles and insurance
texts-were used as well.
Two questions informed the analysis. First, since insurance
fraud offenders use the insurance process to obtain benefits
unlawfully, to what extent do insurance organizations and
activities influence the construction of false claims. Second,
to what extent do processes of image manipulation and the
relationship between deceiver and insurance organization
influence abilities and incentives to detect and control
fraudulent behavior.
The nodel of fraud and fraud control developed in this study
argues that fraudulent activity persists because of features of
insurance process and deceptive behavior which permit offenders
to manipulate loss images and reports and discourage potential
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social control agents from exerting control. Incentives and
opportunities for fraud and its control are analyzed as a
consequence of the contradictory character of insurance
activities and relationships providing opportunities to deceive,
opportunities to conceal the offences, and limits on fraud
recognition and control. The uncertainties associated with
insurable risk permit fraud offenders to construct deceptive
images of loss. Legitimate transactions and organizations
cover-up fraudulent intent and shield fraud offenders from their
targets. Control, like fraudulent behavior, is mediated through
the insurance organization. Other insurance goals and activities
often supercede fraud enforcement efforts. Finally, fraud
effects are diffused limiting further the incentive to control
deception.
This research highlights an important perspective for
analyzing programs and policies. In addition to evaluating
whether programs meet their stated objectives, analysts should
examine a program's influence on the generation of unintended or
deviant outcomes. In this dissertation concepts useful for
analyzing the insurance role in the production and control of
fraudulent claims are developed.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Gary T. Marx
Professor of Sociology
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INrCTacric
Over the past decade insurance scams have becane nationally
recognized phenomena. Arsons-for-profit, medicaid fraud, welfare
fraud-terms once familiar only to program adminstrators-are
ccmmonly known today. Arson-for-profit is perhaps the most
visible of all types of insurance fraud. The burning of
America's cities has been well addressed in national and local
media. The United States Senate as well as other state and local
legislative tndies have established special cnmissions to study
the problem. Comrunity groups have organized around the arson
issue. Enforcement task forces have been established in several
jur isdictions.
Ronald Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign rallied around
the issue of "fraud, waste and abuse" in government services.
Campaign rhetoric identified categories of welfare, medicaid and
food stamp "cheats." In arguing for separating the "truly
needy"-those deserving benefits- fram those receiving them,
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Reagan suggested implicitly, if not explicitly, that United
States citizens were stealing fro their social insurance system.
Doctorr, lawyers and auto body shop owners who set up phoney
autcxobile accidents and then submit phoney claims to insurance
cmpanies have been exposed by national and local media. In 1980
reporters from the Chicag Sun Times and V station WLS went
"undercover" to expose an organized insurance fraud ring involved
in setting up fake autarobile accidents and submitting phoney
insurance clairs to several insurers. Reporters uncovered
instances of unnecessary treatments, even surgery, simply for the
insurance payoff. Also in 1980 Massachusetts' Governor Edward
King created a task force to examine auto theft and auto theft
fraud. The task force reported that an estimated twenty-five
percent of all reported auto thefts were actually fraudulent.
In addition to the highly publicized arsons-for-profit,
medicaid mills and fraudulent auto thefts, insurance schemes
include: persons who murder their spouses for life insurance
benefits; men who deliberately shoot off their arms and legs for
disability benefits; and families who act out burglaries in
their own hoes. The thread which ties arson fires, welfare
cheating, phoney 3acidents, intentional injuries and fabricated
auto thefts together is the potential for filing fraudulent
insurance claims-theft by deception.
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All insurance programs, public and private are susceptible
to fraud. Fraud means simply willful deception. Offenders
deceive, trick, or, in sane way, pervert or manipulate truth in
order to induce others to part with their property or to
surrender legal rights (e.g. insurance benefits). Insurance
fraud offenders manipulate facts so that it appears as if they
are eligible for insurance ccmTpensation when they are not. A
successful insurance fraud projects a credible account of loss
when no such insurable loss conditions, in fact, exist.
Offenders use the system, deceptively, to convince those
allocating benefits that they are deserving of insurance
cmpensation.
1.0 CXRNCEFIUJALIZING BUSINESS--REIATED THEFTS
Insurance fraud can be categorized as one of a number of
business-related thefts. Embezzlement, employee thefts, check
forgeries are others. The literature on business-related crimes
has produced a number of different ways to conceptualize them.
Business-related crimes have been conceptualized as crimes
comnitted by persons in the course of their white-collar
occupations, crimes cammitted by individuals in organizations,
crimes connitted by organizations, or crimes caommitted against
organizations. These conceptualizations focus on the victim (is
it an organization and if so, what kind?) on the offenders (an
organization or an individual?) or on the social control agents
(inside or outside regulators?).
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The analytic split between victims, offenders and social
control agents camm to conventional views of business-related
crimes obscures one of the most important features of
business-related thefts. Offenders utilize conventional business
transactions and actors to ccamnit their crimes. Offenders are
part of the system and use the system to beat it. Distinctions
between rule breaking and conventional activities and actors are
often blurred.
Since the interaction between conventional transactions and
rule breaking is an important feature of business-related crimes,
they can be usefully conceptualized as crime committed through or
mediated b conventional organizational transactions. Unlike
other forms of theft, offenders do not have to "break into" the
system. Once inside, offenders need not take extraordinary
measures to achieve their ends. Consider, for example,
fraudulent insurance claims. Insurance fraud offenders are
insurance policyholders and, thus, have purchased the right to be
claimants. Conventional claim processing transactions provide
the vehicles through which these insurance "thefts" occur.
Offenders often carnit business-related theft through
organizations or econcmIic system %=s which have existing social
control mechanisms. Financial organizations have audit systems.
Insurance claim departments employ adjusters or investigators
whose jots are to ver ify claims. Thus, fraud offenders commit
their cr imes through organizational systems which make same
11
attempt to control their rule breaking behavior.
2.0 QUESTIONS RAISED BY CRIMES MEDIATED EIXIO ORGANIZATIONS
This conceptualization of crimes cnvritted through or
mediated l organizational or eccncmiic transactions raises two
questions. First, since offenders camnit their crimes through
organizational transactions, is there scmething about
conventional transactions or the relationship between offender
and organization which helps explain the rule breaking behavior?
Is there something about the business or econcmic context which
facilitates, provides cpprtunities for or even generates rule
breaking? Second, since sme mechanisms of control are formally
in place, is there scmething about the nature of deviant
transactions which limits or neutralizes control? Is there a
miismatch between type of cxxtrol and type of deviance produced
through econamic transactions?
These questions are explored by examiing one form of rule
breaking thro organizations-property-casualty insurance
frauds. The two general questions about crimes conitted through
organizational transactions can be asked more specifically for
property-casualty insurance frauds. First, since insurance fraud
offenders use the insurance process to obtain benefits
unlawfully, to what extent do insurance organizations and
activities influence the cxstruction of false claims. Secxnd,
to what extent do the processes of deception and the relationship
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between deceiver and insurance organization influence abilities
and ircentives to detect and control fraudulent behavior.
In the following chapters I argue that the insurance
mechanism provides opportunities for individual deviation and
fraud by insurance claimants because of the inherent ambiguities
and uncertainties in the insurance product and process. The lack
of certainty with respect to individual losses permits
policyholders to shape loss circumstances and reports to their
advantages. Offenders who engage in processes of image
manipulation are often able to neutralize the fixed structures of
cnventicnal claims process and fraud control. The uncertainty
which permits the manipulation of false images also limits the
ability to attribute fraudulent motive to a given set of claiming
behaviors. Finally, control, like fraudulent behavior, is
mediated through the insurance organization. Insurance goals of
claim service often supercede fraud enforcement goals. Fraud
effects are diffused throughout the insurance system further
limiting the incentives for fraud control.
Implicit choices regarding how much and what types of fraud
can or should be tolerated and/or controlled are made by
insurance actors as they perform their insurance tasks. By
isolating the relationships between fraud, fraud control and
insurance process, I hope to br ing those implicit choices to the
foreground of public debate. As the insurance institution
spreads to cover more and more of the uncertainties and
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complexities in our society, the negative effects of insurance,
as they are manifest in fraud and abuse, beg further analysis.
This exploratory inquiry into the manufacture and control of
fraudulent insurance claims is a first step in that process.
3.0 MEODI)0F ANALZSIS AND DATA OCLLECTION
Since insurance fraud can be usefully conceptualized as rule
breaking ccmnitted through or mediated by conventional insurance
transactions and organizations, the study of such behavior is
appropriately focused on the interaction between insurance
process, fraud and fraud control. Focusing on transactions and
their outcmes, rather than on individuals or organizations,
provides an empirical cantext for such an inquiry. One can
consider how insurance organizational structures affect camn
interaction strategies, including deception. Conversely, one
might consider how the structure of deception affects oontrol
processes.
This exploratory inquiry into insurance fraud and its
cxntrol is ethnographic in the sense that it is holistic, but,
unlike mote traditional ethnography, the analysis is not confined
to a specific setting. The research is designed as a gtneric
analysis of the system of insurance fraud and its control. It is
not a study of a par ticular agency nor an analysis of a specif ic
set of cases. "Ferreting Out Fraud" is a study of procsses and
hcn those processes are influenced by institutions, not a study
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of institutions nor individuals.
My research is informed by other studies of c ime in
industry which stress the important role industry structures-in
particular, legal, ecxnomic, organizational and normative
cxarpents-play in encouraging deviant behavior. (See, for
example, Faberman, 1975 on the autcnobile industry; Denzin, 1977
on the retail liquor trade; Needleman and Needleman, 1979 on
fraud in the securities industry; and Pontell, Jesilow and Geis,
1982 on practitioner fraud in the Medi-Cal program.) These
studies of criminogenesis argue that same criminal behavior can
be analyzed as a "predictable product of an individual's
wnmbership in or contact with organizational systems." (Needleman
and Needleman, 1979; 517-a point also made by Vaughn, 1982)
My approach to the study of insurance fraud also bears same
similarities to recent criminological research which borrows fro
the human ecology school. Cohen and Felson (1979) in the
clearest articulation of the approach consider the
interdependence between the structure of illegal activity
(predatory violations such as rape, robbery, assault and personal
larceny) and the organization of everyday life.
My analysis differs fron the studies above in that my focus
an structural opportunities for fraud does not ignore or minimize
the importance of human agency. My analysis does not assume that
offenders are passive agents, but that they act to maniplate the
targetted systen to their advantages and attempt to neutralize
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efforts to control their fraudulent behavior. I am arguing for
scmething of a synthesis between the structural and interactive
approaches to the study of deviance.
The research was limited to property-casualty insurance
frauds as a matter of choice. Fraudulent claims against
automobile, homeowners' and ccmercial policies are included,
while claims against disability, health and life policies are
excluded. Other forms of social insurance are excluded from rnry
analysis as well. (See Chapter Two for a more systematic
discussion of the kinds of insurance policies covered under this
research.) Several factors influenced my choice of fraud type.
Because I was interested in the interrelationship between private
and public sector activity, I chose private sector insurance
frauds rather than frauds against public systems. Since arson
and auto theft frauds were openly discussed in the media, I
believed that information might be more readily available for
these fraud types than for many others. Finally, the itructural
division of the insurance industry into property-casualty and
life sectors, with ccmpanies specializing in one or the other,
dictated that I choose amog sectors.
Although insurance fraud appears to be widespread, it is
Conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy. (In this respect this
study is similar to Reiaman's study of bribery (1979) and
Shermarrs study of police cor rupt ion (1978) and suf fer s from soe
of the definitional problems cited in their work.) Because frauds
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are typically hidden fran view, to study them one must often rely
on control agents' identification of fraudulent behavior. Thus,
in same cases, the activities of enforcement agents were not only
a subject of inquiry, but enforcesment agents became resources for
understanding fraudulent transactions as well.
As will become clear throughout this analysis, the fraud
control system is often cmanposed of many different actors,
working at different levels, yet focusing on the same sets of
events. In order to draw a picture of the multiple levels of
enforcement agents and their potential for conflict and
cooperation, data were gathered fram representatives of as many
enforcement agent types as could be identified. In-depth
attention was focused on those agency types which deal
exclusively with insurance fraud activities (see appendix A),.
Data on fraudulent activity and its control were obtained
from a variety of sources. Seventy-two interviews were conducted
with insurance claim managers, policyholders, fraud investigators
employed directly by insurance ccmpanies in special investigative
units, private investigators, industry-supported investigators as
well as with prosecutors and other law enforcement personnel
crncerned with the fraud problem. Data were collecteci frnm
Fifty-eight case files reviewed during a ten day field site visit
with the Florida Division of Insurance Fraud. Case files were
also reviewed dur ing a sixty day observation f ield/site visit
with a pr ivate investigative agency. secondary sources, fraud
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manuals and insurance texts, biographies of fraud investigators
and claim managers, histories of insurance ccmpanies as well as
newspaper accounts (popular and trade) were used to gather data
on fraud and its control. [Note: Newspaper accounts are fairly
reliable sources for data on fraudulent activity. Insurance
fraud has been the subject of several media expose's which have
been followed by indictments and convictions of named offenders.
I have learned that many of the newspaper articles were written
either directly fran the indictments or fro the press releases
of the investigative agencies involved. While they may
exaggerate the quality of participation by the particular agency,
the indictment facts stand.]
One important caveat must be introduced. This research
examined only (1) insurance claims singled out as likely frauds
and considered for further investigation, although in many cases
no further action was taken; aid (2) in a few instances, claims
which claimants admit were fraudulent but which the Insurer
recognized as legitimate. Unfortunately, this research is limited
in what it can say about successful frauds-frauds which pass
through the system as if they were legitimate. Nevetheless, we
can use discovered fraud to make inferences about successful
ones.
The great advantage to an academic inquiry of this kind is
the oversight and distance it permits the researcher. Because I
was rot grounded in a par ticular organizational locale, I could
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view the system frca a broad perspective, a view not typically
afforded to those directly involved in day-to-day affairs of
fraud and fraud axntrol. My analysis of the manufacture and
control of fraudulent insurance claims is a synthesis of all my
field experiences and the experiences related to me by my
informants. It is to those experiences that this research owes
its greatest debt.
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CHAPTER 1
FABRICATED CRIMES, C0NRIVED IDSSES, AND OTHER DECEPTIVE ACTS
Insurance fraud offenders obtain insurance benefits by
wilfully deceiving those allocating compensation. In so doing,
fraud offenders manipulate the meaning of the insurance
relationship and transform a system of compensation into a system
of gain.
The insurance mechanism is a means for sharing and, thus
reducing, individual uncertainty. A group of individuals,
subject to the same perils (e.g. fires, auto accidents, the
threat of suit because of damage to another), contributes to a
shared "risk pool," organized and administered by a private
insurance company, enabling those who suffer from the named
perils to recover from their misfortunes.
"The uncertainty which characterizes the single risk is
exchanged for the relative certainty of the combined
risks. . .this must be considered the prime function
of insurance." (Gephart, 1917;27-28)
Individuals experiencing such losses recover by claiming from
insurance companies sums which are sufficient to restore them to
1-20
their financial statuses prior to their losses.
The insurance conmxdity, a policy or contract, establishes
the insurance relationship. Unlike durable goods exchanged in
the market, the insurance product is intangible and ontingent.
In return for premiums policyholders receive the promise of
protection should they be subject to sane named event.
Individuals trust that by paying an insurance premium their
assets are protected. Those who assume risk (the insurance
ccxrpanies) trust that the risks they assume are
fortuitous-beynd the control of policyholders. (Denenberg,
1968) [1]
Fraud offenders undermine the insurance relationship by
manipulating loss events, images and reports. Insurance
personnel are deceived by fraud offenders into believing that
claims represent cxxpensable losses when they do not. A Florida
man, for example, filed a personal liability claim against his
parents' honemoners insurance policy. He claimed that he
sustained injuries when he fell in his parents' bathtub. If
true, a fall of that kind would be crmpensable under a
hameowner's insurance policy. In the course of their
investigation, however, claim evaluators learned that the man had
not injured himself in the bathtub as he stated, but in an auto
1. Pfeffer (1974;209) refers to insurable risks as ". . .the
per ils to which the individual is objectie-vely xoe at anay
time." (my ebpasis) This does not mean that risks are
random. Individuals often take neasures to change the
relative probabilities that r isks will ocur.
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accident not covered by an insurance policy. Since the auto
accident was not covered, this individual constructed a scenario
to make his rn-compensable loss appear to be one covered under
an existing insurance contract.
Opportunities for manipulating loss events and reports are
often generated within or by the insurance relationship since
exactly what is bought and sold-the perception of security based
on contingent claims service-is not well-defined, and cannot be
well- defined, at the outset. The uncertainties associated with
specific loss events provide fraud offenders with latitude for
manipulating and shaping those events. Attempts to reduce
aggregate uncertainties through the insurance mechanism open up
new possibilities for individual deviation and fraud. Finally,
the social organization of deception and the flexibility of image
manipulation permit fraud offenders to subvert the fixed
structure of insurance process and neutralize control.
The relevance or appropriateness of defining insurance fraud
as a problem of social deviance is questioned by public attitudes
toward fraud. While arson is clearly viewed as a social problem
worthy of intense scrutiny, other frauds, for example ditching a
car into the lake and then reporting it stolen are often not
viewed as particularly troublescme to many insurance consumners.
In fact, it appears that "ripping off" the insurance crmpany is
cxnsidered by many as legitimate behavior. Individuals see
little need for xontrolling scne frauds because "everybodly dos
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it" and "my doing it will not make much of a difference."
Insurance fraud is perceived as a way to get something back fran
insurance coxpanies. Fran that perspective fraud is almost an
entitlement awarded for having participated in the private
insurance system.
By perceiving fraud as an entitlement, something due to us
for participating in the system, we often ignore the insurance
carpany role in "granting" such "benefits" in the first place.
Under what circumstances do cxianies, wittingly or otherwise,
"permit" or "tolerate" fraud? When do they take steps to control
fraudulent behavior? By ignoring insurance cnpanies'
participation in the production and control of fraudulent claims
we minimize their part in defining where and when the fraud
problem exists and how and when it should be controlled. For
example, the insurance industry may conceive of arson fraud as a
problem of a few "unscrupulous" landlords who use fire to
maximize profits and ignore their own participation in
facilitating or providing oportunities for fire to be used in
this way. If cxmpanies tolerate same frauds and not others, this
selective system of enforcement requires further inquiry. Who
are the beneficiaries of fraud tolerance?
Perceiving fraudulent behavior as a system of individualized
" just desser ts" also ignores the significant consequences of
collective action. Estimates of the dollar losses attr ibuted to
fraud run in the billions. A representative of the Amer ican
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Insurance Association noted that fraudulent claim costs could
exceed $11.5 billion a year (The New York Times. July 6, 1982).
In cuparison, dollar losses fran reported crimes of robbery,
burglary, larceny and motor vehicle thefts were estimated at
$9.03 billion in 1980 (Insurance Facts, 1981). These signficant
fraud costs are distributed throughout the insurance system,
often back to policyholders in the form of higher rates [2].
Ccnpanies unable to absorb fraud costs or unable to pass those
costs to oxsumers or other insurers may become insolvent and,
thus, place their legitimate policyholders at sane risk.
Fraud effects also are absorbed directly by those involved
in the deceptive losses. Claim evaluators who are deceived may
lose their cxnfidence or even their jobs. Buildings are
needlessly burned and lives lost in fraud fires. Unwitting
accomplices to fraud may suffer personal distress at their
involvements should they be discovered. Finally, society, as a
whole, bears sane costs as deception and secrecy undermine trust
relationships.
The complexity of fraudulent behavior and the wide range in
fraud consequences beg for an analysis that can recognize
different degrees of fraudulent activity and pAnt to factors
that might accunt for the persistence of fraud within the
insurance systen. The conceptual rrodel of fraud and its control
2. As noted elsewhere (Brill, 1982;63) higher premiwrs place
disproportionate burdens on plicyholders. Insurance is a
form of regressive tax. ILaer inocne policyholders pay a
larger share of their disposable incrme for insurance.
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developed in this study highlights variations in fraudulent
behavior that can be used as a starting point for informed public
debate on the costs and benefits of fraud and fraud control. For
exarple, the model allows one to distinguish frauds that take
place after a loss has already happened in order for individuals
to take advantage of the loss situation fram frauds where the
advantage to individuals canes only after their direct
participation in creating the losses themselves. By isolating
points at which deception and insurance process cone together,
the model draws out the seemingly symbiotic relationship between
deception and insurance and, thus, may inform debate on the
utility of current and proposed strategies for fraud enforcement.
1.1 INSURAN(Z FRAUD DEFINED
Statutory definitions of insurance fraud such as Florida's
False and Fraudulent Claim statute include, as criminal
violations, a vast array of false or misleading statements. For
example the Florida statute (817.234) states that
"any person who, with the intent to injure, defraud or
deceive any insurance canpany. . .presents or causes
to be presented. . prepares or makes any written or
oral statement that is intended to be presented to any
insurance aopany in connection with, or in support of,
any claim for payment (or] other benefit pursuant to an
insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains
any false, inyxurplete or misleading information
conicerning any f act or thing mater ial to such claim;
is guilty of a felony of the third degree."
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Interviews with claimants, claims personnel and fraud
investigators suggested that any useful definition of fraud had
to distinguish the simple exaggerated claims fran those that are
constructed deliberately. They associated different degrees of
rule breaking with false claiming. Scme claim inflation is
expected by the insurance organization and condoned by most
actors. Manufacturing a loss in order to claim benefits to which
one is not entitled, however, is crnsidered a more serious
violation of the insurance relationship. One claims manager
cnrumented,
".a. .You know, we all have a little larceny in our
hearts, although we don't commit the act intentionally.
Once the act is connitted, we have a tendency to
overestimate the damages. That's one of the reasons we
have insurance adjusters. That's the term-adjust
figures back so that both parties are fairly treated.
We have gone fran that to the bold, ccmitted act [of
fraud]." (interview no. 6.)
The distinction between inflated claims and fraudulent ones
is undersoored by recognizing two ways in which one can profit
from losses covered by insurance policies. The first way is to
exaggerate the value of a loss. As the above quote indicates, a
certain amount of exaggeration is generally expected and a rather
formal bargaining mechanism has been developed to reduce its
effect. The second way to profit f ran insurance is to
orchestrate the conditicns of losses in order to deceptively
claim insurance benefits. In the second case, the case of fraud,
individuals ask to be carensated for losses, or parts of losses,
they plays] a role in cxonstructing. Since issues of value are
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perceived differently than issues of legitimacy, a useful
definition of fraud must separate claim inflations (expected, if
not condoned by the insurance system) from fraud, the
manufactured appearance of an insurable loss.
Insurance fraud can be defined as the manipulation of loss
circumstances and reports (including who, what, where, when and
how losses occur) in order to claim insurance benefits that
otherwise should not be forthcaning. Losses may be ineligible
for insurance coverage for one of several reasons: the loss may
not be covered under an existing insurance contract; the loss
may never haved occurred; or the loss may have been
intentionally created simply to commit fraud. Since fraud
offenders must convinze insurance personnel that their claims
represent crmpensable losses, the key factor in the deception is
the manufactured appearance of an insurable loss [3].
While separating fraudulent activities fram claim inflation
may be analytically easy, in practice, there are many obstacles
to recognizing behavior as "intended daceit" rather than
"expected exaggeration." The fine and arbitrary line between
claim inflation and fraud often blurs the behavior in the real
world.
3. My definition of insurance fraud is cxxnsistent with the
elsments of white-collar crime cited by Edelhertz, et. al.
(1977;21-22) They claim that there are five elements to
white-collar crime: (1) Intent to cxxunit a wrongful act;
(2) disguise of purpose; (3) offenders' reliance on the
ignorance or carelessness of the victims; (4) victim
voluntary action to assist offender (e.g. issuing a
settlement draft): and (5) ccmcealment of the offence.
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Interestingly, while insurance activities are oriented to
evaluating whether a claim is compensable-i.e. whether the
claim meets the contract criteria-or whether claims are
inflated, claim processors are not necessarily equipped to
determine whether or not a loss happened in the way the
policyholder claimed. In the words of one claim manager,
"If I gave you the story of a loss and I told you to
examine this piece of information for the purpose of
deciding whether we should or should not pay it, you'd
oe to one conclusion. But, if then, I changed the
perspective and told you I wanted you to examine the
same situation to determine if it's true, you'd cae to
another." (interview 6)
Thus, while claim personnel argue for a distinction between claim
inflation and fraud, it is not clear that insurance activities
are well-designed to recognize that distinction in practice.
Additionally, sane claims personnel believe that complacency
regarding claim inflation may actually encourage policyholders to
cross over from sinple inflation to outright fraud.
1.2 FRAUD INCIDE4CE
Problems of definition and recognition translate into
methodological difficulties in studying fraud and estimating
incidence. As is true for mst rule breaking situations we only
discover a fraction of actual rule breaking behavior. The
problen of determining insurance fraud incidence is capounded
further tq tie lack of centralized accounting mechanisrs. Many
diverse agencies, public and private, are responsible for fraud
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investigation.
In general estimates of insurance fraud ranged fro ten to
twenty percent of all claims filed, although it is never clear
exactly what gets counted in these estimates. There is at least
a perception that fraudulent behavior is increasing. Many noted
that particular schemes were dcminant at different points in
time. For example, soue aMented that arson fraud has been a
problem only at selected per iods, usually around business
recessions. The Aerican Insurance Association, an umbrella
organization for insurance campanies, estimates that fifteen to
twenty percent of insurance claims are fraudulent, an increase
from a decade ago when fraudulent claims were estimated to
acount for only five to six percent of all clains filed. (The
New York Times. July 6, 1982)
The All-Industry Research Advisory Council, a research
organization serving insurance cmTpanies, conducted a survey of
1,544 adults to examine their attitudes toward the
property-casualty insurance industry. Respondents were asked
whether they knew anyone who had made a false claim. Seventeen
percent (17%) declared they did. Analysts report that those
knowing sameone who had filed a false claim were most likely to
be aged twenty-five to thirty-four and to have incrmes in excess
of $30,000 (AIRAC, December , 1981; 15-17) .
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1.3 OO ER aHZPS/1(EES CF FRAUD
1.3.1 oML HAZAND
The gosibility that the insurance mechanism might increase
loss experience and consequence has been recognized by other
social scientists, particularly ecoanmists, as a form of moral
hazard. The literature identifies two types of moral hazard
(Dicine, 1981). The first type occurs when policyholders
substitute insurance for protection. For example, rather than
buying additional locks to guard against thieves, homeowners
purchase insurance to provide cnvensaticin in the event that a
theft occurs. Sine policyholders reduce self-protection, the
potential for losses increases. The second type of moral hazard
ocurs when policyholders increase conswrption of services simply
because insurance pays for them. According to the econcmic
theory, policyholders have no incentives to control inflated, or
even fraudulent, charges for services provided to them because of
the insurance subsidy (Pauly, 1968; Arrow,1968 and Marshall,
1976). I
The theoretical concept of moral hazard assumes that the
relationship between insurance and increased losses reflects
probleM of efficient allcaticn of econamic resources. The
L
theoretically, by rmore efficient distritution of risk through theL
r
market. To reduce noral hazard insurance cxnsumers should absorb
wore financial risk, either by paying higher rates or by becnning
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partners in the insurance policy through co-insurance clauses and
high deductibles. Having absorbed more of the risk,
policyholders will have greater incentives to control inflated or
fraudulent costs and to protect themselves against losses.
The urdel of fraudulent behavior proposed in this research
suggests that frauds against insurance cczpanies cannot be
explained simply as a problem of allocating risk through the
market. Higher premiums or deductibles might control sane
frauds, but increase the possibility of others. For several
years insurance experts have suspected that the potential for
losses increases as a function of higher premium rates.
Researchers at Peter MerriJ. Associates have introduced the
ccrcept of "premium retrieval" to capture that relationship [4].
They argue that policyholders atterpt to recover portions of
their premiums, often in dishonest ways, in order to obtain
desired returns on their "investments." (Peter Merrill
4. Peter Merrill Associates studied the statistical relationship
between auto theft rates and increasing premiums.
Traditionally, researchers have inferred that the strong
correlation between theft rates and premiums was due to rate
relief- auto insurers passing on the increased cost of theft
to policyholders in the form of higher rates. Researchers
tested the hypothesis that the relationship might work in the
other direction as well. Using a series of least square
regressions they found statistical support for increased-
theft rates as a cosqece of increased premiums. Fran
this they inferred that "premumn retrieval" (policyholdersL
atterpting to recover a portion of their premium investmentsU
in dishonest ways) is a real and inportant factor in
motivating auto thef t (p.40) . While one can question their
nethodology and their inferences, I believe it is significant
that saie segnents of the insurance acnmmnity are aware that
high premiums might increase, rather than decrease, losses,
including fraudulent losses.
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Associates, 1980;40, also cited in the Massachusetts' Governor's
Task Force on Auto Theft, 1980;28) .
Furthermore, it is not clear that high premiuns will deter
fraud offenders in cases where the payoff is considerable. Fraud
investigators interviewed in this research suspect that potential
arsonists, unable to purctase insurance in conventional markets,
are willing to pay signficantly higher premiums in specialized
markets simply because the return on their investments remains
substantial.
Moreover, the oncept of moral hazard does not adequately
explain how and why fraud offenders are able to manufacture loss
circumstances and reports to their advantages. The econcmic
model cannot explain why frauds occur in same situations and not
others, nor exactly how insurance process facilitates the use of
deception. To understand the behavioral variation in fraudulent
activity one needs to examine the oxrtunities to distort or
manipulate loss events and reports allowing offenders to deceive
insurance personnel into providing compensation when it is not
due.
1.3.2 LACK OF C3IIWL
The insurance fraud problen also has teen cnnceptuaiized in
termrs of lack of control. Control may be lax because of poor
risk selection (insuring fraud prone individuals), or too little
enforcement by investigators verifying claims or conventional law
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enforcemeit prosecuting fraud offenders [5]. While I cannot
discount the positive effects of more control, the acsumption
that we can select out or antrol fraud either at the application
stage or when claims are filed is problematic for several
reasons. Control, like fraudulent behavior, is mediated by the
business of insurance. Future fraud offenders are often hard to
identify before frauds actually ocur. Finally, it is not clear
that insurance ompanies wish to control the behavior of their
policyholders/clients in all situations. Organizational goals to
maximize profits may supercede enforcement goals, for example
[61.
My analysis suggests that cpportunities for fraud will
persist because of the uncertainties in the insurance
relationship which facilitate the manipulation of events and
images. The insurance context and the nature of deceptive
5. There appears to be an interesting shift in industry position
over the last decade. At the time Ross (1970, revised 1980)
conducted his study of insurance adjusters the public policy
issues were unfair claim denials and insurance availability.
Campanies respcnding to public criticism that they were too
quick to deny claims were happy to project the image that,
when in doubt, claims were paid. Now when arson and fraud
are at the forefront of public debate and insurance ocmpanies
have been accused of lax claim settlement, carpanies are less
cufortable with their images of quick claim payers.
Insurance officials seem eager to argue that they are forced
to pay questionable claiMs because of unfair elaims practices
legislation which limits the tine they may investigate
elaims. This issue will be addressed in note detail in
Chapter Seven.
6. Interestingly, the concept of moral hazard which I argue does
rot adequately explain an individual's fraudulent behavior,
may help explain carpany reaction to fraud. Ccupanies may
tolerate fraud losses because they have nechanisms to share
the consequences of those losses with others.
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transactions cxbine to facilitate fraud and neutralize control.
These issues will be addressed in the chapters which follow.
First, I examine what it is that fraud offenders do.
1.4 TYPES CF DECEPTIVE CAIM ACTIVITY
Fraud offenders manipulate loss circumstances and reprts in
order to obtain benefits to which they are not entitled.
Insurance personnel are deceived into believing that fraud
offenders' claims represent campensable losses when they do not.
Since insurance claims are accunts of victimization (fire,
thefts, injuries, etc.) covered by (i.e. eligible for
cxrpensation from) insurance carriers, the key factor in the
deception is the manufacture of an insurable loss. A successful
fraud projects a credible image of this type of victimization.
Insurance frauds can be differentiated by the ways in which
fraud offenders construct fraudulent loss scenarios. There are
three general categories of action used to defraud insurers.
1. exploiting losses which have already happened.
2. inventing stories of losses which never happened.
3. physically creating losses.
These differences reflect different ways to manipulate loss
events and reirrts and point to different ways deception and
insurance proess are intertwined, tosses which actually happen,
but Which are ineligible for insurance cxmjensation without the
deception, are distinguished fran losses which never happen but
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apar to, and fran losses which are created by fraud offenders.
Policyholders are not the only actors who can instigate
frauds against insurers. In all three categories distinctions
can be made between cases where policyholders or claimants are
part of, or at least privy to, the deceptions on their behalves
and cases where policyholders are the unwitting acomplices,
their insurance policies providing the means by which others
instigate frauds against insurance oanpanies.
1.4.1 EXPLOITING LES
Fraud offenders exploit losses by distorting loss details in
order to make the losses appear to be eligible for insurance
cmpensation. The data indicate three ways in which individuals
exploit losses. (1) Extending damages (2) Past posting losses or
(3) Multiple dipping.
1.4.1.1 Extending Damages- -
Policyholders or third parties involved with losses and
their cmsequences (doctors, lawyers, auto body shop owners,
etc.) can extend damages by adding new damage (e.g. adding dents
or creating additional injuries) or by falsifying recnrds or
overtreating injuries so that it appears as if the damage was
greater than it was in fact. Extending damage differs front
inflating claim value since the physical loss, not sinply the
value of the loss, is exaggerated.
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In 1975 North Carolina's Insurance Ccmissioner related the
folicwing story to the International Claim Association. A large
furniture manufacturing oncrn filed an insurance claim covering
fire damages to their factory. The claim subnitted to the
insurance campany was unusually large considering the size of the
fire. Subsequent investigation exposed the manufacturers attempt
to defraud the insurer. Just prior to the fire, the caopany had
designed and manufactured a new line of furniture.
Unfortunately, the design was faulty and the units were
defective. The unsalable pieces were stored in a nearby
warehouse. After the fire, a quick thinking, carpany eiployee
brought the defective units out of storage and placed them in the
fire damaged area. He saturated the defective pieces with water
and, then, submitted a water damage claim to his
insurers. (O'Neal, 1975)
An investigation by reporters fron the Chicago Sun Times
disclosed that unscrupulous doctors and attorneys in that area
took advantage of motor vehicle accident victims, sane of who
were not even hurt, in order to construct fraudulent insurance
claims. Other metrolitan areas, for example Los Angeles,
Miami, New York, Boston, Baltimore as well as others, report
similar sdsees [7]. Doctor-lawyer teens engaged in this form of
deceptive activity erploy "runners" or "ambulance chasers,"
persons who, through a variety of means (police scanners,
informants in the police departmrent, patrol of likely accident
sites, etc.) discover motor vehicle accidents, appear at the
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scene and attept to entice the accident victims to engage the
services of particular lawyers. The lawyers, regardless of the
extent of injuries (sce accident victims have none) refer their
new clients to doctors who are also ring mmbers. Doctors set up
treatments exceeding what would be necessary for the specific
injuries involved. They coach their patients in exactly what to
say should they be examined by insurance ampany doctors. (See,
for exanpie, the US attorneys case against Drs. Rosenthal and
Hershenow cited in the Boston Globe 4/23/81.) Usually the
treatments involve sare hospitalization, but in order to avoid
suspicion, the office visits are kept within appropriate limits.
One doctor told an accident victim, actually a reporter for the
Chicago Sun Times and totally without injury, that he should be
hospitalized for about ten days. The &tor said
"A couple of years ago Allstate Insurance Ccpany did a
study and they found that these kinds of injuries
usually result in ten to fourteen days in the hospital.
So, that's about the right amnnt." (Chicgo Sun Tines
Special Report 2/11/80;7.)
Smnetimes the exaggeration can be taken to extremes as, for
example, in one instance where a doctor reamnded surgery for a
non-existent injury allegedly suffered by one of the Chicago Sun
7. All types of organizations respondirn, in same degree, to the
insurance fraud problem have eraountered this form of fraud.
Cczpany clainw depar tments, fraud bureaus, federal str ike
forces arnd even investigative journalists, have discovered
this type of activity within their jurisdictions. A
varilation on this scheme has teen arcund probably as long as
notor vehicle insurance. As early as 1930, local bar
associations convened to irquire into the practices of
antnlarce chasing, faked accidents arnd inproper settlerment s
(Botein, 1937).
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Times reporters investigating the scam.
How far will fraud offenders go in extending damages? We
can speculate that the preferred approach to extending danrges is
one in which no new damage actually occurs, but where the
appearance of extended damage is successfully projected.
However, when damages are extended we can expect to see
differences when the losses involve increasing risk to people or
inanimate objects. One can imagine that wrecking a car would be
far easier morally than breaking scmecne's leg. Nevertheless, we
can see from the example above that at least save doctors are not
deterred from performing unnecessary treatments, even surgery, at
saee risk to unsuspecting patients. [8]
1.4.1.2 Past Posting -
Past posting occurs when potentially insurable losses occur
and there is no coverage on hand, although coverage is possible
to obtain. The loss victims wait to report their losses until
the necessary insurance is purchased. Claims are filed after the
insurance goes into effect.
In me Florida case a man claimed that his insured van
8. One clairrs managers suggested that while people are willing
to lie about the state of their property, they are unwilling
to lie alnut their physical health. In part, the issue is
mne of expertise. One needs a doctor to determine that one
is sick, while it requires little specialized kncmledge to
kn that a car f rame is dented. This particular claims
manager suggested, honever, that people are unwifling to lie
about their bodies because of strongly held beliefs that
mne's body is sacred.
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caught fire in April, 1980. Investigators checking into the
claim discovered fire department and towing service records
indicating that the fire had actually occurred in March, a day
befcre the insurance was purchased (case no. 70),.
A Massachusetts policyholder avoided purchasing collision
coverage for his vehicle until it was absolutely needed -i.e.
when he ran his car into a telephone pole causing extensive
damage. The car was towed to a local body shop. The insured
asked the body shop owner to postpone damage appraisal until he
returned the following day. He then used a seond set of plates
to reinsure and re-register his car with a different insurance
caUpany, this time with full collision coverage. When he
returned to the body shop the next day he replaced the old set of
license plates with the ones he used to re-register his car. An
appraisal dated a day after the accident (and, a day after the
new insurance was purchased) was assessed for the car with the
new license plates. (interview February, 1982.)
An interesting example of how one can exploit losses,
retroactively, comes fran Brooklyn, NY. A man reported that, as
a result of an autcrbile accident, his leg was broken in three
places. Personnel frm his insurance cnpany became suspicious
when they tr ied to get repayment (subrcgation) from the insurance
caipany covering the other vehicle involved in the accident.
Acxnrding to that conpany, the accident was a minor ferder-bender
and was unlikely to cause the injury claimed. After an
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investigation, the claimant's insurance cepany determined that
the man's leg was not broken in the accident, but was broken five
hexrs later when his conw-law wife threw him down a flight of
stairs. The man was indicted on several counts of larceny. ( ICPI
pts August/September 1979.)
1.4.1.3 Multiple Dipping- -
Multiple dipping occurs when claimants recover, more than
once, for a single loss. This can be accamplished by making the
same claim several times either at the time of loss (i.e. making
the same claim with a nunber of onpanies) or over several years.
Multiple dipping also covers those situations where policyholders
receive insurance cuxpensation for stolen property, later recover
the property and keep both the property and the settlement for
themselves. [91
The Florida Division of Insurance Fraud reported an
unsuccessful attempt at double dipping by a Tampa attorney who,
without the knowledge of his client, submitted physical damage
claims for the same accident to two different insurance
ccmpanies. The first oupany settled the claim. The second
cxmpany denied the claim after learning of the first payirent.
9. Technically, when you receive conpensation for total losses
(e.g. stolen property) the insurance ccmnpany takes title to
the property. Should it he recovered, it belcrqs to the
insurance crurpany who has the r ight to dispose of the
property as it sees fit. It is not clear, however, to what
extent insurance cmpanies will act to facilitate the
recovery of stolen property.
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The attorney pressed for payment on the second claim and was
subsequently arrested.
In a similar case reported by the Insurance Crime Prevention
Institute an insurance agent used a client's legitimate claim in
one year to defraud other insurance crmpanies in the following
years. Once a policyholder had a claim, the agent would switch
that person's policy to another carrier at time of policy
renewal. Subsequently, he would alter the data on medical bills
paid by last year's carrier and submit them to the new carrier.
The settlemrt checks were sent directly to the agent who forged
the policyholders signatures to cash them.
1.4.2 INVENTING SiWIES OF ISS
Fraud offenders invent stories of losses which never
actually happen to claimants and their properties. Sametimes
stories of insurable losses are invented to cover-up same other
activity, for example, when policyholders sell their jewelry and
claim it was stolen. Stories are invented in two ways: (1)
Losses are "set-up." Policyholders purchase props, e.g. already
damaged vehicles, to create loss scenes. (2) Losses are
fictitious, constrwcted only on paper. Sane times the r isk
covered by the insurance policy exists and cnly the stories of
loss are invented. Other times, both the r isk and the loss are
paper costructions.
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1.4.2.1 Setting-up Losses- -
Policyholders manufacture losses by setting the stage and
acting out dramatic plays. The losses never happen, they just
appear to happen. Three men frcn North Carolina were convicted
on insurance fraud charges for setting up accidents. A wrecked
autMobile was passed between the three men. Each man used the
already damaged vehicle to set up accident scenes and file
accident claims. The auto was pushed, pulled, or driven to
"acident" sites. A tow truck was called imediately and the car
was towed to a nearby garage (thus, establishing the place and
time of the accident.) The police were never called to
investigate [10]. The insurance canpany paid the claim, but no
repairs were ever made. The car was passed on to the next man
and the scheme repeated. ( ICPI Report July/August 1980.)
People will often go to great lengths to insure that their
"make-believe" losses appear real. In one case reported by the
Insurance Crime Prevention Institute a man was paid $200 for
punching, bruising and marking up actors staging auto accidents.
Actually, faking injuries is one of the oldest insurance scans on
the taks. A 12 member gang involved in generating fraudulent
insurance claims was arrested in 1932 for staging automobile
accidents.
10. This is rot unusual in these types of claims. Generally,
you would be required to go to the police department to fill
out an accident report. If the report merely indicates that
you drove your car into a tree, there would be little
investigation.
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"Such a little thing as breaking a leg or arm did not
stop them, It was general practice to scrape of f the
skin with sandpaper, to inflict bruises with clubs and
to inject drugs to produce uncasciousness." ( Weekly
Underwriter 1932; see also Mane, 1944.)
Due to medical advances many of these methods would be subject to
easy detection today. However, as one can see, the approach has
changed little.
Losses can be "set up" simply by producing damaged property.
An investigation, code name "Detroit Phase One," directed by the
Organized Crime Unit of Suffolk County, Massachusetts resulted in
139 indictments on insurance related charges. Seven Corvettes
were repeatedly used, scmetimes as often as ten times, to file
twenty-seven false claims. Fraud offenders substituted damaged
and repaired parts depending on whether insurance personnel were
examining the wreck or the repair. [] The scheme went as
follows:
"One of the principles obtained insurance coverage for
the 1975 Corvette and usually within a mnith and
sumetimes on the same day reported an accident.
The insurance company assigned an appraiser to inspect
the car. He routinely photographed the damage and
returned at a later date to verify that the work had
been done. The insurance capany then paid the claim
which averaged $4300 per 'accident.'
Aanording to invesi'.gators, after the first claim had
been paid, coverage would be obtained frcm another
insurance carpany and another accident claim would be
made. Dumaged parts used in the first claim would be
put back on the car ."
(Boston Globe 10/25/80)
11. A Corvette was used because its fiberglass body and parts
can be easily installed or remrved.
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In a separate Massachusetts case a policyholder collected
for the same auto damage in four separate accident insurance
claims, only the first of which was real. A cxmpany adjuster and
independent appraiser were also indicted in this case for
accepting bribes to settle damages (interview July, 1981).
1.4.2.2 Paper Constructions- -
These manufactured losses appear on paper only. No loss
scene exists to investigate, only paper documentation that the
risk existed and the loss ocurred. Frequently, paper loss
schemes involve theft losses. Theft leaves no evidence for a
loss adjuster or appraiser to inspect. The property is
legitimately missing.
A defendant in a Florida insurance fraud case told his wife
that her car had been stolen. He reported the theft to the
police. She reported the theft to the insurance cOmpany. As
required, she submitted the car title to her insurer. Later, she
claims, her husband told her that the car wasn't really stolen
but had been in an accident and was now in storage. In fact, the
investigation revealed, her husband had sold the car. The schene
fell apart when the man to whan he sold the car ccmplained to the
State Attorney because he couldn't get the title frca the
defendant. Because the loss claimed by the insured never really
happened, this schene differs fran attengts to exploit losses by
distorting loss details (case n. 16).
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Paper car schemes are fairly coman because the insurei
property is rarely, if ever, inspected before the policy is
issued, and the property identity or biography can be easily
manufactured through phony titling. Paper car schemers purchase
titles of vehicles virtually destroyed in previous losses
(salvage) and acquire the necessary documentation to put the cars
"bazk on the road." Theft insurance for the imaginary cars is
obtained and son thereafter theft reports are filed. Since the
cars never existed, they are never recovered. The Massachusetts'
Governor's Task Force on Auto Theft noted that
"In a sample taken fran the files of one insurance
cmpany, of 400 new policyholders who purchased
autamobile theft coverage, an investigation revealed
that 15 percent of the automobiles did not exist and
were insured solely for the purposes of defrauding the
ccupany." (Massachusetts' Governor's Task Force on Auto
Theft, l980;xxiv.)
Sane fraud investigators believe changes in state title laws have
made it more difficult to build paper cars, others believe that
the practice continues, although they expect in sane new form.
As physical and social distance widens and society becnmes
ever more dependent on paper documents for proof of existence, we
might expect to see fraudulent claims of this sort ircrease.
r
Cargo ship scuttling, a popular marine insurance fraud, is a case
in point. Cargo frauds were nore cwmberscie in previous decades
when the fraudulent scheme depended on the substitution of equal
icight boxes for actual cargo in order to make shipping manifests
look cor rect.
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"Nowadays with vastly more streamlined documentation
procedures, an unscrupulous shipper may not have to
produce a cargo at all. As long as the documents are
in order to say that a cargo was loaded. . . and.
. insured, the shipper has a valid claim if the vessel
goes down. It is extremely difficult to prove him
wrong." ( Far Eastern Economic Review February 6,
1981; 35.)
Another form of paper loss, the paper accident involves cars
that may or may not exist but accidents which never happen.
Because there are no loss scenes to investigate, paper accidents
often require inside involvement by loss adjusters who can fill
out the necessary accident reports and loss evaluations.
According to a Postal Inspector investigating a Texas accident
fraud operation, the inclusion of a loss adjuster into the fraud
ring changed the operating scheme from one in which accidents
were staged to "paper accidents" which could be reported without
going through the notion of setting up loss scenes. ( ICPI
Reprrts May 1972.)
Insurance personnel invent loss stories as well. Acording
to Florida's Division of Insurance Fraud, a former claims
representative was arrested for using his position to allegedly
manufacture and then pay fabricated "slip and fall" claims. The
clams representative created dwmmy claim files on non-exi stent
claims and authorized payment to a waiting acawlice. (Florida
Division of Insurance Fraud "Insurance Fraud Report", 80-3.)
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1. 4.3 PYSICMLY CRETING LOSS
Fraud offenders create losses that would not have occurred
without the intervention of policyholders and their agents.
Although there have been instances where sgxises have been
murdered for life insurance benef its and workers have dismebred
theselves for disability and workers' compnsation benefits, the
majority of created losses reviewed in this study were associated
with property and auto claims.
1.4.3.1 Creating Losses Directly- -
Fraud offenders manufacture insurable losses directly by
causing the losses themselves or by paying someone else to create
the loss for them. The most visible of the created losses are
arson losses. Buildings, vehicles and boats have all been burned
with the intent to defraud insurers. Motive for these fraud
fires vary. Saie fraud offenders are simple businessmen
purchasing rundown property, insuring it for more than it is
worth and burning it down. Others see fire as a way to get out
of bad financial situations, shrinking inventories, bad debts,
etc. Policyholders may set the fires or they may pay a
midleman, a "torch," to set the fire for them.
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Arson is a fact of life in virtually every major
metropolitan area in the country. In one of the most successful
arson prosecutions in Massachusetts, thirty-three persons were
indicted in Suffolk County for their participation in a large
arson-for-profit coxspiracy involving over twenty properties.
Real estate brokers, lawyers, insurance personnel and even a
menber of the local arson squad were indicted and convicted.
Although the details for each of the fires covered by the
indictments differed, the general approach was the same.
Properties were purchased for ninal consideration and traded
between friends, each time the property value increasing,
although there were no substantive changes to the property.
Insurance was purchased for the inflated amunt and eventually
the building burned. Sametimes the owners were merely "straws"
or fronts for the real owners. Straws would own the properties
and the insurance would be carried in their name. The true owner
would be listed on the insurance policy as holding the mortgage.
Should insurance investigators implicate the owner in the arson,
the mortgagee's right to recover would be protected. [121
12. Under the mortgagee clause of insurance policies, the
interest of the mortgagee is protected. Even when the
property owner is determined to have contributed to the
loss, the ncrtgagee still retains the right to recover the
amouint of the nortgage. In the Suffolk County arson
conspiracy it appears that banks used that autamatic
protection to their advantage. Although the connection was
never made in wourt, investigators on the case as well as ajournalist suspect that at least one bank foreclosed
properties ax] sold tlnu to knownm arsonists who eventually
burned them down. (Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor' s Task
Force on Arson, 1980.)
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Middlemen, in particular persons who profit fram repairing
loss damage, can create losses as well. Mel Weinberg, the prime
figure in the ABSCAM sting operation, started his early con
career (c. 1950) with a profitable insurance scam. Weinberg
used a slingshot to break the windshields of cars he knew were
insured through his friend, an insurance agent. The victims of
Weinberg's slingshot reported their losses to their agent who
would reccmnend repair at Weinberg's father's plate glass
business. (Greene, 1981.) Many insurance policies won't cover
that kind of damage anymore, hoever, glass repairers continue
this scheme in order to attract custcmers. The New York Times
(January 23,1982) reported that a plate glass repair businessman
was arrested after trying to generate new business by breaking
the windows of all his neighbors' cars.
Injuries may also be created to cover up for other created
losses. Again, frcm the files of the Insurance Crime Prevention
Institute we learn of a case in which a New York man, indicted on
charges of arson and mail fraud, caused injury to himself in an
attsrjt to cover his participation in an arson-for-profit scheme.
Acarding to the ICPI,
"Fearing difficulty in having his claim for the fire.
.approved, he and a crumanicn went to Wheatfield
where, the indictment charges, that E- had the
cximpanicn shoot him in the arm. He hoped in this way
to convirxe the insurance crmpanies involved that he
had enemies out to get him." ( ICPI Reports June,
1980; 8.)
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1.4.3.2 Creating Losses Indirectly- -
When fraud offenders create losses indirectly they cause
innocent third parties to manufacture an insurable loss that
would not have occurred without the offender's intervention. A
classic example of this fraud scenario is the contrived motor
vehicle accident. Officers of the California Highway Patrol are
teaching their fellow officers about the operation of what they
call the "set-down." The "set-down" scheme operates when an
unsuspecting mtorist, Jane, is driving down the highway and
suddenly a car pulls into her lane and reduces speed. Jane finds
herself following closely when another car, the "excuse car,"
pulls alongside, usually in the adjacent left lane of traffic.
[13] At a predetermined signal the "excuse car" swerves in front
of the other two and speeds away. The driver of the first car
slams on his brakes causing Jane to "rear-end" his car.
Everybody agrees to what has happened. Jane admits the accident
is her "fault." The ccupants of the wrecked car complain of sore
backs and necks and file insurance claims with Jane's campany.
Usually this type of created loss is well organized into what an
Officer of the Highway Patrol called a "pecking order of
payoffs." At the brttan are the accident participants who are
paid a flat fee for their particiaption. "Cappers," the
recruiters, line up drivers aind passengers aid supply the cars.
At the top are medical people who allegedly treat the victims aid
13. It is call ed an "excuse car" because it gives the driver of
the first car an excuse for suddenly using his brakes. It
pills away quickly before anyone can identify it.
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the attorneys who file clains on their behalves. (Los Angeles
Times. August 7, 1980) .
Included in the list of indirect losses are those which are
caused with the knowledge, if not active participation, of the
fraud offenders. When policyholders leave cars in front of
junkyards known to strip parts and later report the cars stolen
they indirectly cause the loss. (Buck, 1978.) A typical
"insurance give-up" or "steam" operation was uncovered in August,
1979 when a Braintree, Massachusetts salvage yard owner and
dozens of "otherwise honest" policyholders were arraigned on
charges of receiving stolen property and concealing motor
vehicles to defraud insurance ampanies. According to
investigators involved in the case,
". .. there were car owners who paid $200 to a
middleman to 'steal' their cars and to owners of
autcmotive shops which purchased the parts of the
'stolen' cars. The owners of these cars woYuld then
file stolen car reports and file claims to collect the
insurance." ( Boston Globe August 28, 1979;19.)
1.5 ?AC1MS DNFLLJ!CING THE INCIDENCE OFFRAUDULENP ACrIVITY
While it is nearly imqssible to &ornent the relative
frequency of the various types of deceptive claims activity, ane
can suggest dif ferent factors which might Influence the incidence
of ane type of insurance fraud over another [14]. These include:
relative moral threshold for deception, degree of planning
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required and culpability for fraudulent behavior. Each factor is
descrite below.
1.5.1 CRAL M HRESJVLD
Fraud offenders' amnmitents to particular forms of
deception may depend on their own thresholds of "aceptable"
dishnesty. Survey literature suggests that the specific nature
of deception makes a difference to individuals senses of
propriety. A recent survey in PEyhcology Tody revealed that
while 44% of the respxndents claimed they would drive away after
scratching a car without telling the owmer, mly 26% said they
would keep ten dollars extra change at a local supermarket.
(Hassett, 1981). In a study of bribery Michael Reisman developed
a conceptualization of zones of acxeptable bribery. He defines a
bribal zoe not as a "zone of alegality or amorality but cf
14. Although type refers to the process of deception involved
and oes not refer to policies or physical substances, we
note that different physical and econaic environments
provide different objects used to cmpose fraudulent claims.
Thus, we might expect to see variations in type of physical
loss correlated with sume aspect of the environment.
Decaying inner city properties may be more prone to
arson-for-profit, for example, than suburban hanes. On the
other hand, one might expect to see more burglary claims in
suburban areas than in central cities.
Insurance availability will also influence the type of
loss used to defraud insurers. Obvriously cue wculdn't make
a ~ixmoy burglary claim if one didn't have the appropriate
theft insurance plicy. Individuals who do not awn prcperty
have little chance of making a fraudulent fire claim.
Because of its nearly universal availability, the incidence
of frauds against auto plicies may be higher in absolute
terns than the incidence of frauds against sume other acre
selective form of insurance. A weighted treasure of
incidence per policies in force would be required.
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different legality and morality." (Reisman (1979;136) In the
insurance context we might expect that physically creating
injuries carries a different moral weight than amitting details
on a claim form. Although many individuals may find the latter
acceptable, only a handful would be expected to condone
dismemiberment for insurance profit or creating losses that could
harm innocent third parties.
Moral threshold may be influenced by insurance ampany
structure and character as well as by insurance activities.
Smigel and Ross (1976) and Vaughn (1980) note that large
bureaucracies -e.g. insurance campanies- are likely targets
for certain types of crime simply because of their organizational
reputations and characters. Smigel (1976) surveyed attitudes
toward stealing fron small and large businesses and fron
goverrment. Most respondents, according to Smigel, preferred to
steal from large businesses rather than smaller ones because
large businesses were "imperscnal, powerful and ruthless."
(Smigel, 1976; 22) [151.
The lack of face to face ontact in insurance process may
lower the threshold for deception as well. Insurance business is
often transacted over the phone or through the mail, and often
involves a ntunber of different organizational actors. Since
15. Even when the insurance axnpany is a relatively small ane,
policyholders may perceive of the insurance campany as if it
were a larger buisiness. 'lhere may be a tendency to think of
the insurance industry as a whole, rather than on a cnmpany
by ampany basis.
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fraud offenders need not relate to specific targets/victims, it
may be easier, morally, to engage in deceit.
Vaughn (1980) notes that the collective definition of
organizations as exploitative often makes them susceptible to
crimes. The perceived wealth of the insurance organization, for
example, may ease any moral doubts about filing fraudulent
claims. Not only might offenders believe that insurance campany
profits make cnmpanies legitimate targets, but that policyholders
have contributed directly to those profits with virtually no
benefits to themselves. These policyholders may seize a chance
to "cash in." Consider the following letter sent to Ann Landers.
"I am a high sdhol freshman who rides to school on the
bus. A few months ago my bus was rarmed in the back by
a truck. Luckily robxdy was injured.
When my mother heard about the incident, she made me
pretend that my back was hurt so we can collect mey
from the insurance axmpany.
I don't feel very good about it because I know that
what we are doing is dishonest. When I mention my
feelings to my mother she tells me to shut my dumb
moutih-that the insurance crmpanies have plenty of
mxey and anyone who doesnt get what they can out of
them is a fool. ..
Thus, some fraud offenders may justify their fraudulent
behavior as legitimate considering the circumstances (see Sykes
and Matza, 1957 on justifications use] by delinquent boys to
explain their deviant behavior) . Policyholders may take a "sour
grapes" stance as justification for their increased used of
deception. Believing they were "burned" on their first claim
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(i.e. they have not received what they felt they deserved), they
are deceptive on their second. Scnetimes the deception is merely
an attemp to break even. Other claimants may deny that they are
engaged in illegal behavior because they do not believe that any
injuries have been inflicted. Still other fraud offenders may
simply justify their actions because "everybody does it."
Finally, increased use of deception may accmpany the realization
that there are few sanctions placed on deceptive behavior.
1.5.2 DEGREE CF PIARNING REUJIRED)
The three fraud types require different degrees of planning
and access to people/events needed to construct fraudulent
claims. Policyholders who exploit losses do so without the
benefit of preplanning since losses are chance events. The loss
curs irrespective of fraud. Even when fraud offenders exploit
losses of unsuspecting policyholders with well-designed and
thought out fraud schemes (see, for example, the Chicago Sun
Times example cited above), they must rely on chance events of
policyholders to carry them out.
Opportunities to exploit losses are typically generated fron
the claiming prcess when interested parties coach claimants on
appropriate maniplation strategies [16]. Antulance chasers find
accident victims and entice tham to engage the services of
16. The claiming process includes all procsses leading up and
ircludirq the filing of a false claim. Thus, included in
the claiming procss are loss docnmentation systans outside
insurance control.
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particular lawyers who then coach these victims in their pursuit
of insurance dollars. Police officers may act as insurance fraud
brokers as well. Consider the following exchange related by one
insurance claimant. The police were responding to a complaint
that a pocketbook had been stolen fran a car left unattended for
less than two minutes outside the victim's hame. Without the
advice of the police officer this loss would have been ineligible
for insurance ccmpensation.
Officer: Was the door locked?
Victim: Well, no.
Officer: Do you own this house? [Tries to establish the possibility
of hneowners insurance.]
Victim: Yes
Officer: Then, the door was locked. [Otherwise, not covered.]
Victim: Are you asking me or telling me?
Officer: Telling you. How rruch money was in the purse?
Victim: $100
Friend: We have a $100 deductible.
Officer: How much money was in the purse? (raised eyebrows)
Victim: $200
Officer: Okay (Interview December, 1980.)
Since the questions claims processors ask may, unintentionally,
provide clues on how to work the deception, offenders may learn
how to deceive as they make their way through the claims process
[17].
Created losses and invented stories, on the other hand,
17. Lipsky (1981; 61-65) rotes that street-level bureaucrats
are able to convey information about hov to work the systei
to their clients. Although Lipsky argues that selective
client coachirq is a source of a street-level worker's power
or cxntrol over potential clients, in the insurance context
client learning may actually work to uzdennine the systen of
street-level control. This would appear to be par ticularly
true then the client is wore powerful than the street-level
worker.
require substantial planning if they are to be successful.
Unlike exploited losses where policyholders seize opportunities
which emerge after losses, offenders who employ the other two
eses actually manufacture the losses or appearances of losses.
Insurance and loss details are worked out well in advance of the
claims.
Interviews with claims personnel suggest that despite the
relatively high visibility of created losses, in particular
arsons, a greater prcportion of frauds involve individuals who
take advantage of loss situations. These "otherwise honest"
offenders "drift" into and quickly out of this particular form of
rule breaking behavior.
1.5.3 RElATIVE CULPABILITY FCR FRAUDULEN'T BEHAVIOR
Fraud incidence may be influenced by the risk of fraud
detection (see Chapter 5 for a more extensive discussion of
discovery) . Since frauds are, among other things, econanic
transactions, fraud offenders may assess the osts of pursuing
different forms of fraudulent behavior. Their calculations will
most certainly include the likelihood and consequences of getting
caught.
Although the likelihood of being caught when exploiting
losses may be higher than when inventing stories or creating
losses, the consequences of being caught may be so much less as
to make it a better risk overall. It appears that fraud
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offenders who exploit losses are less culpable for their of fences
than those who pursue other fraud types.
Limited culpability is asscciated with: (1) carpany
preferences for recognizing fraud and sanctioning such activities
as well as (2) offenders abilities to neutralize their fraudulent
behavior. Insurance ccmpany preferences for fraud enforcement
appear to depend on the nature of the claim and the claim
evaluator's ability to separate the intent to defraud from
conventional claiming behavior. Exploited losses, for example,
typically involve relatively small dollar aimunts and are hard to
distinguish fran "expected" claim inflation. Given small dollar
aints, insurance personnel may prefer to avoid expensive
sanctioning devices and choose to limit their claim liability
through less expensive negotiation. If, as suggested earlier,
opportunities for exploiting losses are often generated directly
by insurance claims activities, coipanies may decline to enforce
the rules against fraud if such enforcement directly or
indirectly implicates the insurance organization as well as the
offender. Public police often prefer not to get involved at all.
In making these choices social control agents inplicitly deny the
seriousness of the offences. (See Chapter Six for more on
sanctioning.)
Individual culpability can also be limited when offenders
neutralize control by justifying their fraudulent activity as
innoent mistakes. Because the losses actually tcck place, f raud
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offenders who exploit losses can deny any intended wrongdoing and
walk away fran questionable claim items without caprmising the
entire claim. This form of neutralization technique is far
harder when offenders pursue the other two fraud types since many
more claim and insurance details are constructed deliberately.
1.6 AVITIOALL @ESTICS
Up until this point the analysis has focused on factors
which might help acaount for individual decisions to manipulate
loss events and reports in order to claim insurance benefits that
would not be forthcoming without the deception. I have suggested
conditions which might facilitate fraud by making deceptions
easier, both technically and morally. I have not focused on what
notivates individuals to cmmnit fraud in the first place. To do
so requires research into offender characteristics which was not
part of the original research design. The remainder of the
thesis examines more specifically the influence of the insurance
organization on fraudulent behavior and fraud enforcement.
Chapter Two, "Trading the Insurance Cacdity" examines the
relationship between the insurance business and fraudulent
behavior. Tb what extent does the "business of risk" open up
possibilities for individual deviation and fraud? I argue that
opportunities for fraudulent behavior can be found in the
ambiguity of the insurance product. Policyholders take advantage
of that ambiguity to shape perceptions of their need. Techniques
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of risk spreading and transfer diffuse fraud effects and often
minimize interests in the disposition of individual claims.
Possibilities for deception increase when cocerns for attracting
insurance business supercede tight aontrol over the insurance
process.
The relationship between the claims process and
opprtunities for fraudulent behavior is explored in greater
detail in Chapter Three, "Claims Making." Since claims service
takes shape only after a loss, fraud offenders can shape loss
circumstances and reports to their advantages. While insurers
can predict that one building out of a hundred will burn, they
cannot predict, with any degree of certainty, that a particular
building will burn, nor what shape the associated loss will take.
Uncertainties about what should be renders individual deviations
hard to recognize. Efforts to cntrol the uncertainties of
claims process through routinization open up possibilities for
client learning. Claimants find out what is required to
construct a legitimate claim and use that information to
construct a deceptive one. Lack of insurer oversight also opens
up avenues for abuse. Finally, the practice of negotiating claim
value sets an adversarial tone to claim processing which may
provide moral opportunities for fraud.
Chapter Fair , "Spinning Webs of Deceit" examines exactly how
the cpportunities for fraud are realized. The precise methods or
techniques used to manipulate loss circumstances ard3 reports as
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well as the organization of fraudulent activities are described.
This ciapter considers how the processes of deception affect the
structures of fraud control. I argue that the social
organization of deception and the ambiguity in fraud method
(deception or mistake?) limits cxtrol.
Chapters Five, Six and Seven consider camponents of
discretionary rule enforcement. Issues of discovery,
investigation and sanctioning are treated separately.
Fraud Discovery is analyzed in terms of structural
opportunities to detect false claims. Two questions inform the
analysis in Chapter Five, "Discovering Deceit." To what extent do
insurance actors and organizations influence opportunities to
discover fraud? How might deceptive activity limit systems
designed for fraud detection? I argue that the structural
vantage points of claims processors and other potential discovery
agents limits the types of fraud that can be discovered within
the insurance amtext. Technical constraints, lack of certainty
with respect to claimants' intent and offenders' abilities to
neutralize discovery mechanisms limit fraud exposure as well.
Chapter Six, "Unravelling Deception," examines the
investigatory strategies used to pall apart deceptive claims.
The three categories of action used to defraud
insurers-exploiting losses, inventing stories an] creating
losses- raise different questions that need to be addressed in
fraud investigations. 'The strategies used to address these
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question are described in detail and empirical examples are given
for each. By describing existing strategies, defining their
scope and requirements for success I indicate same of their
limits in investigating certain types of fraud.
Chapter Seven, "Dealing with the Deceivers," examines
sanctioning options available to social cxntrol agents and the
extent to which the insurance context and the nature of
fraudulent transactions influence those options. Like much
white-collar crime, enforceient in the insurance context is not
limited to a simple yes/no decision. A number of enforcement
reactions are possible. False claims can be ignored, mitigated
through claims adjustment, denied, or criminally prosecuted. I
suggest conditions under which each enforcement option might be
applied.
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CHAPTER 2
TRADING THE INSURANCE ()MODITY
Insurance frauds, as well as other business-related crimes,
take place within the antext of ongoing, business transactions.
Conventional insurance organizations and agencies provide the
vehicles through which these frauds occur. Because insurance
fraud offenders use insurance transactions to oanmit their
offences, questions are raised about the relationship between
insurance activity and fraudulent behavior. To what extent do
the structures of insurance activity influence claimants'
abilities and incentives to engage in fraud?
The business of insurance is grounded in perceptions of
risk, protection and service. The perception of risk, for
example, is as important to the functioning of the insurance
comwdity as any objective critieria of risk. Policyholders
purchase theft insurance when they perceive that they are in scme
danger of being robbed. Since .oodity sales depend, in part,
in perceptions, rather than objective needs and events, there is
ron to manipulate what is being bought and sold-security,
investment, imnification, or protection in the event of sae
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defined contingency. While the insurance industry can shape risk
perceptions and manipulate the meaning of the services they
provide, the persistence of fraud suggests that policyholders
can also shape perceptions of thei need. Loss events and
reports can be manipulated so that it appears as if a claimant
has been subject to a named contingency ccmpensable under an
existing insurance antract when, in fact, no such cupensable
loss occurred.
This chapter examines the insurance product and suggests
reasons why "the business of risk" generates or facilitates
opportunities for pramting false images of loss. A brief
description of property-casualty insurance products and markets
is followed by a discussion of each of the following insurance
operations: selling the product, assuming risk (including
ccrmpanies' efforts to pass along the risks they assume),
spreading the risk and investing premiums. The following chapter
examines the claims process and highlights aspects of the service
delivery context which provide opportunities for fraudulent
behavior.
2.1 THE MARKETPLACE
Insurance is a technique for reducing uncertainty.
Individuals reduce uncertainty by transferring sane risk to
others. Those who assuwe risk reduce their uncertainties by
pooling r isks together. Risk pooling increases the
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predictability of antingencies.
Insurance scholars have developed two alternative models of
the insurance function. The traditional model of insurance is
that of trustee. Insurance is a fund accumulated to meet
uncertain losses (Bickeihaupt, 1980 and Mehr and Cummack, 1980
for exanple). Insurance exists as a business because of the
economies of scale inherent in reserve accumulation (Marshall,
1974). [1]
Another model of insurance function considers insurance as a
system of brokerage or a trade in contingent claims (Ginsberg and
Kunreuther, 1980; Marshall, 1974; Arrow, 1973; Zeckhauser,
1973 and Kihstrcm and Pauly, 1971). The second approach stresses
the reciprocity and mutuality of insurance contracts and, I
believe, more accurately describes the property-casualty
insurance industry today. Insurance companies assume individual
risks, pool them together and then spread the risk to others
through a system of reinsurance. Insurance cxmpanies are third
party mediators who trade in contingent claims.
Uncertainty about or discrepancies between what is being
lxqht and sold-protection or investment-might influence
behavior. Consumers may perceive of insurance as a form of
1. Insurance regulation is predicated on this model. Regulators
are concerned with assuring that caipanies have funds
sufficient to cover losses. Insurance regulation is
aoncerned, first and foremost, with insurance campany
insolvency and its adverse effects on insurance consuers
(Patterson, 1927, and Pfeffer and Klock, 1974) .
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protection or as an "investment" fran which the purchaser can
expect sme desired return [2]. Claim personnel may recognize
insurance sinply as a means of indemnification, i.e. a means to
restore the claimant to his or her financial position iniediately
before the loss ccurred. Thus, while claim personnel may
recognize their role as providing campensation equal to the value
of a property at the time of loss, claimants often believe that
insurance should provide caxpensation sufficient to replace the
property. Conflict over insurance goals may set up an
adversarial relationship, and, in sane cases incentives for
fraud. Believing they have been defrauded by their insurance
ccupanies in the first place (not receiving what they thought was
purchased), "otherwise honest" claimants may see no moral wrong
in rule breaking on their parts. Interestingly, insurance
cnpanies may set up that ccnflict by the kind of advertising it
uses to encourage individuals to purchase their product.
2.1.1 THE TISURANCE CUEEITY
The insurance commoity is a contract (policy) that
establishes the insurance relationship.
"In crtrast to [tangible goods] whose qualities can be
seen and felt, the only external manifestation of
insurance is a contract, having no intr insic value..
2. As Tobias (1982) notes that asswmpticn may be radically
inrorrect. Insurance is an extremely low yield investment
strategy. He notes for exanple that for every dollar we
collectively deposit in a savings bank, we withdraw $1.05.
For every dollar we deposit in auto insurance we withdraw
$0.62 and for every dollar we deposit in fire insurance we
withdraw $0.54. (p. 72)
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." (Federal Insurance Atninistration 1974; 50)
In exchange for a premium, individuals agree to participate in a
risk pool. Those who assume the risk agree to indemnify
individual policyholders should they be subject to the named
contingency. Indemnification assures sufficient ccmensation to
restore individuals to their previous financial statuses. True
to the principles of indemnification, no individual should profit
fran a loss [3].
The insurance relationship, a contractural agreement between
policyholder and insurance carrier, is based in trust.
Individuals trust that by purchasing insurance their assets are
protected. Those assuming risk trust that the risks they assume
are, in fact, objective risks-independent contingencies [4].
"The parties to an insurance contract agree that when
the actions of nature bewme known those most favorably
affected will transfer resources to those who turn out
to be less fortunate. If the contract is to provide
protection in this way, it is essential that there be
(at least substantial) independence in the actions
nature takes with respect to different insured
individuals." (Kihlstrom and Pauly, 1971)
3. Replacement cost insurance has been introduced as a new
twist, but has only slightly modified the general principle
of indsnity. Replacement cost insurance allows recovery
equal to the anmunt it would take to replace the property
losses. Traditionally, insurance policies provide for the
recovery of actual cash value-replacement cost minus
depreciation. Replacement aost insurance, thus, provides
ernugh campensation to actually replace the items.
Nevertheless, the principle of indemnity holds. No
individual should profit frcn a loss.
4. The theoretical basis for insurance, neo-classical ncodels of
utility and welfare assume the independence of events as well
as equality amang individuals making choices.
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The ontractural obligations between insurance ccmpanies
providing coverage and individuals at risk are set forth in the
insurance policy. Policy language tends to be standard among
crpanies and policy forms are often regulated by state insurance
caxnissioners. Sane policies ancVor provisions within policies
are, in fact, statutory (fire insurance policies, for example).
Other policies cntain standard provisions to which canpanies
voluntarily comply. Riders, endorsements, limitations and
restrictions amend standard clauses for a given policy contract.
Several states have adopted so-called "easy-read" policies
designed as "plain English versions of coplicated insurance
&numents [5]. In an effort to make the cntractural language of
insurance policies more understandable to lay consumers policy
language has become more broadly and often ambiguously defined.
Claim discrepencies are often treated as differences of opinion
rather than as breaches in contract since there are wide ranges
in interpretation. Broadly defined policy language, thus,
affords to those who wish to deceive sufficient roam to
manipulate the system without jeopardizing their positions as
claimants (interview no. 6) or, in fact, claim servicers. (See
Windt, 1982 for a discussion of the legal basis of settling
ambiguities in insurance contracts.)
5. Cmnsmr Repr_ t otes that all but eight states have
deveIpe easy read policies for kameowners insurance.
(Constumer Reot August, 1980).
The number of perils subject to risk pooling has grown
imensely since the first insurance contracts were written to
cover maritime risks in fourteenth century Italy (Holdsworth,
1917). Industrialization saw the extension of insurance coverage
for such things as fire-late 1700s, accidental injur--1845,
travel-1869, theft-1885, and even untimely death (Carr,
1967;6).
The twentieth century has been one of great product
diversification and expansion of the insurance poplation.
Casualty insurance associated with the new forms of
transportation, particularly the auto, was introduced. Although
teorrarily thwarted by the Depression, the non-life insurance
market gathered mientum during the Second World War and
continued through the sixties. The twentieth century also saw
the rise of scial insurance systems, and through campulsory
insurance statutes, (e.g. auto liability and workers'
cnnpensation) the expansion of the insurance net to capture a
broad spectrum of individuals (Post, 1976). Tbday, insurance can
cover just about anything-novies, investments, defective
products, inventions, hazardous waste facilities-anything that
is perceived to be risky.
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2.1.2 CVERAGES ETENDED
This research focuses soley on property and casualty
insurance. Property coverages are extended for damage or
destruction of property due to specified perils, i.e. theft,
fire, windstorm, vandalism, etc. Casualty (also known as
liability) insurance covers policyholders' exposures (primarily
in the form of civil suits) in the event that they cause damage
to the properties or persons of others. Particular policies
which include more than one type of coverage are referred to as
nulti-per il policies.
TABLE 2-1 TYPES CF CDVERAGES EXTEEND
PKPERIY CWVERAS CASUALTY CDWERS
Auto-physical damage Auto-Bodily Injury
HCnmners Worker's Ccpensation
Fire and Allied Lines Auto-Property Damage Liability
Cauiercial Multi-peril Misc. Bodily Injury
Inland Marine Misc. Property Damage
Ocean Marine Fidelity and Surety
Burglary and Theft
Extended Coverage
Boiler and Machinery
Glass
Aircraft
The distinction between property and casualty coverage also
reflects a loss claimant's position vis-a-vis a particular
insurance contract. In the case of property losses, individuals
make claims against their own insurance policies. Because
policyholders are first parties to the insurance contract,
policyholders' claims for damages to their properties are first
party claiks. In the case of casualty losses, claimants are not
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policyholders, but rather, sate third parties who, through the
actions of the policyholders, suffer losses. Casualty claims are
third party claims. Thus, claimants may be clients (i.e.
policyholders) who must be served, or they may be third parties
wha aopanies serve on behalf of their policyholder/clients [6].
Insurance products are also differentiated by whether they
cover personal risks (i.e. your hae, your car, your health) or
ocmercial risks (your business). Although a single copany may
write both personal and ccomnercial business, sme cxmpanies are
stronger in one than the other. Even within specific categories,
cxxpanies will specialize so that Carpany A will insure taverns
and Ccmpany B movie theatres.
2.1.3 INSURANCE CJMPANIES
Nearly three thousand individual cxpanies were responsible
for the 95.7 billion dollars of property-casualty premiums
written in 1980 (A.M. Best, Aggregates and Averages, 1981).
Four types of insurance cumpany capse the market and are
6. One might expect that claims service differs with respect to
whether claimants are also policyholders or not. We might
also expect that, if a tolerance for fraud exists, frauds
perpetrated by clients may be tolerated more often than
frauds by third parties. Unfortunately, the enpirical
research undertaken here can not address that question
directly. The data on frauds and fraud investigations
includies cases that have already been singled out as
potential frauds and thus wrthy of more intense
investigation. We must note, hcmever that Webb, et. al.
(1981;282) argue that fair play and decency legislatfli Fi
transformed adversarial practices with respect to third par ty
-atls into legal duties and, thus, discrimination against
third parties is less likely.
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licensed by state departments of insurance: stock campanies,
mutual crmpanies, reciprocal exchanges and syndicates or Lloyds
associations [7]. Stock cmpanies are traded on the major stock
exchanges and, as a result are able to attract external capital
funds. Underwriting surplus and profits are returned to the
stockholder owners. Mutual companies are owned and controlled by
their policyholders. Underwriting surplus and profits are,
theoretically, returned to the policyholder/owners at the end of
the year. However, in fact, ownership is so dispersed as to have
little real meaning [8]. Lloyds association are unincorporated
syndicates of individuals who accept portions of particular
risks. Brokers write the policies and sell shares to syndicate
members willing to assume specific risks. Lloyds of London is
7. Sane corporations have begun to assume their own insurance
costs through the formation of captives. Corporations with
larger potential losses buy or form their own insurance
caipanies (captives) to service their particular needs. Some
captives write only their parents' business, others have
becane full-fledged insurance cupanies in their own rights.
A majority of the captives are based outside the United
States, primarily in Bermuda, where tax and regulatory
envircnments work to the parents' advantages. As of April,
1979 over one thousand captives were operating. Insurance
executives have been slow to appreciate the force of these
new insurance organizations, acording to a study in
Institutional Investor (April, 1979) because they have
mistakenly believed tax maneuvers are corporate motives for
forming captives. In fact, this study claims, "the
motivation is a fundamental dissatisfaction with the
insurance market" (p. 100) . Self funding of risk through
self-insurance has grown f ran six percent of the cumercial
market in 1970 to twenty-two percent of that market in 1980
according to a study by Conning and Canpany. (he Weekly
Underwr iter. January 10, 1981)
8. Andrew Tobias rotes that out of the 18.4 million Prudential
policyholders eligible to vote only 323 did so and virtually
ali who did were Prudential employees (Tobias, 1982; 40) .
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the largest organization of this type. Reciprocal exchanges are
unincorprated, non-profit organizations formed to exchange
individual risks between organization members.
Stock cxxrpanies write the greatest share of the
property-casualty insurance business, aproximately seventy
percent, and copose the largest share of the market. (A.M.Best.
Aggregateand Averages. 1981). Entry into the insurance
marketplace depends on a cxpany's ability to meet capital and
surplus requirements outlined by state statute. States differ in
their requirements.
In adition to the numerous coverages available from
coapanies licensed directly by the state, unusual and/or large
coverages are offered by "non-admitted" insurers [9] willing to
write "surplus" business. Surplus business includes coverages
for unusual risks or risks with high loss potentials that no
licensed copany would accept. Surplus coverage can be a source
of secondary coverage (i.e. coverage above and beyond that which
would be available fran the standard market) as well.
Because data on surplus line caopanies are extremely
limited, coverages extended by these coipanies have been excluded
9. An admitted campany is licensed and author ized in a given
state. Ncrn-admitted cxrnpanies are of ten foreign aopanies
(US ccmpanies licensed in other states) or alien ccampanles
(cxmpanies incorporated in foreign countries) . Although
non-admitted insurers are not licensed by the state, and,
thus, not subject to state regulatians, the agents axd
brokers who produce (sell) the business are state licensed
and regulated.
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from the analysis. Nevertheless, as Massachusetts' Lt. Governor
O'Neill's Task Force on Arson suggests, low visibility and
freedn fran state regulation can thwart efforts at fraud
detection and control when insurance coverages are provided
through "non-admitted" cnupanies. For example, when surplus
lines provide secondary coverage for a property it may provide a
screen for the owner's mtive for arson.
"Naninal coverage f rom an admitted carrier on a
building with an incendiary fire may cause public
investigators to discount the owner's involvement;
however, additional coverage frcn a surplus carrier is
generally more difficult to identify and could be
hidden as a source of over insurance." (Lieutenant
Governor O'Neill's Task Force on Arson, 1980; II-B-21)
Task Force members believe that arsonists are now insuring
properties, ineligible for coverage in standard markets, through
surplus line carriers. Although surplus coverage is more
expensive, the return on investment to arsonists continues to be
substantial.
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'IBIE 2-2: PIUPElRTY-C1SUATY N& PREMIfeS WRI T I'EN *
(000,000)
1946 1950 1960 1970 1980
1,729 5,137 10,527 22,429 66,875
443 1,506 3,899 8,979 23,203
RECIPCAIS
LLOYDS
50 199
5 23
522 1,432 5,472
22 24 65
total 2,227 6,865 14,970 32,863 95,701
* Net premiums represent premiums retained by insurance
ocmpanies and does not include payments for reinsurance.
Source: (Best. AGGREGATE kiD AVERAGES. 1981, and as cited
by Pfeffer and Klock, (1974;232) for 1946-70)
Table 2-3: NIMBER CF CIMANIES OF ENCi TYPE **
STXCK
MUIUAL
1156
318
RECIPIOCAIS 61
LLOYDS 40
total 1575
** These figures represent insurance ccmpanles OR groups.
Insurance groups which -rpse a nimber of different ccmpanies
are iounted only once. A total of 2,953 individual campanies
cxxprise the property-csualty market.
Source: (Best. AGREGATES AND AVERAGES. 1981
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2.1.4 CEWPETI
Sirce insurance is a service industry, arpanies campete on
the price and quality of service they provide. The most
inportant cxrpetitive variable in terms of potential for fraud
and abuse is service performance. To perpetuate an image of
quality service insurance crmpanies may, in saime instances,
liberalize claim settlement processes and, inadvertently, open up
avenues for the manipulation of false loss images. However, to
understand the significance of the service variable one needs to
examine the relative effects of other cuipetitive variables.
Both price and non-price variables (e.g. risk selection, policy
packaging) affect the availability aid quality of insurance, and,
thus, opportunities and incentives for fraud.
2.1.4.1 Price -
The intensity of price ccapetition often depends on the
cyclical position of the insurance market at a given time and
other non-insurance factors (e.g. interest rates, or large
disasters). A period of heavy losses often leads to increases in
the price of premiums which, in turn, leads to underwriting
profits (premiums incmes exceed loss expenditures). Improved
profits, industry-wide, ultimately lead to price campetition as
new caipanies enter the market. Price aompetition sets the stage
for decline. (Hamaod, 1980; 163) [101.
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Currently, cmpetition in property-casualty insurance for
cxmmercial risks is keen. Price wars have ensued for the last
four years, according to a recent Business Week analysis
(November 8, 1982).
"The insurers are victims of their own spectacular
success in the late 1970s. The 1974-75 recession
produced a debacle in the business that so alarmed
state regulators they granted insurers big rate
increases to ensure their solvency. With this balloon
to help, insurers' profits soared when the econany
turned around. Earnings swelled further fran lucrative
investments as interest rates climbed. The record of
the past five years show that insurers averaged a
handsae 17% return on investment, vs. about 14% for
all industries.
Such gains have attracted a flock of new players,
same of thm formidable foreign cmpanies, which have
pushed their way into the market by cutting prices.
The cuts have prcmpted established insurers to trim
premiums in an effort to hang on to market share. In
sane insurance lines, rates have dropped as much as 35%
in the past two years."
Price cnnpetition is less important in the personal
property-casualty line as fewer campanies capete for the
business. The personal property-casualty market is far more
concentrated; a few large cmpanies write a substantial part of
the business. In addition, price cuts mean less to the personal
insurance consumer, according to State Farm president, Edward B.
Rust and, thus, may not be as significant a factor in insurance
choice.
10. Ne first half of the nineteenth century, for examrple has
been categorized by a pattern of cut-throat rate cutting,
large fires, insolvencies, asscciaticns of campanies and
then pr ice wars to get the cycle going again (Brearely,
1916, Gephart, 1917, Nelson, 1930, Bennett 1955, and
Stanford Research Institute, 1976) .
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"To ame of our [personal] auto custcmers who is paying
a $250 premium, there is nothing dramatic about someone
coming in with a policy priced at $230," he says,
pointing out that rate-cutting can produce savings
above $100,000 for camercial custaners" (Business Week
November 8, 1982;95) .
Custan, tradition and state regulation also have limited the
extent of price as a coapetitive factor in many cases (Pfeffer
and Klock, 1974),. State regulators who must approve rates set by
cmpanies, control the extent of orpetition in a given state.
For example, in Massachusetts a single pricing structure for
autcmbile insurance is in effect. As a result, ccmpanies do not
carpete on the basis of the prices they charge for automobile
policies. In other instances smaller coipanies which do not have
the loss experience necessary to calculate rates join together
into rating bureaus. Loss data is combined and appropriate rate
structures are calculated. To the extent that campanies rely on
these bureaus they may be less likely to cripete with other
armpanies using the same price determination mechanisms.
2.1.4.2 Risk Selection -
The insurance -xmpany tradition of using risk selection as a
means of obtaining profitable tusiness has reduced the inortance
of pr ice czmpetiticn in same sectors of the market. Selection
cnnpetition refers to the abilities of insurance cxmparnies to
affect their suxresses, not by the price and quality of their
products, but by selecting custcuers in a way that gives then an
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advantage over their rivals (FIA, 1974;18). For example, in the
1950s when the autamobile insurance market experienced tremendous
growth, new "direct writer" coipanies were able to ccmpete, in
part, because of their policies of risk selection. (See section
2.2 below for a discussion of "directwriter. ccmpanies which
sell insurance directly to the insurance consumer and, thus,
bypass the agency system.) Direct writer canpanies sought
specific custamer groups. For example, State Farm directed its
marketing to farmers and Allstate to blue collar workers (SRI,
1976;21).
2.1.4.3 Policy Packaging -
Non-price crmpetition, other than risk selection, focuses on
products and servies offered (Pfeffer and Klock, 1974).
Campanies campete in terms of the cambinations of coverages they
cabine in a single policy. Currently, insurance campanies are
selling "umbrella policies" which cobine heretofore separate
types of coverages or which provide new limits on traditional
coverages. Campanies also cupete in terms of the distribution
of their products. As we will see in the following section on
insurance sales, ccmpanies may employ any one of a number of
marketing approaches. Scine cmpanies rely art personal agents to
sell their prcoducts, while others sell their insurance policies
through the mail. Ccrpanies ccupete along the payment schedules
they require as well. Scare campanies insist on the total prenium
payment at the outset of the policy pericxd, other cnmpanies have
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set up installment plans for payments.
2.1.4.4 Service -
The nust important non-price crmretitive factor in terms of
ptential for fraud and abuse is service. Unlike price or
packaging, concrete and tangible measures, service performance is
often based in perceptions and reputation. Service carpetition
has centered on loss omrtrol-advising policyholders on loss
prevention strategies-and loss adjustment. The key factors in
claim service are "prcmptness, fairness and acceptability" of
loss adjustments (Pfeffer, 1974; 235).
In their efforts to prcmote a positive reputation in claim
service (prampt, fair, and acceptable loss adjustments).
cUmpanies may liberalize their claim settlement procedures. The
scanty literature on the history of loss adjustments (see for
example, Nelson, 1930 and Swift, 1975 and any one of a number of
company histories) suggests that during the late nineteenth
century business cxxpetition often led to liberal claim
settleirments. Liberal claim settlements were an effective tool
for assuring future business when faced with active cnTmpetiticn
Woodlad's (1979) history of the New England Agency Mutuals
indicates that orporate policies regarding sales influenced
claim settlement orientations. Woodland notes that after the
Chelsea, Massachusetts f ire of 7908, the New England Mutuals paid
off losses in order to establish themselves as credible
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ccmpetitors with the larger, stock insurance caumpanies.
"Our mntual cmpanies were a unit in their position
that every claimant should have prompt and fair
treatment, and in more than thirty cases our ocmpanies
waived serious technicalities for the purpose of paying
claims which seemed equitable, even though not legally
cmipulsory." (Woodland, 1979;44)
Although the relationship between liberal claim settlement
and fraud can only be inferred, I argue that opportunities for
fraud arise when ompanies orpete on the basis of claims
service. In following corporate policy to avoid negative company
reputations (e.g.being too tough on claims), individual company
personnel may err in the oacsite direction and, unintentionally,
tolerate fraud. Liberal adjustments may actually encourage fraud
should there be another claim. In an address before the
Insurance Society of New York, in 1916 George Branson suggested
the following relationship which is likely to hold true today.
". .. the loose adjustment makes for gross contempt
for the insurer and often opens the door to dishonest
practices upon the assured by his own representative in
an attempt to participate in the spoils." (Branson,
1916; 5)
The idea that cnupanies see their cnnpetitive advantage in
terms of claims service, and, by inference, in the potential for
liberalizing claim settlement processes, is borne out in the
industry response to arson and other forms of insurance fraud.
Ccmpanies do not take individual positions on fraud. (One
exception might be Aetna which has taken a relatively strong
public position on arson.) Motst public ef forts are joint ef for ts,
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(e.g. the Al Industry Cmittee for Arson Control, the
Coalition for Auto Insurance Reform in Massachusetts and the
advertising canpaign waged by the American Insurance Association,
an umbrella organization for insurance cnmpanies.) Although
arguments of eciany might apply, my research suggests that
individual companies might be avoiding tough positions on claims
because they want to maintain their ccmpetitive service posture.
The inportance of a cxmpany's coTpetitive position with respect
to claims service also is evident in the reluctance of individual
ocmpanies to swear out criminal cxrplaints against known
insurance fraud offenders, in cases other than arson. It appears
that public prosecution of insurance policyholders occurs, for
the most part, only when campanies join together or when industry
organizations (e.g. the Division of Insurance Fraud in Florida)
stand as caplainants. Thus, no individual omnpany need be
singled out as the canplainant in a criminal action.
2,.2 SELLIG THE INSURAC PRxxvr
As is true for any cOmrnodity, marketing plays an important
part in both defining and selling a product. Successful sales
depend on comsuers' convictions that a product is useful or
needed (Kornhauser and Lazarsfeld, 1955) [lVI. Changing risk
perceptions is central to the developient of insurance.
". . risk exists only in the perception of an
observer-that is, what otherwise exists as a natural
condition becomes a risk when sameone observes that
condition and perceives it to be of danger to a person
or property." (Post, 1976;25.)
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Individuals need to be convinced that they are "at risk" aid that
insurance can provide same measure of security or protection.
Attracting a large consumer population is particularly important
to the insurance business because profits depend on accurate
predictions of expected losses. Good predictions require a
sufficiently large number of exposures.
Despite its pervasiveness, experts agree that people are
reluctant to purchase insurance. In testimony before a Senate
Subxonnittee on the Flood Disaster Protection Act, the former
director of the Federal Insurance Agency (FIA) , George Bernstein
cammented,
"Most property owners simply do not buy insurance
voluntarily, regardless of the amount of equity they
have at stake. It was not until banks and other
lending institutions united in requiring fire insurance
for their mortgagors that most people got around to
purchasing it. It was also many years after its
introduction that the now popular homeowners insurance
caught on. At one time, too, insurers could not give
away crime insurance, and we just need to look at
automobile insurance laws to recognize that unless we
force that insurance down the throats of the drivers,
many thousands of people would be unprotected on the
highways. People do not buy insurance voluntarily
unless there is pressure on them fram one source or
another." (as quoted in Ginsberg and Kunreuther,1980;)
Studies of insurance purchase indicate that perceived
11. The relatively new nor tgage protections insurance being sold
is an exanple. Recognizing that many young hcoeowning
couples need two irccames to support their mortgage payments,
acipanies roi offer insurance in the event that one or the
other spouase dies and leaves the other to make the payments
alane. It is not clear that witirut marketing people would
have perceived of this "risk" nor whether they would have
seen insurance as a form of protection for such a
contingency.
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ser iousness of hazard (or risk) and knowing sameone who already
has insurance are the dcminant factors differentiating insurance
purchasers from non-purchasers [2,2]. In their study of flood
insurance, Ginsberg and Kunreuther (1980) speculate that friends
and neighbors play a subtle, but important role in risk
recognition and decisions to purchase insurance. They question,
as do I, the role cxxdity sellers (insurance producers) play in
creating perceptions of need and encouraging individuals to
purchase their products [13]. To what extremes will insurance
salespersons go to sell their products? Interestingly, the same
intangibility in the insurance product which permits the
manipulation and shaping of risk perception may be used by
policyholders to shape perceptions of their need-e.g. insuring
a house for more than it is worth, establishing the profit motive
for fraud.
Insurance cmpanies sell their products either directly to
the insurance consumer (direct writers) or through third party
agents or brokers (the agency system). The insurance literature
1 2, The role of personal influence in the adoption of new
products has been established in studies of innovation
acceptance.
13. The tension betwen the two nodels of insurance
furction-furds holding or cxntingent clairrs-carries ov;er
to the area of insurance sales. Are insurance salespersons
selling investment or protection? What do conswrers believe
they are buying? In her insightful study of the life
insurance industry, Viviana Zelizer (1979) traces the
marketing transformation of life insurance. Initially a
system of family protection, insurance reached its
cnmercial zenith as a system of sound investument around the
turn of the century.
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refers to agents who sell insurance as insurance "producers." The
notion that those who sell are also those who produce emphasizes
the intangible, contingent product being sold. The only
"aw niity" production is the sale. An insurance adage,
"insurance is sold, not bought" stresses the importance of
marketing and salesmanship.
2.2.1 A(NTS
As representatives of insurance ccmpanies and sellers of the
insurance product, insurance agents have significant control over
the quality and quantity of insurance business. Agents sell
insurance policies, classify risks, assign appropriate rates and
pass along the policies to the xrpanies they represent for
approval. In return. the agents receive a canission. Since
agents are often on the scene to evaluate risks, while ccmpany
officials are not, agents have tremendous influence over the
amount and kind of business an insurance ccnpany writes.
Agents have binding authority which permits them to issue
nnrandrums of insurance pending delivery of the formal policies.
Since the agent "binds" the policy, the consumer can get
irmnediate coverage, often before the policy has been off icially
approved (14] . Agents also have limited author ity allowing then
to settle snail claims.
2-85
M.st agents work for a cxmission which tends to fall around
ten percent of the prermium written. Insurance agents are
licensed and regulated by state departments of insurance. They
must pass a written exam and obtain insurance campany
sponsorship. The Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriter
(CPCJ) is the professional designation ascribed to an agent who
has passed examination by the related professional society.
Agents are of two types, independent or exclusive, depending
on the number of ompanies they represent. An independent agent
is appointed by more than one omrpany to sell policies and
perform limited underwriting and claims service. Independent
agents own and control the insurance policies written through
them and, thus, they own the policy data and the right of
renewal. Technically an agent can nvve a policy from one canpany
to another he or she represents. To underscore the agents'
positions vis-a-vis the insurance aontract sane states require
agents to sign or countersign policies. An exclusive agent, on
the other hand, represents only one ccurany. They reserve the
ownership, use and control of policy records for the insurer.
The discretionary authority afforded to agents to issue
policies led to insurance expansion and development durian the
nineteenth century. However , the decentralized agency systemi
also created great avenues for abuse as cnnpanies had less
14. This iould appear to be a significant area for abuse.
Unfcrtunately, data are not available to determine how often
frauds (fake accidents, turned buildings) ocur during this
preliminary pericxd.
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control over the risks they assumed. Lack of control over
agents' decisions created two major fraud problems which persist
today. Agents' discretionary authority to issue policies led, in
some instances to the insuring of fraud prone risks and
overinsuring-insuring property for more than it is worth. Both
conditions set up incentives for fraud.
The physical distance between agent and insurance carrier
increased opportunities for agency participation, witting or
otherwise, in frauds against the ccrnpanies. Many of the agents'
discretionary judgnents went unchecked. Agent potential to
facilitate frauds became all too apparent to the Royal Exchange
Assurance office in England in the 1860s, for example. In this
case, an agent had submitted a claim for a fire which was,
"...fram beginning to end, a pure piece of fiction,
excepting the mere fact that the owners and occupiers
named really have an assurance in this fire office." US
Insurance Gazette. 1861; 254)
There was no house, there was no fire and, probably, the persons
named on the policy did not exist. The agent had manufactured a
ccmpletely false claim. Lack of insurer oversight opened up
possibilities for fraud and abuse.
Agents" camissicm are perceived to be highly correlated
with over insurance. Eager for axruissions, agents insure
property for wore than it is worth in order to receive a higher
premiwn dollar. Overinsurance, historically, has been cited as a
rmotive for arson [l1.
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Alexander Canpbell in his early work (1902) on insurance and
crime (the first to deal with insurance fraud as an important
social problem) critiqued campany administration of the agency
system.
". .the amxnt at risk by fire insurance cupanies
[enlarged by the agent ccanission system] if those
ccpanies are not properly administered, stands as a
great bribery fund to reward the careless and the
criminal for losing their own property and endangering
the property and lives of others. . ." (Campbell,
1902; 147)
Those resjxnsible for assuming risk for the individual ccrpanies,
the underwriters, also were concerned with attracting enough
premiums to cover policyholders' losses and to ensure ccnpany
profits. Thus, they were not an effective check on agents'
discretionary judgment (Merritt Canission, 1911 and for more
current analysis, US Senate Camnittee on Governmental Affairs,
1978).
Thus, while decentralizing insurance sales through the
agency system led to great diffusion of the insurance product, it
was not without sae real costs. Canpanies have recently tried
15. In an address on incendiarism delivered at the eleventh
annual meeting of the fire underwriters association of the
northwest in 1880, H.E. Palmer claimed that
"During the past five years, 1875 to 1879
irclusive, the fire losses in the United States
alone have anounted to the neat sum of
$353,018,125. Of this anount fully thirtythree
percent is directly chargable to incendiarism or
over insurance. . .No legislation against
incendiar ism can by any possibility be ef fec tive
that will not deal pr imar ily arnd vigorously with
the cause of it, viz, over insurance." (Proceedings
of the 11th Annual Meeting of the Fire Underwriters
Association of the Northwest, 1880;117)
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to check agent abuses by renewing agency contracts on the basis
of an agency's loss-ratio (anoint of losses to total premiums
written),. However, caopany control over agents is limited.
Since agents own the policies they write, they can choose with
which crmpanies they will place their clients'business. When an
agency represents a number of cxmpanies, the insurance ampany
finds itself in a position of wooing the agent simply to retain
business. In the current crmpetitive insurance market,
individual insurance campanies have begun to establish profit
sharing programs with their agents in order to win additional
favors fran the independent agents.
2.2.2 DIIRECT IES
Carpanies which have their own production (sales) force, are
called direct writers. They use a variety of sales techniques.
Some try to attract new business through the mail. Anyone who
owns one of the major credit cards has been innundated with
insurance plan offers. Although a relatively new phenomenon,
they are a growing force in the industry. While Direct Writere
accounted for slightly more than a quarter of the auto insurance
market in 1955, by 1978 their share had grown to over fifty
percent (INA Ed and Research, 1977;ll) . Direct writers are also
making inroads in the canmiercial markets, long the province of
the independent agents and brokers.
"Over the past ten years, they've grabbed 12 percent of
that business [personal property-casualty] bringing
their total [market] share to 57 percent and leaving
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the independent agents with only 36 percent of the
market. . .The direct writers have already snatched
away 21 percent of the cammercial market." (Hill,
1981;94-95)
2.2.3 BIOEM
Insurance brokers represent policyholders, not insurance
carpanies. Brokers are ociamly utilized in the larger
metropolitan areas, particularly for ornercial business, and for
planment in the specialized markets. Unlike agents, brokers do
not have authority to provide insurance services such as binding
or small claim settlement. Brokers deal with any insurance
ccmpany (or agent acting on behalf of a campany) that will
provide their clients with the most advantageous insurance
packages. In return, the brokers receive ccmissions.
Brokerage firms have been increasing in the past few
decades-often taking over independent agents in their paths.
The top twenty brokerage houses have taken over one thousand
independent agents in the past decade (Hill, 1981;85). Two
factors account for this trend-- the increase use of surplus
insurance sold only through brokers and] a growing corjrrate
aonswmer aoncern for r isk managenent which argues for the
individual packaging of insurance prcducts.
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2.2. 4 SELLING INSURANCE CAR STIWG UP OPPORIJNITIES FOR FRAUD?
opportunities for fraud and abuse arise if, in their quest
for sales, insurance salespersons provide insurance when no need,
in fact, exists. By providing for econmic ccompensation in the
event of a contingency when the contingency was not a likely
event, insurance salespersons undermine the insurance function.
Since incentives to gain fro the insurance relationship are
nresent when potential insurance cmpensation is greater than the
value of the risk insured, insurance sales personnel may
contribute to the generation of false claims if they overinsure
property or provide insurance when there was no risk. Should
policyholders believe that they were "forced" to purchase
insurance that they did not want, they may take advantage of a
loss situation in order to affect a return on their premium
investment.
2.3 ASStMING RISK
Insurance companies reduce the uncertainties they face by
poxling together the risks they assume. Techniques of risk
spreading and transfer-pooling risks, classifying them and
predicting likely outsxmes-minimize the iimportance of and
interest in individual dispositions and deviations. Sane frauds
may be tolerated as long as the total fraud effect is deemed
acceptable by campany officials.
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The insurance mechanism operates by applying the law of
large nunbers to selected and pre-classified risks. Dealing with
large numbers of hnmgeneous observations, inproves insurers'
abilities to forecast claim costs. (Hanrrrrnd, 1980, Houston,
1968, Dennenberg, 1968 as well as standard insurance texts such
as Bickelhaupt, 1980; Mehr and Camrack, 1980 and Pfeffer and
Klock, 1974). By accepting only risks which conform to certain
standards, classifying them and estimating probabilities of loss,
insurance cnpanies increase the certainty that they will have
collected enough revenue (in premiums) to cover total claims of
loss they expect to be filed.
2.3.1 RATE SET=ING AND CLASSIFICATICN
Using the law of large numbers and laws of probability,
insurance actuaries estimate the likelihood that a risk of a
certain type will experience the contingency insured against.
Assuming these probabilities of loss, premium rates are set in
order to provide sufficient revenue to cormpensate policyholders
experiencing losses, to pay the expenses of doing business and to
produce a reasonable profit for the aopany. (Bickelhaupt and
Magee, 1970).
Except in two states, rates are set by campanies or rating
bureaus. Some cxopanies are too smll to have their own
statistical base for rate making and, thus, rely on industry-wide
rating organizations. States which have uniform rates for
2-92
certain policy categories (e.g. autambile insurance in
Massachusetts) rely on a single rate making body. Most states
require that insurance comissioners approve the rates set. (161
The mechanism by which insurers reduce the uncertainty and
risk they assume (classifying risks and predicting probabilities
of loss) also open up fraud possibilities in so far as they
create distance between those at risk and those assuming risk.
The development of the corporate form of insurance organization
transformed the business of insurance from a personalized system
of risk sharing to a depersonalized system of risk distribution
where those at risk were unfamiliar and unknown to those assuming
risk. Opportunities for individual deviation and fraud increased
as concern for aggregate outcnes replaced concern over
16. Rates are calculated by cnpany actuaries who combine
similar risks and estimate the likelihood and severity of
losses. The two primary factors when estimating appropriate
rates are (1) aggregate claim frequencies and (2) aggregate
claim severities measured by the cost (or estimated cost) or
claims. Four rate making approaches are employed by
property-casualty underwriters: Class, Judgment, Experience
or Retrospective rating. Class rates combine objects with
similar characteristics and assign rates based on the
average degree of risk. When risks are grossly dissimilar
and do not fall neatly into risk classes, rates may be
determined at the underwriteri judgment. Experience rating
is based on the prior experience of the individual or group.
Retrospective rating adjusts the premium paid under an
experience rating system to reflect the insured's actual
exper ience.
Basic rate setting standards include: (1) rates
reasonable and adequate for classes of r isks to which they
apply, (2) no rate should discriminate unfairly between
r isks facing essentially the same hazards, (3) consideration
shall be given to past and prospective loss exper ience, all
factors reasonably attributable to classes of risks and a
reasonable underwriting profit. (Bickeihaupt and Magee,
1970)
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individual ones and physical and social distance separated
policyholders fran the insurer.
The earliest insurance transactions in the United States
resetle what we now refer to as self-insurance. Merchants
joined together to transfer risks amog themselves. Much of the
business was transacted in coffee houses where merchants agreed
to indemify each other by signing their names under the
description of the risk (hence, the name underwriters).
Merchants who had property at risk would approach a broker who
would issue a policy in return for a premium. The brokers sold
shares of the policy to other merchants. Those who assumed the
risks were aware of the particular characteristics of ships they
insured and the nature of the risks they assumed.
With the development of underwriting associations in the
mid-1700s, insurance was taken out of the direct hands of the
merchants. Underwriting associations,
". . .ccmbined two of the requisite insurance
functions: they served as both the brokers and the
acutal writers, the role previously filled by other
merchants. In so doing, the new underwriting firms
secured both the broker's comission and the
underwriting profits resulting fran the excess of
premium receipts over insured losses." (Post, 1976;39)
Still, rates were fixed on a case by case basis. Those assuming
risks remained fully aware of the risks undertaken.
Oportunlties for misunderstanding between policyholders and
their insurers were minimized (Nelson, 1930;17) .
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The developnent of the corporate, publicly-owned insurance
company, Ominant by the mid-1800s, separated those at risk fram
those evaluating and assuming risks. The newly formed stock
cxapanies were owned and amtrolled by a broad based group of
stockholders unrelated to the risks insured. Wide ccmpany
ownership minimized the risk to individual owners and expanded
the capital base allowing these cmpanies to take on larger, and
more profitable, risks.
Insurance became a specialized industry apart fran other
forms of canerce. As insurance personnel became a distinct
professional group, merchants were freed to pursue other
non-insurance interests. Salaried capany employees developed
the technical expertise to produce lczer insurance rates and to
perform other insurance functions. As campanies began to
accumulate underwriting data, new "scientific" techniques for
risk assessment replaced merchant consensus as the base for
insurance decisions. Sophisticated statistical analyses replaced
personal intuition in decisions to accept risk in cases where
risks were more or less standard and loss exposures relatively
high.
Insurance coripanies cxntinued to ref ine their underwriting
and statistical rate making procsses in order to increase the
certainty that claims would be paid and profits ade. In so
doing, cxxrpanies subjected the risk asswnption process to more
specialized, yet also more rcrtine, rules and procedures.
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Personal auto insurance underwriting is now considered
sufficiently routine as to warrant cmputerization (Hanond,
1980;162).
Nevertheless, "underwriters," the insurance personnel who
select, classify and assign rates to individual requests for
insurance coverage often make their decisions under conditions of
great uncertainty. Underwriters have limited information about
particular risks.
"0. .. the underwriters knowledge of the physical and
moral characteristics of the risk under consideration
is inperfect. Regardless of whether the underwriter
has a description of the risk or has personally
inspected the risk, it is virtually ingssible to
collect and assimilate all of the physical and other
facts which have same bearing on the desirability of
the risk for the coverage desired." (Launie, et. al,
1980; 48)
Classification of risks conforms to standards about types and
quality of risks corporate policymakers choose to accept.
Corporate policymakers also set retention limits which determine
the extent to which they are willing to put a campany's assets at
risk. Since information gathering incurs additional costs,
additional data are obtained only if the cost is "commensurate
with its place in the decision." (Launie, et. al, 1980;49)
Decisions to look closely at a particular risk thus often depend
on its relationship to the aggregate picture. Thus, a camrpanys
wiflingness to render insurance coverages depends on the
probability of loss for similar risks, the anount of surplus
funds available to cover losses which do occur (capital) and the
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expectation of an underwriting profit (premiums to exceed
losses). Aggregate outwres inform individual decisions.
2.4 SPREADING RISK
Insurance companies may reduce the uncertainties associated
with claims filed against them by spreading the risks to other
cnrpanies or syndicates. The two methods generally available to
reduce individual uncertainty-pooling and transfer-apply here a
well. Through prling, insurance cxnpanies share the costs of
high risk business that state regulators have mandated must be
carried. Insurance apanies can also transfer a percentage of
high risk business to other campanies. Just as individuals
transfer the risks to third parties (insurance capanies),
insurance cumpanies transfer their risks to business enterprises
which specialize in reinsuring insurance business.
Risk spreading diffuses fraud effects and limits incentives
for controlling fraud as companies can share the risk of claims
filed against them. In fact, the reinsurance mechanism appears
to set up a condition of "moral hazard" for insurance campanies
[17].
17. Arguments for moral hazard (Pauly, 1968; Marshall, 1974
and Dionne, 1981) typically fcus on individual consumer
behavior . As I noited in Chapter One their argwrent does not
provide an adequate explanation for conswmer decisions to
cxxunit fraud. It may, however, explain lax enforcement on
the part of those insurance campanies threatened by the
per ils of fraud.
2-97
2.4.1 POOLING HIQH RISK AND SHARING COSTS
For specialized risks, ocuipanies writing insurance in a
particular state join together to share or pool the risks that
one individual ampany does not wish to bear alone. In sane
instances the prls are formed voluntarily. In others, the pools
are mandated by statute. Falling in the later category are the
two types of organizations most frequently encountered in the
literature on insurance fraud: the FAIR (Fair Access to
Insurance Requirements) Plan and Assigned Risk Plans for auto
insurance.
2.4.1.1 The FAIR Plans -
The FAIR Plan (xncept emerged in the late 1960s when the
Hughes Panel, the President's National Advisory Panel on
Insurance in Riot Affected Areas, convened to discuss insurance
availability in inner cities. The Conission found substantial
insurance redlining and insurance cxmpany reluctance to write
policies for inner city properties. Concluding that insurance
was a necessity, the "cornerstone of credit" and that
"conunities without insurance are ccurnities without hope,"
panel members devised a plan to spur insurance availability.
(National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot Affected Areas,
1968) The Urban Proper ty Protection and Reinsurance Act was
enacted in 1968. The federal government agreed to assume swn of
the insurance costs associated with riots and civil disorders in
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return for insurance cmpanies' participation in approved state
plans to extend insurance coverage to inner city properties [18].
The FAIR Plans provide fire and hcmeowner coverage to inner
city properties which no other insurance ccupany in the
"voluntary" market will write [119]. They are insurers of last
resort. Theoretically, the FAIR Plan provides insurance coverage
at a cost no higher than that obtainable in the voluntary market
18. At the time, the insurance carnunity did not want to accept
the financial burdens of riots since, they argued, riots
were socially contingent events. In testimony before the
Hughes panel, the president of the Insurance Cczpany of
North America crnnented,
"It is clear that we are undergoing a social revolution
in which deliberate destruction of property has been
utilized as a tool to achieve social aims. A private
enterprise system of insurance cannot survive unless
law and order is maintained and wilfull destruction of
property is suppressed. . .Catastrophic losses of the
type here under discussion are not the product of
natural elements, but of social change. The cost of
social change should be borne by all segments of
society. Presently insurance ccompanies are being asked
to bear a disproportionate share of the burden.
(Hearings, President's National Advisory Ccission on
Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, 1968;3)
They continued to pressure the state to pick up sane of
cost. Riot reinsurance is a means for insurance ccpanies
to pass on the costs of riot coverage to the state.
19. Note that excess or surplus line insurers discussed above
are not considered part of the voluntary market. Inner city
property owners might be able to obtain coverage through
excess or surplus line insurers although at a much higher
rate.
20. Critics of the FAIR Plan argue that the insurance
availability afforded by the Plans has not ended insurance
discrimination against inner city properties. More
str ingent investigations, additional surcharges and mrore
limited coerage than couild be expected in the voluntary
market enables insurance ccmpanies to retain their practice
of selective discr imination. .(Fderal Insurance
Aaministration, 1978 and Wrks, 1977 for example)
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[2~0]. By placing all "undesirable" business in a pool companies
can share the costs asscciated with this "residual" business.
Each caipany is assessed an amnxt equal to the proportion of the
total state business they conduct. Data are not available to
calculate the proportion of inner city insurance business written
through the FAIR Plan.
The FAIR Plans are overseen by boards of directors who
represent the major property insurance interests in the states.
The Boards of Directors establish organizations for daily Plan
management. Insurance cupany executives perceive the Plans as
"service organizations" for the insurance industry (interview no.
2). They are not government programs as generally believed. The
FAIR Plan system provides a means for the insurance industry to
cxxply with public policy to extend coverages to inner city
properties without direct regulation by government officials.
The FAIR plan programs experienced a substantial amount of
arson losses in the late seventies and came under sharp attack
during Senate comnittee hearings on the arson problem [21]. Most
of the criticism centered on lax underwriting and over insurance
(insuring a building for more than its worth), and careless or
indifferent claim investigation. Critics of the insurance
industry and the FAIR Plan suggested that because the costs of
risks were spread among so many coipanies, there was no incentive
21L Note that the high correlation between FAIR Plan coverage
and fire loss is to be expected giv&n that the FAIR Plan
covers properties not insured through the voluntary market
and, almost by definition, they are more fire vulnerable.
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for companies to screen out "fraud prone" risks or to investigate
their claims. They suggested that FAIR Plan guidelines for
underwriting criteria could be tightened and still fall within
the intent of the law (see the Illinois Legislative
Camission,1978). In response to these criticisms, the National
Carrnittee on Property Insurance, the umbrella organization for
the FAIR Plans, has developed an anti-arson action plan to
tighten underwriting procedures and screen out arson prone
properties. The FAIR Plans have also increased efforts to
investigate suspicious fire losses. It is too early to assess
the efficacy of such measures. Information is not available to
determine whether similar plans for tightened underwriting
practices and increased claim investigation have been created for
other non-fire risks nor whether insurance ccmpanies are making
similar efforts for the risks they voluntarily carry.
Two factors account for the centralization of anti-arson
effort in the FAIR Plans. First, the FAIR Plans have experienced
the largest concentration of arson losses. Second, the pooling
mechanism permits the sharing of costs associated with anti-arson
efforts. No one caipany need foot the fraud enforcement bill
alone [22].
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2.4.1.2 Autcmobile Plans -
Every state and the District of Columbia has established an
autcmobile plan to accomodate persons who have difficulty in
obtaining insurance through the voluntary market. In all states,
but one, Maryland, private insurers participate directly in the
plan [23]. Each insurance caripany must accept the motorists
assigned to it. The carpanies retain the profits and absorb the
losses from the assigned business. A ccpany's direct
participation in the plan is in proportion to its share of
voluntary business. Two alternative plans for assigning high
risk business have developed: a Reinsurance Facility and a
Service Carrier Pooling Plan, sanetimes referred to as a Joint
Underwriting Associaton.
22. The All Industry Research Advisory Council, an organization
formed by the property-casualty insurance industry to provide
research on matters of risk and public policy, conducted a
closed claim study of 13,418 residential and commercial fire
claims exceeding one and five thousand dollars respectively.
The results of their study published in March, 1982, revealed
that arson was suspected in thirty percent of fires
associated with residential property covered under the FAIR
plans and with only eleven percent of the residential
properties covered under voluntary market policies. The
arson percentages were slightly higher, forty percent for
FAIR aid twenty-seven percent for voluntary market, when
aommercial property fires were examined. This same study
concluded that fourteen percent of the arson fires covered by
the voluntary market policies could be attributed to
arson-for-insurance profit. Interestingly, similar
calculations were unavailable for FAIR Plan arsons (AIRAC,
1982; 11)
23. In 1973 Maryland set up a state operated plan, the Maryland
Autczmobile Fund. Even here private insurers subsidize same
of the losses. Similar state-owned funds are cnor for
workers canpensation coverage.
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Under a Reinsurance Facility Plan an individual auto insurer
provides coverage and services to all those who apply. but
transfers the cost of undesirable policies to the facility. The
Facility reimburses the ccxpany for any losses suffered by those
clients. AU cxipanies share in the Facility losses since they
are assessed for them in equal proportion to the total business
they write. Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina and
New Hamphsire have such facilities. The Reinsurance Facility has
been subject to same of the same criticimn applied to the FAIR
Plan, particularly careless claim evaluations and limited
incentives to improve on loss prevention techniques
(Massachusetts Governor's Task Force on Auto Theft, 1980).
Under a Service Carrier Pooling Plan a few coampanies agree
to write and service all the assigned business. To assure
access, every insurance agent writing in the state must represent
one of the servicing carriers. As is true for the facility,
losses and expenses incurred in servicing the assigned business
are shared by all the campanies, but unlike the facility,
campanies specialize in assigned risk business.
. In comparing the performance of the two assigned risk plans,
one study of auto thef t found that Reinsurance Facilities
experience greater losses. Fram 1974 to 1978 states utilizing
Reinsurance Facilities experienced a greater grcwth in auto thef t
rate than states utilizing other mechanisns to acccmndate high
risk business (Peter Merrill Associates, 1980;40) . In both
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cases, sharing costs opens up possibilities for fraud in so far
as it diffuses fraud effects and limits the incentive for fraud
control.
2.4.2 TRANSFERING RISK THROGQI HREINSURANCE
Reinsurance is another means of spreading the risks
associated with the business of insurance. The asstmption is
that like any business, insurance businesses face perils of
insolvency and overcxmnitment for which insurance can be
provided. In return for a premium, a reinsurance canpany agrees
to indanify an insurance capany for losses it may sustain under
policies it has issued.
The concept of reinsurance dates back to the earliest
insurance contracts. The first reinsurance copany was not
established, however, until the mid-nineteenth century (Ibsen,
1975;34). Reinsurance is typically sold through brokers who
match the insurance ccmpany (primary insurer) with caMpanies or
syndicates willing to assume part of the insurers' risks.
Two types of reinsurance are ormi: treaty and
facultative. In the case of facultative reinsurance, insurance
carpanies reinsure specific risks. For examrple, an insurance
ampany might issue a policy covering a novie production. Rather
than assuming all the r isk asscciated with insur ing that nnvie
production, the insurance carpany might reinsure sane portion or
all of that initial policy. Treaty reinsurance is a
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cxmprehensive contract which covers sane percentage of insurance
cnipany business. An insurance ccnpany might reinsure
twenty-five percent of its autcmobile policies, for example, or
all of its assigned risk business (see above),. Unfortunately,
data are not available to determine what proportion of total
property-casualty insurance policies are reinsured. We do know,
however, that most of the reinsurance business involves treaties.
Eighty-four percent of the property-casualty reinsurance business
assumed in 1981 was treaty reinsurance (Reinsurance Association
of America, 1982)
Reinsurance increases an insurance cnpany's capacity to
accept risks. This follows fran the law of large numbers
applicable to insurance in the first place and in eonnomies of
scale. It is safer to write a number of small risks than a few
large ones. The larger the insurer, the larger the amount of
risk a capany can assume. Reinsurance adds to that amount and,
therefore, increases a ccpany's capacity (Baker, 1980) Thus,
availability of reinsurance in a cmpetitive reinsurance market
has the potential to alter the risk-taking behavior of insurance
ccmpanies. Reinsurance allows insurance campanies to take on
business that they might not otherwise accept, and scmetimes,
business that they shouldn't accept. The existence of
reinsurance causes urndewr iters to ignrxe pr ior probabilities arnd,
thus, sets up a situation of mioral hazard for insurance
comrpanies.
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The reinsurance business also opens up many possible avenues
for abuse. Just like insurance, the business of reinsurance is
based in trust. Cmpanies trust that their assets will be
protected. However, reinsurance agencies (cmpanies, syndicates
or even individuals) are not publicly known or regulated.
Primary insurers rely on publicly regulated intermediaries to
place their business with reputable reinsurers. The reinsurance
tradition of "good faith agreements among gentlenen" appears to
be breaking down in today's cmpetitive market. The reinsurance
industry has many new, and not well-known, players. (Wall Street
Journal December 8, 1982, Journal of Canerce December ,1981)
Seventy-five percent of the industry does not know who their
reinsurers are and depend crnpletely on intermediaries, according
to an investigator looking into the current crisis in the
reinsurance market. (Wall Street Journal December 8, 1982)
Recent scandals have shaken the reinsurance market as it has
been fraudulently used to siphon funds fram insurance canpanies
facing insolvency. (See, for example the scandal surrounding the
POSA Group (Brenner, 1982) and Kennilworth (Wall Street Journal
December 8, 1982)). Unscrupulous intermediaries agree to place
business with reinsurers and, instead, place the money in their
own bank accounts. Because of the secrecy surrounding the
reinsurance market no one is the wiser until the initial crpany
experiences ser ious losses. The ciunpany then discovers that the
reirnsurance premdums it has been paying have not really gone to
the purchase of reinsurance at all.
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Reinsurance creates another type of fraud problem, not
typically discussed in the literature, but more important to our
discussion of insurance fraud. When campanies reinsure a
percentage of the business they write, they diffuse the effects
of losses, even fraudulent ones. Ccpanies have less incentive
to protect themselves because of the reinsurance mechanism.
Thus, insurance ccmpanies experience a form of moral hazard,
usually attributed to individual insurance consumers.
2.5 INVESTING THE INSURANCE PREMI M
Even an oversimplified understanding of the way insurance
crmpanies make money (i.e. through investment) is important to
discussions of fraud since underwriting decisions about which
risks to accept are indirectly tied to potential investment
outcome. Accounting and investment are critical corporate
insurance activities. A portion of insurance accounting
practices are mandated in the states insurance codes, errphasizing
the quasi-public character of the insurance ccnpany. Typically
the requirements are structured to provide the regulatory
agencies with sufficient information to assess company solvency
and performance. Other accounting practices conform to standard
tuisiness criteria for managerent decisions, tax purposes, etc.
As Andrew Tobias (1982) rather glibly put in his book on
insurance, Th Invisible Bankers "There are only two things as
cxmplicated as insurance acxxxinting, and I have no idea what
they are." (Tobias,1982;26.)
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A second, and probably equally baffling, insurance function
is investment. Investment departments manage campany portfolios.
Although investment incnme tends to be downplayed in discussions
of insurance xzpanies' health, it is an important force. In
1980 property-casualty insurers total investment inane less
investment expenses and before taxes was eleven billion dollars
up from slightly more than nine billion a year before ( Insurance
Facts 1981;16.) The investment experience of property-casualty
insurers in the recent climate of high interest rates yielded an
industry-wide investment profit higher than all other industries
(Business Week November 8, 1982) Investments optmize campany
irvxre and capital gains. The capital involved is substantial.
"The capital underlying the operation of the State Farm
Mutual Autmobile Insurance Canpany, at year-end, 1980
$4.6 billion, was greater than that of either Citicorp
or Bank of America, double that of the Chase Manhattan
Bank." (Tobias, 1982;14)
Good relationships between investment departments and their
underwriting counterparts are critical to optimizing profits
since both functions place insurance coxpany assets at risk.
(Pfeffer, 1974; 385)
Several claims managers interviewed in this study suggested
that same cuupanies write business on what is referred to as a
"cash flow basis". This means pricing coverage low enough to
br ing in premiumi dollars to invest. It could also mean less
careful risk selection. (Although no claims manager thought that
his cnqpany operated on this basis, many mentioned the
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hypothetical possiblity.) Recent analysis of the current crisis
in the property-casualty insurance market also recognize this
trend (see, for example, The New York Times November 17, 1982 and
Business Week November 8, 1982) .
The cash flow investment strategy could lead to two
developments associated with fraud. (1) Over insurance- insurance
coverage for more than the property is worth-may bring in the
premium dollar but is also cited as one of the primary motives
for insurance frauds such as arson. (2) Carpanies may accept
risks that underwriters recognize to be potential frauds
anticipating that if fraud occurs, the claim can be denied or the
loss figure adjusted so that an overall increase in premium
dollars and returns fra investments more than offset the
expected losses [24]. In the meantime, a building may have been
burned and people injured in the attempted insurance fraud.
2.6 THE BUSINESS OF RISK AND FALSE CLAIMING
nsurance is the business of risk. The uncertainties
associated with particular risks are reduced by transferring
and/or spreading sae part of an individual's risk to others. In
this chapter I have indicated ways in which the mechanisms
enplayed to reduce risk copen up possibilities for irdividual
2 4. A recent analysis suggests that when the "camined ratio"
(premiwn incue to losses and expenses) reaches 114 you are
past the point wen investment irvxre can offset losses (New
York Tines Ncvember 17, 1982) This figure indicates, hcmever,
that investment incxre provides insurance cnupanies with a
substantial cushicrn for their losses.
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deviation and fraud-new forms of hazards. In Chapters Five, Six
and Seven I discuss insurance cnrpany attempts to control
deceptive behavior.
Despite control efforts, this analysis suggests that fraud
will persist because of the image making quality of the insurance
product which provides roam to create perceptions of loss as well
as risk. Physical separation between those at risk and those
assuming risk and the positions of financial intermediaries
(carndity sellers) also open up new fraud possibilites.
Competition for insurance business may lead to practices such as
liberalized claim settlement and, thus, by inference, to fraud.
Corporate ccern for aggregate outcomes as expressed in
underwriting profits (ratio of total premiums collected to total
losses) may supercede concern over individual claim dispositions.
Sane frauds may be tolerated as long as claim activity remains
within acceptable limits. The promise of substantial profits
from the investment of premiums may lead to less careful risk
selection and the insuring of fraud prone risks; investment
inccme offsetting any losses. Finally, risk spreading, the major
concept of insurance, may provide a relatively risk free
environment for fraud operators. By reinsuring policies they
issue, insurance ocunpanies diffuse fraud effects and limit their
incentives to actively prevent and/or protect themiselves from
fraud.
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CHAPTER 3
CIAIMS MAKING
Insurance claims personnel Enforce the rules of the
insurance contract. They separate clearly compansable claims
from the more questionable ones. This chapter describes the
activities and organization of claims processing in order to
highlight opportunities for fraudulent behavior even in
organizations where claim verification and control are major
activities.
Decisions to cxmpensate losses affect not only the claimants
who suffer losses, but also insurance organizations whose assets
are tapped and claims processors whose working conditions and job
mobility are affected by their decisions. Fraud offenders take
advantage of the conflicts and uncertainties in bureaucratic
organization and procedures of claims process to successfu, ly
construct false images of insurable losses.
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Workers in large service bureaucracies who carry out the
agencies' mandates-e.g. service delivery- have been
ccnceptualized by Lipsky (1980) and others, e.g. Prottas (1919),
as street-level bureaucrats. As defined by Lipsky, street-level
bureaucrats are
"Public service workers who interact directly with
citizens in the course of their jobs and who have
substantial discretion in the execution of their work."
(Lipsky, 1980;3)
Teachers, police officers, public health and welfare workers and
even insurance adjusters (Ross, 1970 revised 1980) have all been
conceptualized in this way. A similar, slightly more specialized
conceptualization of low-leavel bureaucrats providing essential
services is that of gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are functionaries
who are in positions to allow or disallow individual's access to
particular services. A physician is a gatekeeper to the extent
that she diagnoses a patient as sick and eligible for benefits
(Stone, 1979).
The research on street-level bureaucrats suggests that
organizational and situational pressures (e.g. inadequate
resources, conflicting rules and incentives, ambiguity in
performance measures) influence the way in which bureaacrats
conduct their business, arid, thus, the way policy is formred.
Although minimizing the inportanee of clients and their abilities
to manipflate the system (crucial to general discussions of
fraud), the concept sensitizes us to certain features of
street-level work-discretion and informaticr control -which are
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important to our discussion of claims processing and fraud.
Prottas (1979) in particular focuses on the way street-level
bureaucrats transform client data (typically stories of
misfortune) into organizationally useful data.
The bureaucrat, the agency expending resources and the
client each have stakes in classification decisions and, to a
limited extent, each tries to influence the process (Prottas,
1980). [11 Mst studies of bureaucratic process (Lipsky, 1980,
Prottas, 1979 also studies of police as street-level workers,
e.g. Smith and Visher, 1981) suggest ways in which street-level
work produce structural discretion to the processors' advantages.
For example, claims adjusters might use their discretion to
disallow a claim on the basis of relatively questionable grounds.
My analysis suggests, however, that the advantage may work in the
other direction as well. Inrurance claimants control significant
claim information and may take advantage of the ambiguities in
claim classification categories and in claims process itself to
manipulate loss images and reports.
1. Street-level bureaucrats who are also professionals (doctors,
lawyers, police officers) face additional pressures stemming
fram conflicts between professional norms and bureaucratic
requiremants (Stone, 1979). The "political arena" of
conflicting interests and bureaucratic pressures create
contingencies influencing the organization's collective
behavior. The studies tend to cxmclude that street-level
bureaucrats develop distinctive coping medhanisms which
enable then to handle conflicts and] contradictions within
their hvrk settings. For exanple, in order to expedite
claims, bureaucrats will often generate broad categories of
behavior or clients so that they may procss their clients'
claims3 quickly.
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This chapter explores insurance claims processing as a form
of street-level work. I consider how the activities of
street-level bureaucracies might generate opportunities for
unintended or deviant outcmes. After describing processing
organization and actors, I will examine in more detail claims
processing activities. Each section will indicate ways in which
the process of insurance service delivery and the relationship
between claimant/clients and the service organization open up
avenues for abuse.
3.1 THE SRCtTURE _CF CLAI PROCESSING
The structure of insurance claims processing sets up
opprtunities for deception in so far as it establishes
disincentives for fraud control. Limits on control may create a
relatively risk-free enviromw.nt for fraud operators.
Ccmplicated and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures developed
to handle unusual or suspicious claims may actually discourage
claim evaluators fron treating non-routine claims in any other
way than routine. Similarly, workload constraints may discourage
other claim evaluators from pursuing fraud investigation. The
discretion afforded to claim evaluators working in the field,
away frce supervisory personnel, also opens up avenues for abuse.
Pcuwer ful claimants may use their influence to shape claim
processors' decisions regarding specific claims.
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3.1.1 CGNIZATIONAL SEFINW
Claims prossors may work for insurance organizations which
include a full range of insurance functions or they may work
within organizations that specialize in claim service and
cxtract to insurance ampanies on a case by case basis.
Although data were not available to systematically test
differences in reward structures, several possible variations are
suggested in the literature and from my interviews. Ross (1970
revised 1980) suggests that differences in management structures
exist for independent and staff employees. He argues that,
crtrary to popular xmceptions, the average claims processor is
rewarded, not for claim denials, but for terminating claims. The
fastest way to terminate a claim is to pay it. Thus, processors
in his study were pressured to settle claims. This observation
was cnfirmed in my interviews. Independents, on the other hand,
often work on a r diem basis which decreases pressures to
settle claims quickly. Independents, therefore, may be more
likely to spend the extrr time investigating a claim they
suspects may be false.
Different paths of career mobility also may influence
individual decisions to spend time investigating claims. Many of
the staff adjusters enter insurance campanies with the idea of
making a career out of their employa.&nt. b that end they may he
extremely conscientious. Independent adjusters may or may not
feel the sane pressures. Job frustration and lack of annitnent
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could lead to less efforts ant by inference, less fraud control
as well.
3.1.1.1 Claim Departments -
All insurance cxmpanies have same form of claim department,
although the cairosition of the department varies depending on
Nmpany size. In the very small carpanies the claim department
may consist of one campany vice-president who reviews loss
assessments written by outside contractors and tho authorizes
claim settlements. In the larger cxrpanies, with local branch
offices, a formal bureaucracy for claims processing, headed by a
local vice-president, was typical. Claim departments in the
larger ccmpanies are functionally separated by type of policy
line.
Same of the larger insurance groups, crmosed of a number of
individual campanies, have one claim departnent to service claims
made with any one of the individual carpanies. Sentry Insurance
Group which includes thirteen different campanies including the
Sentry Insurance COmpany, has a single claim department with
several regional branches to service clairs filed with any one of
the thirteen caipanies.
The larger insurance cnrpanies might also provide claimts
service for corporations which are otherwise self-insured.
Self-insured firmrs contract with insurance carpanies to handle
only claims processing. The insurance campany helps evaluate
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liability, however, the pecuniary obligations remain with the
self insured firms.
3.1.1.2 Service Organizations -
Cmpanies which have only minimal capacity for claims
servicing use the services of one of a number of claims service
organizations that are contracted on a case-by-case basis. Even
campanies with large claims departments may utilize these
specialized organizations to handle extraordinary risks. The
General Adjustment Bureau (GAB) and Underwriters Adjusting
Canpany are two of the larger, nationally organized, private
caipanies which provide claims adjustment services on a contract
basis. Smaller independent adjusting firms are available as
well. As of May 1974 the National Association of Independent
Insurance Adjusters reported that 460 member carpanies employed
2500 adjusters processing over 1.8 million claims (Swift,
1975;6-9.)
Other "umbrella" organizations provide service to member
capanies as well. For example, the Mutual Fire Insurance
Association of New England, crmposed of twenty-four, small, New
England m =utuals writing property insurance, offers claim
information and advice to memibers investigating major losses,
questionable claims or unusual coverages. 'Te Property Loss
Research Bureau (PLB) , maintained by one hundered riutual
insurance cxmpanies, has develcped claim handling procedures to
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assist processors in detecting and evaluating insurance fraud and
provides trained investigators to assist in arson fraud
investigations. A similar claims service is provided by a
section of the American Insurance Association.
3.1.2 CLAIM PKOCESSORS
The claims process is ccmposed of a number of different
activities. Tasks include reviewing notices of loss submitted by
policyholders, examining and verifying policy coverages (i.e.
property covered, perils insured against, extensions, exclusions,
etc.), determining the cause of loss and campany's liability,
determining the extent of damage and, eventually, negotiating a
settlement. Suspicious claims require more intense scrutiny.
Official stataients are obtained fran the relevant parties to the
loss when there are questions regarding claim details. The
claims processing organizaticr is also responsible for setting up
cxrpany reserves, sums of mney sufficient to meet reported
losses as well losses incurred but not yet reported [2].
In the smaller cupanies one or two individuals are
responsible for all tasks. However, in the larger, bureaucratic
2. Claims personnel sametimes estimate loss reserves on a case
by case basis. However , wore typically, formulas are used to
estimate loss reserves (e.g. average cost by claim type) .
Liability claims which often drag on for years, with less
certain outcxcves, present additional probldms for estimating
loss reserves, solved, in part, by statutory formulas
prescribed by state regulators.
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insurance organizations the claims processing function is
performed tq a nuzber of different employees. One person, for
example, might collect the initial claim information, while
another inspects the loss scene and still another evaluates the
dollar value of the claim.
In the following section I will describe the possible claim
processors. The actors described here are resgpnsible for moving
a policyholder's claim through the insurance system [3]. In a
later secticn I will describe the activities of claims
processing.
3.1.2.1 Providing Claim Inputs -
Mtst insurance texts fail to take into account that
policyholder s/claimants are the backbone of the insurance claims
process. Claimants provide the "inputs" for claims process.
Although, theoretically, a significant piece of the insurance
organization, policyholder/claimants are more cnnventionally
treated as outsiders to the insurance organization. By treating
claimants as outsiders, however, one minimizes the significance
of the interaction between claimants and processors to claim
cocomles.
3. Titles associated with individual positions tend to vary
saog carpanies so that one capany will call an adjuster a
claims service representative, while another might call an
equivalently positioned actor a desk adjuster. I have tried
to cnrform to labels available in insurance texts, although
there are sate discrepancies aimong texts aid labels I
ercountered during the field research.
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Individuals who suffer losses and make claims against
insurance policies are of two types: first party or third party.
First party claimants submit claims against their own insurance
policies. Third party claimants submit claims against the
policies of others who are, allegedly, liable for their losses.
In the case of third party claims, the policyholder is not the
individual who experienced the loss, but the individual who is
suppsedly responsible for the claimant's misfortune.
3.1.2.2 Support Players-Counsel For Claimants -
Public adjusters may be hired by claimants to help them
prepare claim documents. Unlike claim service representatives
who evaluate claims of loss on behalf of insurance capanies,
public adjusters are hired by claimants to advocate and support
their claims. If a loss was a large and camplicated one and the
claimant needed specialized advice, he or she might seek the
services of a public adjuster. Since public adjusters work on a
ccunission basis, they tend to advocate for the highest
settlement possible.
Several investigators interviewed suggested that, in their
search for the highest settlement, saie public adjusters inflate
claims and entice claimants to cnrmit fraud (also see, for
exanple, Battle and Weston, 1978) . Although public adjusters
have been indicted for their participation in arson conspiracies,
it seems a little unjust, and perhaps, a little too oonvenient,
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to single out public adjusters as the primary villians. it is
the responsibility of insurance campany claims representatives to
review claim docuents, to adjust settlements accordingly or if
the claim is not warranted, to deny it. Insurance companies, it
sees, must bear same of the burden when public adjusters have
helped to inflate claims and, in some cases, to pursue fraudulent
ones.
Sane claimants choose to have counsel represent them in the
course of their claiming activities. Once counsel is retained
all future contact between the claimant and the insurer must be
mediated through the attorney. Whether or not the claimant is
represented will influence the armount of claim settlement. Ross'
(1970 revised 1980) study of the liability claims process
indicates that claimants represented by counsel tended to have
higher claim settlements, overall.
3.1.2.3 Mediators Between Claimants And Campanies -
Although not all individuals purchase insurance through
independent agents, a proportion who do inform their agents that
claims will be filed before filing their claims with the relevant
insurer. Sae agents have discreticn to settle very small
clams. As the initial contact [flint and often intermediary
between claimants and ccampanies, agents are in unique psitions
to pramote, knwingly or otherwise, a false claim of loss.
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As the first claim evaluators, however, agents may also be
the first to suspect fraud. Despite their vantage points,
incentives to detect and report fraud do not appear to be
universally provided nor effective. Agents represent a number of
cnpanies and traditionally have not shared in the costs or
profits of insurance axupany operations. Since they have not
shared £n the ansequences of losses, they have had limited
incentives to control losses or frauds, other than their own
personal interests in doing so. In fact, as indicated earlier,
certain agents, historically, have overinsured property in order
to reap a higher cxnission. Overinsurance has been cited as a
precondition for insurance frauds, particularly arson.
The recent coapetitive insurance market has prcmpted sane
insurance cxmpanies to take steps to improve their agency
relationships, aid, by so doing, to create new incentives for
fraud amtrol. Recognizing that agents can place business with
any one of the canpanies they represent, insurance cmipanies have
devised schemes to encourage agents to place the business with
them. Several campanies have offered profit-sharing plans to
their agents. In addition to attracting business, these plans
may actu11y create incentives for agents to be more careful in
selecting risk aid to take greater efforts to control fraud. It
is too early to assess whether these goals will be realized.
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3.1.2.4 Company Representatives -
Individuals responsible for evaluating claims, determining
ccupanies obligations to pay claims and negotiating settlements
when appropriate can be usefully classified under the general
heading of claims service representatives. As claim evaluators,
these personnel are responsible for assessing claim legitimacy.
The uncertainties in claim situations and discretion afforded to
claim evaluators is often manipulated by fraud offenders as they
manufacture false images of loss.
There are to main types of claims representatives: desk
and telephone adjusters, or field adjusters. Individual
campanies may have different ccnbinations of claims
representative working in their departments. One ampany might
employ primarily desk adjusters with only a few adjusters working
in the field. Other ccpanies might deploy most of their
adjusters in the field. A single individual may work as both
desk and telephone adjuster. An adjuster might work one or two
days at a desk in the office and the rest of the time in the
field.
In addition to distinctions based on position or title,
claims service representatives are also distinguished by their
authority to settle claims. Authority is defined in terms of a
doliar limit on an irdividual's discretion to settle a claim.
Sane adjusters can settle only those claims under $500. Others
can settle claims up to $10,000. Author ity is rot restricted to
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clanns service representatives, but can apply to branch offices
as well. A claims manager for a branch office of a large
insurance group noted that his branch, operating in a large
metropolitan area, only had authority to settle claims less than
$150,000. Claims of more than $150,000 had to be referred to the
hcme office for disposition (interview no. 11).
In sane aopanies, particularly those coTmanies which use
independent adjusters, the adjustment process (verifying coverage
and investigating losses) is separated fran payment processes.
Examiners review the adjusters report and determine payment. In
other campanies adjusters cnplete the entire process themselves.
3.1.2.4.1 Telephone Or Desk Adjusters -
When policyholders have losses they usually inform their
insurance ccpanies by telephone. Many of the larger insurance
Ocinpanies have toll-free, twenty-four hour telephone numbers
available to their policyholders for loss reporting. The past
decade has produced a surge in the use of telephone adjusters
(Swift,1975). While sate telephone adjusters are merely
telephone receptionists who provide initial contact, take down
preliminary facts and, then, refer the claim to snmone else,
other telephone adjusters follow a claim fram its initial intake
through the entire claiming process.
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Desk cr telephone adjusters process the smaller, routine
claims that are referred to the claim department. Virtually all
business with the claimant is conducted over the telephone.
Recorded staterents are taken over the phone and loss details are
verified orally. In instances where police reports, claim
notices, or verified receipts are required, they are secured
through the mail. The adjuster need not leave his or her desk in
order to process the claim (hence, the name "desk" adjuster).
Because telephone or desk adjusters handle only the most
routine types of claims, standard operating procedures and check
lists have been developed for efficient claim handling.
Stream-lining claim processing through routinized telephone
procedures, and even cxmputer handling, has been a controversial
undertaking in a business that prides itself on custcmer service.
Critics of the new standardized techniques argue that custmers
prefer personal treatment. Additionally, they argue, the lack of
inspections may increase the chance for exaggeration and ".
.scue of the less experienced claims representative may
unwittingly be viewing claims as a sort of social program,
instead of the discharge of a contractural obligation" (Swift,
1975;TA-3). Lack of personal oversight may, in fact, increase
owprtunities for fraud and abuse. Advoates argue that the
excesses are not substantial and are more than of fset by
efficient claims prcedures-the ultimate concern of the
policyholder.
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In mcst companies, if telephone or desk adjusters suspect
that a claim is fraudulent, they refer the case to a higher level
or transfer it to the appropriate department (e.g. a special
investigative or internal security unit). It is not clear,
however, how many frauds are detected given such high claim
volumes, and greatly standardized claim procedures. Telephone
adjusters rarely have the time or access to information which
would enable them to give a claim the detailed scrutiny which
claims personnel argue is necessary to detect fraud. Similarly,
since telerftne adjusters handle only the smallest claims, it is
likely that the claimed amount is too small to warrant the cost
of detailed investigation. Claim managers clearly stated that if
it cost more to investigate a claim than to pay it, in most cases
the claim wuld be paid.
3.1.2.4.2 Field Adjusters -
Claims service representatives who have direct personal
contact with claimants are field adjusters. Although the overall
duties performed by these officials are similar to those
performed by desk adjusters, higher settlement authority is
typical for adjusters working in the field. Because they handle
larger and less standard losses, field adjusters often conduct
individual loss evaluations and have nore discretion to interpret
claim facts. Typically, an adjuster will spend one half to two
thirds of his tine out in the field interviewing claimants and
witnesses, examining damages, etc. The remaining time is spent
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writing reports and documenting the claim file. When fraud is
suspected a supervisor or a fraud specialist might be called in
for cansultation. The adjuster will ocntinue his or her
activities depending on the higher off icial's judgment.
Adjusters" discretion lie in their interpretations of claim
facts. Their decisions reflect their abilities to balance often
conflicting demands of supervisors, claimants, claimants"
attorneys as well as workload and professional requirements. As
noted earlier, Ross (1970, revised 1980) found that, contrary to
popular cxnceptions, adjusters were rewarded for terminating
claims, not denying them. One claims manager interviewed in this
study camented that his motto was "Do it, Document it, and Dump
it." (interview no. 17) . Sine investigations often prolong
inevitable claim settlements (most claims are settled out of
court eventually), and since investigations often cost more than
cxMpanies are willing to bear, adjusters may respond to suspicous
claims be negotiating lower claim settlements in the first place.
(See also, Ross, 1970, revised 1980;128).
Cmpanies' policies to fight fraudulent claims through claim
denials may be counteracted by reward structures for claims
personnel which emphasize minimizing the time and expense of
claims process. If so, terminating claims through settiement
when fraudulent intent is rot immediiately clear may be perceived
as the fastest way to gain ccmpany approval for individual
per formance. Of course, scare adjusters are "hot dogs" for whom
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ferreting out fraud is the most interesting part of their work.
These individuals may investigate all suspicious claims simply
because they like doing so and prefer to do what they like rather
than what they ought to do for cxrpany advancement [4].
Adjusters have significant ontrol over information used to
evaluate their per formance and can use that control to balance or
neutralize the denands of their supervisors. Ross (1970, revised
1980) notes that adjusters answer to supervisors through their
claim files. Sir claim files are constructed and controlled by
adjusters, Roes concludes,
". .. The supervisor exercises control not over the
real world, but over the file, and the file may be
influenced by the adjuster's personal need to minimize
the conflict element in his role." (p.59)
Limits on supervision afford to adjusters a significant aioiunt of
discretion in claims handling performance and outcme. Thus, if
they suspect fraud, they may ignore it and even construct the
claim in such a way that supervisors will not, or can not,
question their judgments.
Adjusters' discretion in the field also may yield power over
their claimants/clients. Street-level bureaucrats can take
advantage of ambiguous rules and discretion afforded to then by
their work to enforce or not enforce rules as the situations 15)
4. And, if they are gcood enough-that is, deny many claims and
have the denials stand up in court-they may still achieve
success in the amapany, should they want it. Note that this
appears to a sumewbat more r isky way to advance through a
canpany.
5. Prottas provides a similar example from welfare work.
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apply.. An adjuster's power rests in the unpredictability of
his/her decisions. Although claimants may know friends or
relatives who have been paid for inflated or fraudulent claims,
they cannot be certain that their behavior will produce a similar
reaction [6].
On the other hand, powerful claimants are able to subvert
adjuster discretion and use it to their own advantage. The
pssibilities of adjuster pay-offs or bribes offered and accepted
for settlement of fraudulent claims are described in the
following chapter. In addition to obvious manipulations through
pay-offs and coercion (e.g. extortion or blackmail), deception
allows for more subtle subversion. Stories can be twisted and
facts distorted. Ambiguity which, on the one hand, gives power
to adjusters, can also work to the claimant's advantage.
Claimants can use that ambiguity to force settlements for claims
when they are not entitled to them.
3.1.2.5 Outside Appraisers -
Insurance aompanies may employ inhouse or outside appraisers
who examine damages and determine dollar equivalents. Note that
this figure is rot necessarily the same as the settlement figure.
Appraisals are adjusted up or down dependirq on the loss and/or
6. Dittcn's (1977) stxdy of erployee thef t recognized the
arbitrary systm of enforcement as a signficant source of
managment aontrol over the wovrkforce. Emloyee thef t cnuld
be treated as a perk, as pilferage or as out and out thef t.
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policy contingencies. In sae cases an independent appraisor is
called in when there is disagreement over the settlement amount.
Opportunities for the manipulations of adjusters' decisions noted
above apply to opany appraisers as well.
362 SMBVERING OAIMS PKCESSING ATHORITY
My analysis suggests that the organizational structure of
insurance claims processing may contribute to opprtunities for
the manipulation of loss images and reports. The differentiation
and segmentation of insurance tasks and processors who perform
them provide multiple access points for fraud offenders to
manipulate parts of the process without subverting the whole [7].
The powerful discretion afforded to claim evaluators may be
manipulated by equally powerful offenders who can take advantage
of uncertainty to shape images of insurable loss. The
discretionary authority to settle claims opens up potential for
abuse since supervisors can exert only limited control over
adjusters' decisions. Powerful claimants may use their influence
(influence which is often stronger, and more persuasive, than
that provided by the insurance organization) to shape claim
decisions. Finally, to the extent that claims processing
organizations set up disincentives for fraud investigation and
cxntrol, a relatively risk-free envirorment is often created for
7. See Katz, 1978; Vaughn, 1980 and Altbeide and Johnson, 1980
for other discussions of the way task differentiation and
bureaucratic form act to facilitate image manipulation,
shield deviant activities and neutralize control.
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fraud operators.
In the following section I will examine specific claims
processing tasks. Not only does the organizational structure of
claims processing open up possiblities for fraud and abuse,
claims processing activities, themselves, often facilitate the
projection of false images.
3.3 TE AD F'10 RAUD
In adition to deciding whether or not claims are
cMpesable, claims processors must also project images of
servicing the needs of policyholder/clients. Insurance is a
service industry and, thus, maintaining a perception of good
service is imortant for attracting new business and retaining
old.
Claims processors must balance the often conflicting goals
of maintaining good client relationships and limiting claim costs
as they pass through the five steps of claim process. These
steps include: claim filing; exanining the insurance policy and
verifying coverage; investigating the claim; assessing the
loss; negotiating a claim settlement and claim recovery.
Although typically all five steps are cxmpleted, there are
occasions when one of the steps may he citted, for exanple if
the claim is small, there may he no investigation.
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Maintaining good relationships with claimants is perceived
as an effective way to insure a positive claim outaMe. For
example, many insurance ccmpanies inpose an imediate contact
rule- usually within twenty-four hours of the initial intake of
claim information (Webb, et.al. 1981 and Swift, 1975)-in order
to facilitate a congenial atmsphere in what is potentially an
adversarial relationship. Insurance experts suggest that delay
in cxrtacting third party claimants, in particular, can
negatively affect claim outcomes. By failing to create timely
contact with claimants, adjusters may
.create ill will, anger and distrust. The
claimant will be Iruch harder to deal with.
Furthermore, the lapse of time festers trauma over the
circumstances surrounding the loss and inflates the
anount of money which the claimant feels entitled to
recver for settlement." (Webb, e al. 1981;315)
A claims processing textbook includes a chapter on
"Motivation Principles and Claims Handling Techniques" intended
to inform claims personnel of "special techniques" for "better
cannunication." In fact, this chapter teaches claims personnel
techniques for controlling claim negotiation. Techniques for
"obtaining favorable behavior" include small carpliments, eye
contact and other interactive techniques for creating a relaxed
environnent. Claims personnel interviewed in this study
cxnfirmed the basic prenise behind these methods. They say that
an adjuster has to "sell" the claim settlement. HcM you sell may
depend on the attitude of the buyer . In all cases the adjuster
nust assert his or her position aid then br ing the claimant
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around.
."Highbaugh [author of a samewhat dated text How to
Control the Human Element in Claim Hadling ai
Elsewhere (1938)Flikens the roleCoF the insurance
claims representative in such a situation to that of
the anaesthetist and surgeon team. When the
anaesthetist and the surgeon approach the patient on
the operating table, the anaesthetist must keep the
patient in a manageable state while the surgeon
proceeds with the operation. The claims man [sic] must
perform both functions. He first must calm the
claimant. Once the claimant is docile, the claims
representative proceeds to reason with him to attempt
to influence his actions." (Rokes, 1967)
Despite the eMphasis on building positive client
relationships, the activities and orientations of claim
evaluation are not well designed to facilitate the necessary
congeniality. Organizational pressures to limit claim costs
often lead claims processors to question the legitimacy of a
claimant's story and the validity of a claimant's assessment of
his or her loss. In so doing, claim personnel often set up an
adversarial relationship between themselves and their clients
[81.
Policyholders play the game as well. A survey camissioned
by Sentry Insurance Group of auto and homeowner policyholders
revealed that forty-seven (47%) percent believed that
policyholders try to collect more than they are entitled to in
8. Personal experience suggests that the adversar ial tone to the
relationship between claims processor and claimant transcends
particular situations. I recently had occasion to submit an
insurance claim. Despite, or perhaps because of, all I knew
about the elaims process, I found myself ready to do battle
as soon as the adjuster asked the first question regarding
the claim.
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loss settlements. This survey confirmed that many policyholders
believe claim settlement practices are negotiations in which each
side acts to gain. Forty-three (43%) percent of the autamobile
policyholders surveyed-"only two out of five, acording to the
report- believed that cxmpanies settle for the full aount.
Another twenty-eight (28%) percent felt that cnmpanies pay as
little as possible (Louis Harris and Associates, 1974).
Nevertheless, when policyholders who had claims were asked
if their insurance cxmpany was unfair in loss settlements, only
one out of four felt so. A Consumers Report survey of haneowners
claimants also found a majority of claimants to be satisfied with
their treatment (Consumer Reports September, 1980.) Despite the
low percentage of dissatisfied claimants, the authors of the
first study introduce the following observation
"While questions of "fairness and full value" inevitably
solicit subjective evaluations, the results of the attitudes
and opinions surveyed clearly indicate policyholder
dissatisfaction with the _y ccmpanies settle claims." (my
emiphasis Louis Harris Assoclates, 1974;32)
3.3.1 PRESENTING LOSS IWGES-FILING CLAIMS
The first step in claim process is claim filing. It is the
policyholder's responsibility to notify the insurance cmrrpany
that a loss has ocurred. It is here that claimants have their
first oprtunity to project manufactured loss images. Sane
policies require "immediate notice," others "timely" or
"suff icient" notice. Despite the dif ferences in language, the
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courts interpret this requirement to mean that the claimant must
give notice of a loss in a timely fashion so as not to prejudice
the insurer-i.e. close enough to the loss events so that "fair"
evaluation of the loss is assured. (Webb et.al. 1981;302).
Oral notice is usually sufficient for the more routine claims.
If the claim is canxplicated or the coverage unusual, claims
personnel may require written notice as well. Many of the
companies use the same "Property Loss Notice" form, (also known
as the "ACMM" form) to collect initial claim data.
Claimants are also respnsible for submitting "proof" of
their losses. Written proofs are not required for all claims.
Again, for the more sinple claims, claims personnel may waive the
proof of loss requirement. Proofs of loss ordinarily include
facts about the loss and the risk, individual interests in the
risk (owners, mortgagees and other lien holders), detailed
accounts of losses (items stolen, injuries sustained) as well as
estimates of loss value. Receipts, invoices and bills for
medical treatment may also be required depending on the ccmpany
and/or policy. Ccapanies with special investigative units for
autamvbile claims have developed a standard form, an affidavit of
vehicle theft, which claimants are required to coplete before
settlement will he made.
In addition to notifying insurance cumpanies of their losses
and subitting loss dcxuentation, claimants are required under
the terms of their cxntracts to cxxperate with insurance cxmpany
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personnel in their efforts to settle losses (Webb, et. al,
1981). Property losses must be available for insurance campany
inspection should that be required. Property claimants are also
required to take necessary precautions to prevent additional
damages (e.g. protecting fire damaged property by boarding up
windows). Fraud investigators interviewed in this research
countered claimants' refusals to cxoperate with threats of claim
denials based an their lack of cooperation. It is not known,
however, how often non-cooperation has been upheld by the courts
as a justification for claim denial. As a threat, however, it
has proved effective.
3 3.2 ESTABLISHING THE UES-VERIFYING OVERACES
Adjusters examine the insurance policies against which
claims are made in order to clarify the cupanies' and
policyholders' obligations. Although many insurance policies are
standard, special clauses, extensions, exclusions and policy
riders can produce substantial deviation fran conventional forms
[9].
Claims representatives verify that the claim antingency is,
in fact, a peril covered by the insurance contract and that the
specific loation of the loss is one that is covered. The
9. The most Iiportant of these clauses for discussion of arson
is the mortgagee clause which designates payees. The loss
payee under a mortgage clause has independent rights separate
and apart f rom the insured. In contrast, a loss-payable
clause guarantees the payee only those rights afforded to the
insured.
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adjuster Must also identify the "insured." Although generally a
straightforward procedure, on occasion a number of insureds are
covered under one policy. Claims personnel also identify parties
who have "insurable interests" in the loss. Insurable interest
is defined as a relation between an individual and the risk
insured such that, in the event that the contingency occurs, the
individual would suffer financial and economic harm. Banks
hoiing mortgages have insurable interests in those properties.
Claims representatives also must determine which types of
property or financial interests are covered and which are not.
For example, if an inocie producing unit is destroyed by fire,
the claims person must determine whether rental losses due to
rents not paid are covered under the hameowners or fire insurance
policy.
Establishing the cause of a loss is the key to determining
cnripany liability and, thus, is a central task in the claims
process. Under same policies, for example, one must produce
physical evidence of a "break" in order to receive insurance
ccnpensation. An irate policyholder told me that she was unable
to recover for items stolen out of her car because claims
personnel found no evidence of a break. She claimed that her car
had been stolen and later recovered by the police (a theft of a
vehicle and its aontents nccoding to official police statistics)
[10]. Claims processors, however, argued that she was not
covered under her hncweners policy, which includes theft of
cxxntents from a locked vehicle, because there was no evidence of
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a break (interview 54) .
303.3 VALIDATMIE 0LCDITIMWS
It is herd to generalize about claim investigation. (A more
thorough discussion of the investigation of fraudulent claims can
be found in Chapter 6). Differences in investigation intensity
reflect differences in loss size as well as the degree to which a
claim is regarded as "typical" or "routine."
TO cumnt loss nsequences claims personnel will
interview claimants or their representatives, obtain official
records of the loss event and contact witnesses, if they are
needed. Experts may be called in when the cause of a loss is
hard to determine. Fire experts may be called when there is
suspicion that a fire was incendiary. Accountants may be called
in to sort through a claimant's records when embezzlement losses
are claimed.
Investigators gather their claim evaluation data into a
written report. Repair or replacmrent invoices and the proof of
loss (cUplete with receipts subitted by the insured) are
included. Written and oral (transcribed) statetents by
policyholders, claimants and witnesses are often included in the
claim report, particularly when there are questions regarding
10. Note that because insurance policies for losses sustained as
the result of same cr iminal act (e.g. turglary) are pr ivate
contracts between policyholders and insurance oampany, policy
provisions take precedence over criminal law def initions.
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liability or claim legitimacy. In same states, and for saie
policies, claimants may be required to give their statements
under oath. Statements help preserve testimny and provide a
written record for the claim file.
Claims personnel also gather secondary data to complete
their investigative files. Police and fire reports, hospital
records, aacounting records, appraisal statements, media accounts
of losses all add documentary evidence to the case.
A Polaroid camera is the hallmark of an insurance adjuster.
Photographs are used to establish the locale and visual
characteristics of a given loss and to supplement visual
inspections. In many cases, photographs are used to depict the
extent of damages. Videotapes or motion pictures of simulated
losses may be created when there is a strong likelihood that the
case will end up in court. Movies to document surveillance of
the daily activities of disability or workers' cOnpensation
claimants are covertly made in sone cases when claims personnel
want to determine the seriousness of the injuries claimed.
Finally, adjusters may pursue "activity checks" or
"neighborhood canvasses" to find out additional information about
a loss or a claimant. Neighbors might be interviewed for their
views on the claimant's financial condition, daily activities and
other gossip items which cxould be relevant to the claim filed.
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Again, not ali investigative steps are taken for all claims.
The amount of investigation necessary to complete the claim file
is left to the discretion of the claims representatives and their
supervisory staff. Claims personnel suggest that intensity of
investigation is related to the size of the claim as well as to
the extent to which claim circumstances can be easily verified.
For the most part, however, unless fraud is suspected, the
investigation requirement on first party claims is minimal.
Opportunities for false claiming arise because much of the
data presented by claimants to verify and support their claims is
outside the antrol of claim evaluators. Insurance personnel
have limited control over receipts, doctors' reports or police
reports, for example. Although insurance personnel can inspect
loss consequences (damages), they are not on the scene to
determine if the events happened in the way policyholders claim.
Claims personnel must often rely on after-the-fact accounts of
loss presented by scaetimes interested third parties.
Fraud offenders can take advantage of both teTporal and
physical distance between losses and the evaluation of losses to
shape or manipulate meaning. Claimants can construct intricate
stories of losses which are difficult to penetrate without
spending substantial time amd ef for t on unravelling the
deception. While claimants can put a good portion of their
energies and resources into weaving credible stories, claim
proessors, who woark on many cases at once, can place only
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limited resources into pulling apart the many threads of
deception which copose a single fraudulent claim.
In attempts to cxp with the complexity and uncertainties of
claim situations, insurance organizations have devised schemes to
routinize or rationalize the claims process [11]. This is seen
most clearly in the developnent of more intr icate claim forms
designed to categorize and classify all possibly relevant loss
details. Routinization, however, has an inherent irony. It
permits client learning. Knowledgable claimants can use the more
intricate claim forms and standard operating procedures to
determine what is needed to fulfill the criteria of claim
legitimacy. They can learn what triggers more careful claim
scrutiny and can use that knowledge to construct false claims.
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3.3.4 NEXIIIATING CDIENSATION
The burden to prove the extent of damages rests with the
claimant. Claimants must supply insurance personnel with
11. The general tendency for the administration of social
control to becxe ever more rational in the face of
increasingly complex and unpredictable rule breaking behavior
has been suggested by both Spitzer (1979) and Marx (1982).
12. Rcutinization has other cxxtervailing tendencies which have
been recognized elsewhere (for example, Spitzer (1979) aid
Marx(1982). Paul mntagna (1980) has argued that CPA's have
a stake in preventing camjuterized financial audits systemts.
Effor ts to deskill the audit through routinization are
opposed by professional auditors because of the potential to
usurp same of tie professionals' power. It would be
interesting to see to what extent adjusters appose
cxmputerized claim evaluations on these gronds.
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estimates, invoices, inventory lists and other documentary
evidence supporting their claims for loss canpensation. When a
claim is small, for example, a small theft loss, a policyholder's
oral statement of ownership and value is sufficient. However, in
many cases the claims person will sit down with the claimant,
detail all items lost, examine written verification of cost and
awnership and, eventually, arrive at an acceptable measure of
campensation.
In many cases settlements are extremely straightforward.
The adjuster and claimant agree on the value of loss and a
settlement draft is issued. In other cases, typically in
liability claims, extensive negotiation is comon. Negotiation
centers on issues of liability (cnrpany"s obligation to pay) as
well as the dollar value of loss, particularly when the loss is a
per sonal injury. How do you measure the cost of a lost leg?
It is often when negotiating settlements that heretofore
good relationships between insurance campany officials and their
policyholders break down. Differences between what claimants
view as their right or entitlement and claims persons" views of
what is legitimate, given their reading of the insurance
contract, becme mst obvious. For examnple, without a receipt to
verify cnst and cownership, saie claimse representatives would be
unwifling to allow recovery for the specific items. The insured
might protest, but it is unclear to what end. A different claims
representative, on the other hand, Knight approve the settlement
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The possibility for formal litigation exists for all claims,
especially liability claims where questions of judgment regarding
fault and worth are so difficult to compranise. Property claims,
on the other hand, are litigated only after claim payment has
been denied and the claimant sues for recovery. Few cases
terminate in a court of law, however. Ross (1970, revised 1980;
136) notes that only one out of 20 liability cases were settled
in court. (Note, hwever, that his research was conducted nearly
fifteen years ago and the general trend to litigate may have
increased that percentage smewhat.) The threat of litigation,
nonetheless, pervades the settlement process, since any claim
denied could end up in civil court sametime in the future.
According to Ross, the spirit of negotiation that transcends the
entire claims process is fueled by unwritten rules to avoid
court. Claims processors work towards reaching agreement without
recourse to formal legal process [13].
The spirit of negotiation which pervades claim handling
produces an adversarial atmsphere, a game of wits where each
party tries to outmaneuver the other. The bargaining aover claims
settlement can virtually force claimants to overstate the values
of their claims in order to obtain what they believe they
deserve.
13. Plea bargaining may be analogous to claim settlement as
there, too, one bargains in order to avoid the formal court
proess. Interestingly, in plea bargaining, as in insurance
claims processing, the formal systen hangs in the background
as a symbolic threat which can be evoked by either party to
force the negotiation one way or the cther.
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The author of a book on insurance investigation argues that
the actions of insurance claims adjusters may encourage
policyholders to inflate their claims. Healy notes that the
process breeds its own corruption.
"It is abmost a rule of thumb that the insurance
adjuster lowballs his claimant, particularly on thefts,
fires and property losses. He will literally force the
claimant to highball him. . .Insurance officials
bring a lot of this exaggeration on themselves."
(Healy, 1975;253)
Although most claims managers recognized and were complacent
about claimants' atterjts to hide their deductibles by inflating
claim value, some worried about the long term effect of such
tolerance. Of particular concern was the possibility that claim
inflation could lead to outright fraud. One claims manager
commented.
"People who have a claim form an opinion. . .They do
learn something. If they have occasion again, they
start from a different level." (interview no. 8)
Negotiation prosses open up ortunities for fraud or
facilitate fraudulent practices because they are themselves
deceptive. Limited deceptions, for example aritting details or
holding back information, are standard negotiation strategies
(Schelling, 1960; Fischer and Ury, 1982). Negotiations involve
deceptions in the form of trickery, false pranises and
expectations as well as lies. Such deception, acceptable within
the negotiating framework, may actually work to arover for
deceptions regarding claim legitimacy. Fraud offenders may
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threaten to take their cases to court if they are denied, even if
they have no intention to do so. Claim evaluators might then
resxd to the court threat rather than to issues of claim
legitimacy.
The negotiation process also facilitates fraud by providing
a range of acceptable outaomes within which fraud offenders may
operate. The boundaries of negotiation also serve as the
boundaries for acceptable manipulation. Ross (1980) notes that
all involved in the process- claimants as well as
adjusters-formulate settlement ranges, either by formula or
professional judgment, above and below which settlements must not
fall. With settlement ranges in hand (Ross notes that in many
cases both parties are aware of the range) fraud offenders know
how far to manipulate the system without tipping the balance
against themselves.
303.5 EOVERING CLAIM EXPENSES
A claim department's performance is evaluated not only by
the amt of money paid to claimants, but on the ultimate claim
cost to the caupany, including the oost of processing. The mney
paid out in a claim can be recouped through the sale of salvaged
property or through subrogation (recovery from another liable
third par ty) .
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Subrogation is possible when a policyholder's liability was
caused by a third party. An insurance cxripany may attempt to
recover the anut paid to a claimant fram the third party who
caused their policyholder to harm or injure another. For
example, suacse B's car collides with C's. B's car was -forced
into the collision because it was hit by A's car. C files a
claim for 10,000 against B's insurance policy. B's insurance
cnipany pays C. However, because A caused B to hit C, B's
insurance ompany tries to get the $10,000 it paid to C fran A's
insurance campany. If sucessful, B's cropany would, in effect,
pay no claim.
No fault insurance works on a similar principle. If Joe
runs his car into Sally's, causing $500 damage, Sally can collect
from Joe's insurance cnrpany (as a third party claimant) or she
can collect from her own insurance campany (as a first party
claimant). Because Sally was not "at fault," her insurance
ampany would subrogate the claim with Joe's insurer.
When an insurance acqoany pays a claimant for property lost
or damaged, the carpany technically purchases the property fram
the claimant. Thus, for example, when a vehicle is declared
"totalled", the claimant sells (gives up) the title to the car.
Claims personnel attempt to reduce their total claim liability by
sefling the "totalled" vehicle as salvage [14]. In sae
instances the total wmout paid to the claimant can be recovered
throwfth the sale of salvage.
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In the case of notor vehicles, attenpts to recover claim
costs may actually cxtribute to future frauds. Paper cars which
exist only for the purpse of defrauding insurers are created
through the purchase of salvaged vehicle titles. Fraud offenders
using this schene are willing to pay extraordinary prices for the
titles of these salvaged vehicles as they expect high returns on
their initial investment. For example, acording to one fraud
investigator, a future fraud offender might be willing to pay
$1800 for the title to a Corvette when, in fact, the Corvette may
be nothing more than a burned out shell. Since, it is the title,
not the vehicle, itself, which is necessary for the fraudulent
scheme, the fraud offender is willing to pay an inordinately high
price for the salvage. Faced with pressures to limit their
caxpanies' claim costs, claims personnel may accept the highest
bid for salvage even when they suspect that the ultimate use of
the title is for fraud. Thus, pressures to limit claim costs
open up avenues for abuse in this way.
3.4 CRIMIOGESIS IN CAI PRESSING
Claims processing activities are best categorized as a
series of negotiated decisions. Since claims are processed only
after losses ocur, loss evaluations are conhducted on data that
reflect social reconstructions of the events. Ta saie extent,
14. Note that a car is totalled when the value to f ix the car
enceds the book value of the car. This does not in any way
mean that the car is worthless. Individual parts can he sold
for a total amount greater than the anmut the car is worth
whole.
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each party to the negotiation atteipts to change those
reconstructions to their advantage. Each party tries to
outmaneuver the other. Physical and terporal distance between
losses and loss evaluation provide ron to shape images while
limiting the other party's opportunity to verify claim details.
Negotiation processes open up possibilities for fraud because
they are themselves deceptive. Bargaining over claim settlement
sets up an adversarial relationship both encouraging the use of
deception and easing moral doubts about rule violation.
Deceptions as parts of schmes to defraud are hard to distinguish
fran deceptions that are accepted. In addition, by providing an
acceptable range for manipulations, negotiation also facilitates
the manipulation of images. With settlement ranges in hand,
offenders may learn how far they can distort the system without
tipping the balance against themselves.
The conflicting demands of limiting claim costs while, at
the same time projecting the image of servicing the needs of
policyhclder/clients can constrain claims processors fran
pursuing claims they suspect are fraudulent. Some opportunities
for fraud will persist if, in their need to maintain good client
relations, processors systematically ignore same types of fraud.
Profit-naximizing goals may also provide opportunities for
fraudulent behavior if claim procssors are discouraged from
executing costly claim investigations when they suspect fraud.
Finally, pressures to limit the oosts of particular claims
3-148
through the sale of salvaged material may actually help to
generate future frauds. Pressured to limit costs, claims
personnel may accept the highest bid for salvage even when they
know that they are selling the raw material for yet another false
claim.
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CHAPTER 4
SPINNING WEBS OF DECEIT
The previous two chapters examined the business of risk and
the process of claim evaluations. I identified aspects of
insurance business and clais processing which provide
opprtunities or conditions facilitating the construction of
false claims. The high uncertainty associated with loss events,
cxnflicting insurance goals and limits on information available
to make informed insurance decisions cxmbine to create an
atmrosphere of "structural ambiguity." Fraud offenders take
advantage of ambiguity in order to deceptively obtain insurance
benefits.
In this chapter I examine how frauds are constructed. What
methods or techniques do fraud offenders use to build their
deceptive claims? How are fraud offenders organized to cxmmit
their offences? The possible inplications of particular methods
and organization for fraud detection and investigation are
discussed as well. Issues regarding fraud control are discussed
re systematica1iy in subsequent chapters on detection,
investigation and enforcement. In this chapter I merely explore
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how cpportunities for fraudulent behavior might be realized by
fraud offenders.
4.1 MECDS USED fIN rPTIVE C[AIM
Many methods are used in deceptive claims activity, each
allows for the manipulation of information in order to falsely
claim insurance cnnpensation. The data indicate seven different
methods used to file deceptive or false insurance claims. Fraud
offenders exaggerate, conceal (hide away, obfuscate, make
difficult to find,) alter, anit, create, forge as well as
substitute elements of a claim in order to make a non-camensable
loss appear catpensable. These methods are employed to establish
the image of victimization or to oover-up a fraud that has
already taken place. The image conveyed is something other than
what the fraud offender knows to be true. Some methods used in
deceptive claims-making are illegal in their own right (e.g.
forging documents), others could be thought of as breaches in
trust (e.g. same omissions). Still other methods are simply
conventional business strategies. Employed with the intent to
deceive, however, these seven methods are the keys to deceptive
claims activity.
One can convey a false image either by over t or cover t
action. Covert methods (omitting, concealing or alter ing) hide
data which, if knmw, would exclude insurance recovery to the
claimant. Overt methods (fabricate, substitute, and create)
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project new data into the claims process, data that are needed to
establish the claimant's entitlement to recovery.
Offenders engaged in any one of the three fraud types
described in Chapter One-exploiting losses, inventing stories of
loss or creating losses-may utilize any one of the seven methods
or same set of methos to caomnit their offences. Each fraud
type, however, is more likely to have a different combination of
methods or degree of deceptive activity. Creating losses or
inventing stories of loss typically requires the active
projection of loss details since the losses are actually
constructed by the offenders. Thus, one might see more created
elements than, for example, omissions. Since one can only
exploit losses after they have already occurred, we might expect
a greater need to exaggerate or hide loss details in order to
make the ineligible loss appear eligible for cupensation.
Abilities to employ certain methods depend, in part, on
available resources for confirming the images or facts presented
by claimants. Lack of recognition or control may be related to
bureaucratic dysfunctions. The overwhelming volume of data for
any one claim precludes detailed evaluation of any single piece
of data, unless there is same glaring discrepancy. Exaggerating
the value of a risk at the time insurance is purchased is
possible because the risk itself is rarely inspected. Those who
evaluate losses are not on the scene when the loss ocurs and
facts often are hard to verify. If a person fabricates a
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burglary and the police are called, but don"t respond, or do
respcnd but don't investigate, it is nearly impossible for a
claim investigator, after the fact, to ascertain whether the
burglary actually occurred.
Difficulties in cxntrolling fraud may also be related to the
nature of what is being claimed. Same methods used in deceptive
claims are possible because of genuine, identifiable, knowledge
gaps between event, cause and consequence. Fraud investigators
often cannot prove that an insured's accident could not have
caused the damage claimed, or that a loss could not have happened
in the way it was stated. Some knowledge gaps are narrowing over
time. With lab tests one can now determine whether auto damage
occurred six mnths ago or within the past few weeks. Although
advances in sane medical diagnostic techniques have made it
easier to detect false claims of personal injury, lacunaes still
remain in our abilities to prove that a sequence of events
happened in one way and not another. Fraud offenders can take
advantage of these "knowledge gaps" in order to illegitimately
claim insurance benefits.
4.1.1 EXAGGERATE
The extent of damage or claim credibility can be increased
through exaggeration so that a loss too snall for insurance
cxmpensaticn may be perceived as crmpensable under a given
insurance contract. The ntnber of visits to a dcctor, for
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example, can be inflated in a claim. Treatment for injuries
sustained in a fall can be blown up to be larger than actually
necessary. The difficulty in matching damages precisely to
particular losses alows a certain flexibility in what may be
claimed. For example one can imagine a range of possible
consequences/damages stemming from a fall down a flight of
stairs. Thus, one can exaggerate the extent of injuries while
still remaining within the boundaries of what might be expected.
Ranges in acceptable behavior provide rom for exaggeration and
create potential loopholes for fraud offenders advantage.
4.1.2 CCEAL
Insurance fraud offenders conceal data in two ways. They
hide data or they may intentionally confuse or obfuscate claim
data in order to make it difficult to understand or harder to
evaluate. Sane policyholders who submit claims for phoney
burglaries actually hide property they claim was stolen.
Documents which could aid claim evaluators have been hidden in
other cases. When asked, policyholders might cite an office
break-in as a justification for their absence [L]. Doctors who
engage in autcmobile frauds which depend on the unwitting
involvement of accident victinms, avoid detection by policyholders
by hiding their falsif ied billings from their patients. Bills
are sent directly to the attorneys involved in the schemes.
1. This was an excuse used by one of the defendants charged with
arson and insurance fraud in Suffolk, County, Massachusetts.
(interview 65)
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Since the patients never see the bills, they cannot verify
whether they are correct. In a fraudulent scheme reported by the
ICPI, a dental clinic added charges for services never rendered
to insurance claimants. Aorrding to the NYC prosecutor involved
in the case, insurance cxmpany payment procedures contributed to
the scheme. Since the dental services included in the insurance
payments were designated only by code number, patients were
unable to verify whether the specific services were actually
per formed. (ICPI Reports. September, 1977)
When property ownership is concealed (for example, when
"straw owners" or "fronts" are created) investigators may find it
hard to establish fraud motive as it is difficult to document or
make inferences about who gains fron the fraudulent activity.
Although the practice of cncealing ownership is not
illegal-straws are cnmnin to many business maneuvers-in consort
with other activities, concealing ownership facilitates frauds by
hiding one's intent or motive for fraudulent behavior.
Creating confusion around loss events can be used to insure
that losses work to the benefit of fraud offenders. A property
owner imediately reported a fire in his hcme to the local fire
department, but intentionally gave the wrong address0 Because he
reported the fire in a timely fashion, the owner passed off any
noticn of cantributory negligence while, at the same time,
insur ing delayed response by f iref ighters and, thus, a larger
loss. Other arson fraud offenders are known to set their f ires
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on holidays when firefighting staff is low. (interview no. 60).
The ability to purchase insurance under a number of
different names (corporate or personal) and aliases may conceal
the identity of the offender and allow sane fraud to pass
unchecked. Since many of the indices used to detect fraud are
based on name searches, the use of an alias decreases the chance
of detection through ccmputer matching.
4.1.3 CHT
The act of anitting is similar to concealing, although
action is not required. While concealed data would be obvious
unless hidden, there is little likelihood that cnitted data would
be discovered unless disclosed. For example, when an auto
accident occurs on private property or involves only one vehicle,
it is not necessary to call the police at the time of the
accident. Saetimes the police are never called. By not
calling, omitting that step in the claims process, the claimant
is able to control the story of the loss-event (what happened,
where, etc.).
White (1975) underscored the significance of anissions in
his tcok on claims ad justing.
"The adjuster who represents Mr. Smith's insurance
ccrpany is also aware that while par ties involved in
accidents generally tell the truth, they very seldcan
tell the whole truth! It's one thing to actually tell
a lie, and quite another to fail to mention samething
that detracts fram one'*s case." (White, 1975;7)
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Omissions with the intent to defraud are difficult to distinguish
fran simple errors, clerical mistakes, or other legitimate
justifications for the absence of information.
Omitting data may also divert claims personnel fram looking
into a claim. For example, one policyholder interviewed admitted
filing a false claim, eventually paid in full. In addition to
exaggerating the value of certain items and fabricating the
existence of others, he never mentioned that he had two previous
claims with other cmpanies, although he was directly asked about
prior claims on the current claim form (interview no. 52). In
the literature on claims adjusting, confirmed in my interviews
with claims personnel, it is clear that prior claim experience is
a flag for more careful claim scrutiny. If that holds true in
this particular situation, the omission of claim data may have
been critical to the success of the fraud. (More information on
red flags for fraud crmtrol can be found in Chapter 6.)
4.1.4 ALTER
An ineligible loss may became eligible for insurance
cnnpensation simply by a date change. For example in cases of
"past posting" (see Chapter One) one might have to alter the date
of loss in order to make it appar to have taken place af ter
insurance was purchased. Alter ing recvrds also may change loss
severity. A iell krown politician used his influence to have a
police department report altered in order to increase the
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ser iousness of his wife's autcmobile accident. (ICPI Reprt.
Jan/Feb/March, 1980!80). Altered documents can hide the identity
of the claimant (e.g. changed social security numbers) or the
identity of property (e.g. filing off identifying serial
numbers),. Altered documents can also be used to manufacture
dumry claim files. Legitimate medical records, for example. can
be photocopied with phoney names inserted. One can imagine that
the invention of photocopy machines and sophisticated correction
devices have made altering docunents a far easier task.
4.1.5 CREMTE
In addition to creating the loss itself (e.g. burning
buildings, or self mutilations) fraud offenders may create claim
data to document a loss, or to establish the consequences of a
loss. These data exist (or ce to exist) for no other purpose
than for filing a false claim. Often times created data are the
overt "evidence" of a fabrication. For example, if one
fabricates a burglary one might "create" receipts and other
evidence of items allegedly stolen in the theft. Or, in
situations when insurance personnel invented losses and obtained
payments using duny claim files, the files themselves were
actually created.
Fraud offenders creating doctnentation for their losses may
do so through written reports or by establishing witnesses.
Autawobile titles and receipts for merchandise can establish
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property ownership. Phoney death certificates [21 and phoney
police reports have all been created in support of insurance
claims [3]. Certain types of documents are easier to create than
others because they lack uniformity. Receipts may look like
formal cxmputerized billing statements or a few lines jotted down
on business stationery. Thus, receipts are a double-edged sword
for insurance claims adjusters. While receipts help verify
property ownership, they are of limited use simply because they
are so easy to acquire. One claims vice-president comaiented.
"I don't really think people keep receipts. The one's
who keep receipts you're just as suspicious of as the
one's who don't. . .Those people who have had
experience with claims can get them [false receipts]
faster than others." (interview no. 19)
Doctors can also create documents to substantiate their
non-existent treatments or to cover-up other fraudulent
activities. In a large federal mail fraud case prosecuted in
Massachusetts, doctors were tried for their participation in
creating phoney medical reports of treatments for injuries
2. In one case reported by the ICPI a man took out a life
insurance policy for a sister who was already dead. When the
capany insisted on a physical exam prior to issuing
coverage, the man went instead and signed his sister's name.
This was possible because he was foreign born and the person
filling in the forms was unaware of the apropriate gender.
Later this sane man claimed his sister died while visiting
her parents in Jordan and produc~ed a phony death cer tificate
to that effect. Because it was unclear what a Jordanian
death certificate actually looks like, no one noticed the
fake dcnrents at first.
3. A policyholder wrking in a sher if f's off ice typed up her
own, fraudulent thef t repor t in one case investigated by the
Division of Insurance Fraud.
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sustained in real autamnbile accidents. In this case doctors
maintained two sets of appointment books, one an accurate
accnunting of office activities, the second manufactured to
substantiate the fraudulent billing. (Boston Globe. April 23,
1981.)
Witnesses to losses or to the consequences of losses can be
created by "setting up" the alleged victimization. For example,
an offender may go to a doctor's office and request treatment for
a non-existent injury. In such cases the doctor beccmes an
unwitting acccmplice, a witness to the fact that the claimant had
sane sort of injury.
Documentatimn systems, particularly those that are public,
highly bureaucratized and fiscally constrained (for example, car
registries) are effective tools for the construction of false
claims. Although established as watchdogs and record keepers,
these overburdened systems can provide easy access to false
documents and provide legitimate justifications for document
discrepancies. Massachusetts' claims managers note that the
Department of Motor Vehicle Registry suffered massive budget cuts
after local property taxes were slashed. There are few personnel
available at the registry to verify autcmvbile titles. Blank
title forms have been misplaced or stolen, prestnably turning up
as "legitimate" documents used for fraudulent purposes.
(interview ins. 18,23) One can imagine that many legitimate
errors eminate from systens facing budgetary and labr
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anstraints. Because there are so many legitimate discrepancies,
discrepancies suggesting fraudulent intent can be justified as
credible bureaucratic errors.
Policyholders also create images of themselves, their
property and their loss events to add credibility to their
claims. In fabricated auto theft claims fraud offenders create
the impression that cars exist and are operational by selling the
cars, on paper, and, thus, creating car biographies. A fraud
offender tried to convey the impression that a vacant building
was occupied when it burned (and thus wcrth more) by purchasing
second hand furniture and clothing and spreading it around the
building (interview no. 63).
Although created documents may divert suspicion away fram
the fraud offender (i.e. one might not look as closely at a
claim if all the supporting docunentation is available), once
suspicions do arise, created docunents leave a trail of fraud for
the fraud investigator [4]. In fact, in a majority of cases
reviewed in this research, falsified documents provided the
substance of criminal cases against fraud offenders. It appears
that when fraud offenders create docunentation themselves (e.g.
create their vn receipts) they rimn a greater risk of heing
4. The same may not he true for created loss events. Take the
arson example. While the evidence or trail may make it easy
for the investigator to determine that a f ire was set, a
samewbat harder task, not always manageable from the fire
evidence itself, is to determine who set the fire and why.
This suggests that fraud type is sanehaow related to ease of
discovery.
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caught once suspicion is brought to bear against them. A smaller
risk may be in effect when fraud offenders create the scenarios
or events, but document their claims with information provided by
often innocent third parties.
4.1.6 FCGE
Forged documents are used to establish a claim or to cash
payments that have been obtained through other fraudulent means.
In general, forgeries are attempts to cover-up other deceptions.
When third parties (agents, lawyers or doctors) forge documents
they usually do so in order to reap the rewards of their fraud
efforts. In several cases, doctors' signatures were forged on
altered or created documents [51. A claimant's signature on a
settlement draft must be forged in order to cash the draft
without the claimant's knowledge.
4.1.7 BSITLI'EU
Substitution is one method fraud offenders use to create the
appearance of an insurable loss or the consequences of a loss.
In a previous example we saw how new and damaged parts were
installed on a Corvette depanding on whether the fraud offenders
were claiming that the car was in an accident or that it had just
been repaired. In 1980 a claim was filed with Lloyds for $60
million worth of oil supposedly lost when a ship went down off
5. The use of signature stamps in place of actual signatures has
made this activity scnewhat easier.-
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the West African coast. Investigation into the claim revealed
that the oil had actually been unloaded in South Africa and the
tanks had been ref illed with sea water. Authorities believe that
the tanker was deliberately sunk (Far Eastern Economic Review.
2/6/81; 37).
In a Quincy, Massachusetts case a corrupt insurance
adjuster, part of a phoney boat theft operation, had an entire
file of pictures of damaged boats that he would substitute when
needed to write up false claim reports. In another case fraud
offenders switched license plates when the same car was used in a
number of claims (ICPIRepts. March/April, 1979; 7). In an
example cited above, license plates were substituted in order to
re-register a car with the proper insurance.
Fraud offenders also substitute claim data in order to
legitimate their claims. In several cases investigated by
Florida's Division of Insurance Fraud, work orders, lay away
receipts or estimates were submitted as bills of sale to document
claims. In yet another Florida case, the fraud offender
photocopied a friend's receipt and submitted it as her own.
4.2 CRE7fTING ICERITAINT'Y
I have shonr how save nethcxds used in deceptive claims
activity establish the loss (created docwments) , while others
cawer-up the fraud (crncealed ownership). Sane methodis are
possible because cxntrol is lax, arnd others because of ambiguity
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or uncertainty about the relationships between cause and event.
Same methods are illegal or direct breaches of contract
(forgery), while others are como interaction strategies
(amissions). It is the latter category which creates the
greatest difficulties in evaluating fraud. Were the claimants
attempting to defraud the insurance crpany when they cmitted a
few relevant details or did they simply forget? Were the
claimants onfusing details of the loss in order to ccmmit fraud
or were they genuinely confused? Was the straw owner created
with the intent to defraud an insurer or was that simply standard
business practice?
The wncertainty surrounding many of the methods euployed in
deceptive claims making cambines with the uncertainties in the
claims process to permit fraud offenders to manipulate their
meaning in certain situations. In one Florida case concerning a
phoney theft of two gold rings from an autamobile, the claimant,
after his arrest, changed the date of the alleged theft
suggesting that he made a mistake and that he had not intended to
deceive. The thrust of the states case had been the
impossibility of the loss occurring on the date claimed by the
defendant. The new data made the story believable, however, so
the case was dropped. What looked like a case of criminal fraud,
becamre a cler ical error. One can speculate that the ambiguity as
to tie appropriateness of applying cr iminal sanctions against
insurance frauds adds to the abilities of fraud offenders to
manipulate the image of the offence in the manner described
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One could argue that the activities involved in creating
losses are more overt and less ambiguous than methods used to
exploit or invent stories of loss. When losses are created
scuething physically happens. If visibility and certainty with
respect to intent are important factors in decisions to control
fraudulent behavior (Chapter Seven suggests that they are),
holding other variables constant, we might see greater control
when more over t methods are used.
4.3 TM CGANIZATIt F EECEPTIVE CLAIS ACTIVITY
Lcosely defined, the fraudulent claim organization includes
all actors and activities involved in the production of deceptive
claims. Policyholders, insurance cupany employees, agents,
brokers and adjusters are included as part of the organization.
Included, as well, are actors whose primary functions are
unrelated to insurance, but who might be called in to assist
policyholders or insurance carriers in the claims process.
Police who f ill out accident reports, f ire off icials who make
fire scene investigations act in this capacity. Finally,
individuals who provide direct service to loss victims, i.e.
doctors, auto repair shops, contractors and others who can expect
insurance reintursswet for their services, are included.
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Direct offenders are those who gain from fraudulent
insurance claims and can include interested third parties as well
as policyholders. Insurance adjusters can create phoney claims
for policies that never existed in order to collect insurance
settlements for themselves. Policyholders use the insurance
system to pay for the repair or replacement of damaged vehicles.
Doctors and lawyers instigate frauds against companies by
manufacturing, on paper only, office visits and treatments of
accident victims.
The following section provides a brief outline of
organizational variation in fraudulent activity. Social control
response and its success may be linked to the way in which
fraudulent behavior is organized. Claims personnel interviewed
in this study recognized differences between fraud organizations
based on the number and status of offenders (amateurs or pros),
visibility and cohesion of fraud organization.
4.3.1 CMPLEXITY
The most simple frauds are those in which only one of the
actors involved in the claims process is engaged in the deceit,
although others may be unwitting accrmplices. In these cases the
pattern of fraud leads directly to the offender. When
policyholder s dr ive their autcucbiles of f piers and repor t them
stolen, they must file a thef t report with the police before
making their claim. Although the police report becxxnes part of
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the fraudulent package, the responding police officer is not
directly involved in the deception. The policyholder, in this
case acts alone. Insurance claim adjusters who create dummy
claim files for fabricated policyholders and then collect the
settlement drafts issued to the fabricated claimants are examples
of other single actor frauds.
Claim personnel and law enforcement recognize that,
typically, single actor frauds are undertaken by "otherwise
honest" policyholders who realize their chance to get sanething
back from their insurance policies. A Manchester, New Hampshire
police officer who specialized in investigating auto theft frauds
cxrented,
"Most of these people are young, middle-class people
who are honest, hardworking and decent for 364 days of
the year, but for that one day when they know they
cannot make the car payments anymore or they need the
mney badly, they burn their car and report it stolen."
(New Hampshire Times. July 15, 1981;3) .
In the most ccuplex fraud organizations, all relevant actors
to the claims process are involved in the deceit. Insurance
producers (agents and brokers,) policyholders, public safety
officials, as well as claims adjusters are knowingly engaged in
the false claims activity. Sane of the large arson-for-prof it
r ings descr ibed in the U.S. Senate Ccmunnittee Hear ings on
Arson-for-Hire, 1978 are examples of the most complex multi-actor
frauds- i.e. ali participants in the claims prcess were
involved in the scheme.
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The pattern of fraud in multi-actor frauds may be harder to
detect since it weaves through so many different actors, each
providing a form of insulation for the others. Nevertheless,
multi-actor frauds have an inherent weakness which can be
exploited by those wishing to break through the organization.
When a chain of fraud has many links, once one link breaks, the
chain itself disintegrates. According to investigators
interviewed in this research, the most successful prosecutions of
insurance fraud involved menbers who "turned" against their
fellow members and provided information to investigators about
organization activities.
433.2 VISIBILITY
Frauds differ with respect to their visibility and, by
inference, their possible discovery by outsiders [6]. Some
frauds require that information about fraud operations be shared
amng a number of individuals. In these instances the chances of
security leaks and exposure increase as more people becane aware
of the frauds. In the example of the Chicago Sun Times
investigation cited above, ambulance chasers were on the streets
actively recruiting clients for participation in their fraudulent
operations. Although same public safety officials engaged in the
deceptian clearly "turned the other cheek" to what was going on,
informaticn about the oper ation was publicly available. The nost
6. Te nvtion of discovery does not imply that any action be
taken in response. Thus, simple frauds might be discovered,
but allcwed to pass through the system nevertheless.
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simple frauds, e.g. when policyholders ditch their cars, do not
require that information about the fraud be shared and, thus,
these frauds remain hidden frem view.
Scne frauds are hard to recognize because they are masked by
legitimate business enterprises. These businesses provide
insulation and cover for fraud offenders and buffer social
control. Legitimate business, organized crime and even law
enforcement have acted in this capacity.
Although Organized Crime was an apparent factor in only one
of the cases reviewed in this study, the presence of the "Mafia"
or the "Mb" has been suggested by all types of fraud
investigators working in the public and private spheres and in
sce of the literature on insurance fraud (see, for example,
Karchmer (1977) . Karchmer argues that the Justice Department has
recognized the existence of mb run arson rackets since the
mid-sixties.
"The mob gets involved in arson scams as an outgrowth
of a gambling or loan shark debt owed to the mob, or as
one of the many freelance activities of mob underlings
anxious to profit by burning a failing business on a
contract basis. Also arson scams have grown into an
organized business where the mob sells a cambination
package of arson and insurance frauds, and where the
primary occupation of the racketeers is the arson
scam." (Karohmer, August 1977;22)
The Insurance Cr ime Prevention Institute argues for a
connecticn between the "nob" and insurance fraud which needs
further empirical support. They suggest that
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"A close look reveals that mob figures and white-collar
criminals often exist in symbiotic relationship with
one another. Doctors and attorneys who conspire to
inflate medical claims often find that their "volume"
is handscmely increased through their cooperation with
underworld characters; and the underworld frequently
finds itself needing the services of white-collar
professionals in order to support its ventures into
fraud." (ICPI Reports July/August 1980;7)
To the extent that organized crime is involved, we might find
that measures of neutralization (e.g. bribes, pay-of fs),
typically attributed to mob activities related to gambling and
narcotics (McIntosh, 1973), apply to insurance fraud as well.
The federal government inadvertently covered for an
insurance fraud racket when an undercover operation to infiltrate
organized crime in the construction industry backfired in 1978.
"Operation Frontload" set up an FBI informant, Norman Howard [],
as an insurance broker selling construction performance bonds [g
to cupanies suspected of having mob ties. After persuading the
New Hampshire Insurance Group to provide Howard with the
necessary credentials to sell the bonds, the FBI set Howard up in
business. Howard is now accused of taking nearly $300,000 from
ccmpanies and issuing worthless performance bonds during his
tenure with Operation Frontload. His "victims" are suing the
government. (New York Tines. May 18, 1979)
7. Acnording to FBI officials Howard had previously been
instrumrental in obtaining evidence about insurance and
broker ing f rauds.
8. Performance bnds are issued to guarantee crmpletlon of
amnstruction projects should the contractors default.
4-170
The FBI has also been involved in setting up insurance fraud
opportunities in sane sting operations. One of five Buffalo
stings financed by LEAA targetted the growing auto theft problem
in that city. In particular, the sting was aimed at car owners
who "steamed" their vehicles, i.e. arranged to have them stolen
in order to collect insurance money. Investigators involved in
the case were surprised to learn that nearly half of the
individuals netted in the "steam" investigations had no prior
history of criminal involvement. One has to wonder whether these
"otherwise honest" policyholders would have "steamed" their
vehicles had the goverrrent not provided them with the means
(ICPI Reports August/September 1979; 4-5) .
Perhaps the most prevalent cover for insurance fraud
activity and the hardest to empirically document is the
legitimate business enterprise. Doctors who inflate injuries on
sane accident claims also run legitimate practices. Auto repair
shops, part of large auto theft fraud rings, maintain legitimate
businesses as well. In New York City, as elsewhere, insurance
schemes involving motor vehicles often originate in larger
salvage yards. Most yards are recognized by the appropriate
licensing authority as legitmate auto-wrecking and parts shops.
Aanording to a detective in New York City's auto thef t squad, the
large volwme of tusiness cxnducted in a given week by one of
these yards makes it easy to slip an occasional insurance fraud
wreck into the system. According to a New York City police
sergeant, "Wthen the heat comes in they just fall back into the
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legitimate parts trade." (Sgt. Robert Davis quoted in Bunk, New
York Magazine, May 8, 1978) [9 ].
Even the insurance organization has inadvertently helped
insulate or neutralize a fraud ring's operations. A claims
adjuster's participation in an arson-for-profit ring was covered
by his outstanding performance record in negotiating loss
settlements (note the importance of discretion). In testimony
before the Senate Ccmittee on Investigation, an attorney central
to the prosecution of a Florida based arson-for-profit conspiracy
noted.
"Mr Carter [the insurance adjuster] was sort of playing
a double role in that, obviously, during the conspiracy
he knew what was going on, yet he was in the hub of the
insurance industry in Tampa. He was probably the best
known adjuster in the city. So he would, on the one
hand, appear to be cooperating with the insurance
campany and furnish them with clues on obvious arsons
or obvious people to avoid, while at the same time
protecting others. And, in essence, he felt that would
avoid suspicion on his part and on the conspiracy in
general." (US Senate, Arson-for-Hire Hearings, p. 119)
The story reminds one of Jonathan Wild who played both sides
of the fence, arranging thefts and recovering stolen property,
all for a profit (Howson, 1970 as well as others). Meiership in
the enforcing organization, in this case organizations to enforce
the insurance contract, can act, to shield or neutralize rule
breaking (for a discussion of organizational cover-up see Katz,
1978) .
9 .. The connection between insurance cnrmpany practices and the
perpetuation of often illegal salvage operations has been
discussed in an earlier chapter.
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Specialized expertise may be a critical factor in creating
deviant opportunities and shielding or neutralizing the deviance
of others. Access to specialized knowledge provides fraud
offenders with the proper information to manage deceptions when
the fraudulent claims involve ocuplicated loss appraisals. In
one case an insurance fraud offender was a former claims adjuster
who copied doctor's reports from the campany claim files and used
that as the basis for filing totally false and fabricated claims.
Norman Howard was a former insurance broker and former law
enforcement official before engaging in his fraudulent
enterprises. The sophistication or technical specificity of a
claim may actually work to cover a deception and to obscure
meaning.
4.3.3 CHESION
One may participate in a fraud with or without knowledge
that the fraud is taking place. A majority of participants in
fraudulent claims probably do not know of their participation.
Police officers who write up burglary and theft reports, doctors
who see patients complaining of injuries, even insurance
adjusters who have faith in a claimant's story may be "duped into
participating in a given fraud. Sane may know that they are
participating in a fraud, but not care. Others may be concerned
ainut their involvement in an insurance fraud but be powerless to
do anything other than participate.
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Strategies for fraud participation are the bonding
mechanisms for fraud organization. Participants may be d
into participating. They may be cinuitted to the fraud because
of social ties. Others may be bribed into participating or
participate as part of a pure business deal (econcmic exchange) .
Finally individuals may be blackmailed into participating or
participate because of same larger cover-up. One can hypothesize
that strategies for unraveling deception will reflect, in part,
the nature of the bonding mechanism and that fraud organizations
with stronger bonding mechanisms will be harder to control [Q].
4.3.3.1 Duped -
People who are &ped into participating and thus unaware of
the role they play in the deception tend to be claim legitimators
ading credibility to a fraudulent claim. This research can not
address why it is that people are duped, but one can speculate
that people are duped into believing a story because they have no
reason to doubt the verity of a claim or a claimant or because
they don't have the resources to make an informed evaluation of
the situation. Wives have been duped into filing false claims
for their husbands, according to one insurance investigator. A
husband arranges for the house to be burgled while he and the
wife are away for the weekend. They both return to the burgled
house only she believes they have been truly rotted. The husband
.10. In fact, fraud investigators repeatedly mentioned the
diff iculty of breaking fraud r ings when the r ings are bound
by familiar and ethnic ties.
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arranges things so that the wife is responsbile for dealing with
the insurance cxupany. She doesn't slip up because she, herself,
has been duped and, thus, provides a convenient shield for the
fraud offender (interview no. 27).
Participants in fraud schemes may be duped into
participating because they don't have any alternative explanation
for the behavior other than that it is a legitimate insurable
loss [11]. Training seminars for fire investigators auto theft
detectives, doctors and lawyers point out the red flags, the
signals of fraud, to these professionals. It is unclear whether
signals of this type affect the discovery rate, but seminar
organizers believe that they are positively related to fraud
discovery.
4.3.3.2 Comitted Because Of Social Ties -
Persons may engage in filing a false insurance claim because
of friendship with the fraud offender. In several cases
investigated by the Division of Insurance Fraud friends served as
witnesses to fraudulent losses and to the existence and
conditions of the risk iunediately prior to the loss. According
to the experiences of one coupany fraud investigator friends have
limited value as covers. This investigator believed that friends
11. There is an interesting parallel here to classification
problem~s. In the case of fires, when the cause of a blaze is
undetermined, fire investigators tended to mark the
"suspicious" Lox on the f ire reprrt form. Had there been
alternative, specif ic categor ies, a more precise
classification of fires might have resulted.
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are quite willing to lie in statements to insurance campanies,
less willing to sign a formal statement, and far less willing to
perjure themselves in front of a jury (interview no. 22),. As an
example, a Florida man was arrested for insurance fraud based on
the testimony of a friend who had been picked up for receiving
stolen property. The friend testified that the defendant had
given him the property to sell as part of a scam against his
insurance caupany.
Persons involved in fraudulent schemes may be camitted to
each other because of family ties. In a criminal case involving
an arson conspiracy all three defendants belonged to the same
family. In arguments presented before the judge on standards for
assessing guilt or innocence in cases of arson conspiracy, the
prosecutor noted that because this particular conspiracy involved
family members, it was impossible to get an insider to testify
for the state. The prosecutor, arguing for the use of inference
in assessing guilt, also emphasized the significance of social
bonding to social cxntrol activities. A similar cohesive bonding
and implications for fraud investigators was discussed by the
Director of Florida's Division of Insurance Fraud, but this time
the reference was to close ethnic groups. He mentioned that it
was harder for his staff to penetrate fraud r ings which were
bondi by strong ethnic ties and less likely for them to cane up
with sameone who would "turn". One claims manager interviewed in
this study spent a gccd portion of the interview discussing a
group of Hungarian gypsies wto are suspected of carunitting a
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range of insurance frauds. The Insurance Crime Prevention
Insitute also ran a series about Hungarian ethnics engaged in a
massive fraud ring. According to the prosecutor involved with
that case,
"They are like a vertically integrated corporation.
You can't get one to testify against another. They
have employers who set up phoney employment
verification and phoney disability reports. They go to
Hungarian doctors and chiropractors. They have their
cars fixed at Hungarian body shops. Same even buy
their policies from Hungarian Insurance agents. (quote
fran New West Magazine in ICPI Report. June/July,
1979;9).
The data suggest, therefore, that strong ethnic and family ties
may achieve a bonding that is relatively impenetrable for social
control agents.
On the other hand, rifts in family relations can work to the
advantage of fraud investigators if they know how to exploit
them. After one ex-wife helped the Florida Division of Insurance
Fraud successfully convict her husband, ex-wives became an
important investigatory resource. In several cases worked by the
Division, ex-spouses have testifed against their former mates,
providing information on the existence and disposition of items
allegedly stolen in phoney hare and auto burglaries.
4.3.3.3 Cczmitted Because Of Political Ties -
Although the research uncovered only one example of the
significance of political ties to ccnmittment to insurance fraud
activity, this example underscores the possibility that frauds
may be comitted for mney which can be used for same political
purpose.
"A ring of nore than 100 individuals, many of them
students from several Middle Eastern nations, is said
to have filed more that $1 million in false insurance
claims against a number of American insurance firms.
In one state alone, insurance capanies may have paid
the ring more than $250,000 in claims. The group is
well organized and operates nationally. Its members
are trained in techniques of staging phony accidents
and false injuries. Arson claims alone have run into
the millions of dollars. Investigators fear that same
of the money may have been used to finance guerrilla
operations in the Middle East." (as quoted in the
Washington Post. February 16, 1977 and cited in
Bequai, 1978)
4.3.3.4 Economic Exchange -
One may also participate in an insurance fraud as part of a
straight business proposition. When, as in a Florida case, an
adjuster offers to inflate your damage inventory in return for
seven percent of the profit, one could argue that your
participation resembles little more than a business deal. An
auto mechanic who buys your car, dismantles it and then sells the
par ts for four tines the value of the car may be par t of your
phoney auto theft scheme, but for him, it could be a straight
business deal.
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4. 3.3.5 Bribes And Pay-offs -
Participants in fraudulent schemes may be bribed into active
participation or bribed into looking the other way when fraud is
apparent. In the Suffolk County arson conspiracy discussed
earlier, a lieutenant in the Boston Arson Squad was convicted of
aepting bribes for his part in the arson-for-profit scam. He
was accused of fixing fire reports so that arson fires were
classified as either accidental or suspicious, but in each case
classified so that the attention of the arson squad would be
drawn away fran the particular fire. In one case reported by the
Insurance Crime Prevention Institute a man was offered mcney for
the use of his name in a phoney medical fraud. In several
Florida cases friends were paid mney to lie to claims
investigators.
Claims adjusters with tremendous discretion to settle claims
are often the targets of bribe offers. It is not really known
how often bribes are offered, let alone taken. Even adjusters
who insisted that most adjusters don't take bribes acknowledged
that bribes are offered. A claims adjuster for a small property
mutual cmpany told of an attempted bribe offered to one of his
adjusters. The adjuster was walking around the house looking at
the damage when the policyholder offered him a cup of coffee. He
accepted. When the policyholder handed the adjuster the coffee
several one hundred dollar bills were wrapped around the cup.
Te adjuster backed off and reported the bribe attempt to the
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wRany (interview no. 10). But, if he hadn't. . . Mr.
t ames McMullen, Director of Security Investigation for the
Farmers Group Inc. (an insurance group) has had thirty-seven
years of claim related experience with his campany. In testimony
before the Senate Camnittee On Investigations he said,
".. .it is my opinion that probably about 25 percent
of adjusters wxuld succumb to proposals to participate
in a profit through conspiracy." (US Senate Comnittee
on Governmental Affairs, 1978; 132)
Mdullen cited the low pay scale of adjusters as contributing to
decisions to accept a bribe. The testimony suggested that an
adjuster could make more money adjusting one fraudulent big time
fire claim that he/she could make in a year with the campany.
4.3.3.6 Extortion Or Black Mail -
Extortion or blackmail is used as a strategy to make sure
that a participant in one fraudulent claim participates in
another. In Norfolk County an adjuster later convicted of
accepting a ccrnercial bribe, was, acxnrding to the District
Attorney, a weak man who, under certain financial pressures,
agreed to settle a damage claim that he knew to be fraudulent.
He received cash in return. When the "claimant" asked the
adjuster to "settle" a second fraudulent claim, the adjuster
tried to refuse. The claimant threatened to expose the adjuster
for his first misdeed. Faced with this blackmail situation, the
adjuster acxuiesced (interview no. 40) . The potential for
blackmail was acknwledged as a deterrent to accepting bribes by
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adjusters interviewed in Ross' (1970,revised 1980; 64).
4.4 RGNIZING TO'C NCFAL FRAUD
Opportunities for fraudulent behavior are realized by
different organizational forms. I suggest that variation in
fraud organization is correlated with the relative ease of
detection and enforcement response. As we shall see in the
chapters which follow, enforcement responses include: ignoring
frauds (no response), recognizing fraud and attempting to lower
claim value through normal claim process, denying payment of the
fraudulent claim and criminal processing. Three aspects of fraud
organization are particularly important to fraud control: the
complexity of fraud, measured by the number and status of
offenders, the visibility of fraud and the cohesion of fraud
organization. Interestingly those frauds easiest to detect and
control are not necessarily those easiest to prove in a court of
law. In fact, many of the more easily detected frauds are
detected on the basis of procedural violations which limit
cnpanies' obligations to pay, but for which criminal intent is
both difficult and costly to prove.
Greater complexity increases insulation between fraud
offenders and their targets and, thus, often buffers social
cxntrol. Difficulties in drawing straight lines of culpability
fran offenoes to the offenders may discourage formal social
control efforts, for example, criminal proessing. Frauds which
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are ocated within the context of other business enterprises are
often difficult to disintangle from those legitimate enterprises,
and thus, control is limited.
Camplexity may increase visibility and increase the chance
of detection, however, depending on the way in which fraud weaves
through the organization, detection may or may not lead to
sanctions. We can refine our notion of camplexity to reflect
differences in the way fraud organizations are constructed.
Organizational complexity may be either vertical or horizontal.
Vertical crplexity is found in those organization which set up
buffers between offenders and targets. The direct offenders are
concentrated in single persons or small groups of persons. Most
of the fraud organization, then, acts as supports, covers and
insulators. Horizontal oanplexity involves the spreading out of
fraudulent activities to engage more and more potential
offenders. Greater visibility is a necessary coponent of
horizontally cxplex fraud organizations because fraud offenders
often must be recruited. Since they are more visible, we would
expect that horizontally organized frauds are more likely to be
detected than vertically organized ones.
The quality of cohesion in fraud organizations may affect
relative abilities to penetrate the organization arnd to
effectively control fraud. Sircelit is less likely that sameone
from within the organization will testify against other
organization nnnbers, tightly bonded organizations are wore
difficult to control.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCXVERING LEIT
Opportunities for fraud persist because of inherent
antiguities in insurance services. Fraud offenders take
advantage of the uncertainties in claim situations and manipulate
loss images in order to claim benefits unlawfully. At the same
time, the methods and organization of fraudulent activities help
conceal fraudulent transactions fran those targetted by the rule
breaking.
This chapter and those that follow examine the potential
enforcement responses to fraud. Rule enforcenent can be broken
into three analytic opcients: (1) detection; (2)
investigation and (3) sanctioning. The next three chapters
examine these three processes as they apply to insurance fraud.
Fraud enforcement is limited, not simply because of lack of
technique, but because enforcement decisions are located within
ongoing business transactions and relationships. Other insurance
goals often supercede fraud enforcement goals. Moreover,
institutionalized enforcement agents and mechanisms are not
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always well-positionea nor well-designed to detect, or
investigate attempts to obtain insurance benefits deceptively.
The processes of deception afford to those who deceive a certain
latitude in creating advantageous conditions that effectively
neutralize existing enforcement efforts.
The discovery of infractions is often ignored by those who
study crime control and discretionary rule enforcenent [1].
In so doing, researchers disregard the significance of discovery
for business-related crimes, such as fraud, where the success of
the rule violation depends on concealment of the offence as well
as the offenders. While violent crimes often leave instantly
obvious, although not necessarily acknowledged, traces of the
criminal activity (the injured victim, the smashed window), no
similar "on site" clues alert fraud targets or social control
agents that crimes have occurred. By assuming discovery, social
scientists neglect the processes involved in making frauds
visible and overlook situations where rule violation is
systematically ignored.
False claims are hard to recognize because, by def inition,
1. One exception is Mawby (1981) who examines strategies to
discover "low visibility" cr imes and studies such as Hagan,
Nagel and Albonetti, ,1980 which examine the "proactive"
policing of white collir cr imes.
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they are deceptive. A successful insurance fraud projects a
credible image of cxrpensable loss when ocmpensation otherwise
should not, or would not, be forthcoming. Since claims are
antingent events, conventional claiming behavior is uncertain
and unpredictable. Fraudulent claims are hard to distinguish
from legitimate ones because claim evaluators lack certainty
about the shapes legitimate losses should take.
How then are frauds discovered? Fraud discovery is examined
in terms of analytically defined opportunities for detecting
false claims. Discovery in this context means that information
about a possible fraud is available to warrant an investigation,
although no investigation ray, in fact, oacur. Opportunities
refers to those conditions which permit purposeful discovery [2].
Two dimensions of discovery opportunities-location (where frauds
are discovered and by whom), and technique (how frauds are
discovered)-influence the incentives to look for fraud and the
types of fraud that can and will be exposed [3].
Insurance organization and activities influence fraud
detection in so far as they affect the location, and techniques
available for fraud exposure. Insurance goals of quick claim
service, for example, may limit a claim processor's access to
data necessary for careful fraud evaluation and provide
disincentives for exposing rule violations by claimant/clients.
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Insurance activities not only influence discovery by those
directly involved in the claim process, but also those outside
the process who may stumble on fraud in the course of their daily
routines and who might "ignore" fraud simply because it is an
insurance problem. Conventional law enforcement officials may be
reluctant to expend public dollars detecting fraud, including
arson frauds, should they believe that insurance canpanies ought
to be responsible for recognizing their own victimization.
Similarly, public officials may not be permitted access to
insurance data that would allow for easy fraud recognition
without insurance caipany involvement.
The nature of insurance fraud activity also influences
discovery opportunities by permitting offenders to change imagery
during the course of their offences and, in so doing, to
circumvent discovery. While discovery mechanisms typically are
structured around fixed rules and procedures, frauds are often
2. Purposeful discovery refers to action above or beyond randcm
checking or routine audits.
3. A third dimension, timing of discovery, may be significant,
however data are not yet available to assess its importance.
Fraud discovery, relative to fraud cominssion, may be
anticipator, simultaneous, or retrospective. Sane frauds
are discovered as they unfold. Other discovery strategies
are aimed at detecting frauds after a claim has been filed,
but before claim settlement is reached. Still other
nechanisms expose fraud only after claims have been paid. In
sane rare cases, frauds are detected before claims are filed.
In sane instances discovery after the fraud is campleted may
actually anticipate the beginning of a new fraud,
particularly if the fraud discovered is part of a larger
fraud oper ation. One could argue that the timing of f raud
discovery may influence the incentives of agents to make
their discover ies known.
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fluid and flexible. Offenders use that flexibility to change
imagery and to neutralize discovery mechanisms.
This chapter is divided into two parts which reflect the two
dimensions of discovery opportunities identified earlier.
Discovery agents and their structural locations vis-a-vis
fraudulent transactions and insurance process are considered
first. Second, the techniques or mechanisms explicitly designed
for fraud detection are examined. I consider how insurance
process and fraudulent transactions influence both dimensions of
discovery and, thus, the incentives to look for fraud and the
types of fraud that can and will be exposed.
5.1 THE LOCATIM (O DISCDVERY AGENTS
Who are the discovery agents and what can they see? What
are their incentives and disincentives to look for fraud? To
what extent does insurance process and the nature of fraudulent
activity affect their discovery opportunities?
Incentives to discover fraud will differ according to one's
organizational location or position vis-a-vis the fraud or the
fraud offender. Some fraud discovery strategies are designed as
manager ial conitrols and the individuals who use thaem are
concerned, first with supervision, and only incidently with
fraud. Internal auditors, for example, review cases in order to
check on the activities of comrpany snployees. In the course of
their review, they may stumbie on fraud. Other frauds are
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discovered by claims personnel within the context of normal
claims processing (e.g. agents, adjuster). In such cases the
incentives to detect fraud are embedded in larger, and more
routine, claims processing procedures-in particular, the
verification of claim facts- and may be influenced by the
quality of interaction between adjuster and claimant.
One's discovery location permits different access to
discovery data and mechanisms, and, thus, to types of fraud that
can be exposed. Agencies which maintain or have access to
cxrputer indices of claim histories are able to detect recurring
sets of frauds across multiple fraud targets. Investigative
journalists who have resources and expertise to go "undercover"
can expose insurance fraud rings as they unfold. Structural
vantage points, therefore, limit the types of offences/offenders
that can be exposed.
5.1.1 CIAIDS PERSCNNEL
Ad hoc and informal discovery is typical. in the insurance
context. Interviews with claims managers revealed that, despite
the enormous statistical base available to insurance companies,
fraud discovery depends strongly on an adjuster's "sixth sense"
developed after long association with the insurance claims
process and attempts to defraud it. Claim processors scrutinize
clainw and mreasure them against generally reccqnized categor ies
of legitimate and fraudulent claim types. To a limited degree
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(i.e. mostly for autcomobile frauds and only in the larger
cxarpanies), systems of red flags have been developed to prod the
adjuster's sixth sense into action. Even then, fraud recognition
depends on an individual clain processor's discretion and
resembles, in many respects, thi process of typification
described by Sudnow (1965). Claims processors suggest that the
more fraud an individual sees, the more expert he or she will
became at fraud recognition.
Although adjusters are located in positions allowing them to
detect inconsistencies in current claims, they are not well
situated to detect recurring sets of events that might indicate a
pattern of fraudulent behavior. Since they work on single claims
filed with particular caOpanies, adjusters have limited access to
data necessary to evaluate the current claim in relationship to a
claimant's other claims filed with other cxmpanies. Furthermore,
adjusters' interests in the disrxstions of current claims may
override efforts to ferret out fraud through researching
circumstances of claims that have already been paid or that have
been filed elsewhere.
Adjusters' distances fram actual losses further limit
oportunities to detect fraud. The keystone of a fraudulent
insurance claim is the manufacture of an insurable loss.
Adjusters are rarely on the scenes to see the losses transpire.
At best, they view damages after losses have already occurred.
Loss evaluations rely on reconstructions of loss events through
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third-party accounts (police reports, witnesses statements) which
are hard to control. Thus, the separation fram loss events
(measured in terms of time and distance), sets constraints on
claim processors' evaluations of those events.
Despite the restrictions or limits on individual processors,
the organization of a claim department may increase that
department's overall potential for noting patterns of fraud. The
informal subculture of adjusting increases the organizational
memory of the claim department as a whole. Casual conversations
amoaig adjusters about current claims can spark recognition of
other similar claims. For example, one claims manager noted that
his department discovered a fraud only after he assigned a case,
originally handled by one adjuster, to another. The first
adjuster saw nothing suspicious in the claim. The second
adjuster, however, recognized the claimant and circumstances of
loss as similar to a claim that he had recently evaluated.
Further inquiry revealed an instance of a policyholder trying to
collect several times for the same loss (interview no.19). When
claim department staff includes transfers from other companies,
the units organizational memory increases.
5.1.2 (XNPANY ALDITCES
Insurance cxompanies have internal audit staf f who seek to
control fraud and other violations by employees. Auditors
conduct spot checks of field office operations, review files aind
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look for inconsistencies in claims handling. Claims may or may
not be settled at the time of their review.
Although rot explicitly engaged to discover fraudulent
insurance claims, auditors review many claims and, in the course
of that review, may recognize patterns which suggest fraud.
Auditors' incentives to expose false claims by policyholders
appear to depend on professional camittments, as well as cxrpany
loyalties and personal ethics [4].
5.1.3 AGENTS
As the first persons to hear about losses, insurance agents
are in unique positions to suspect that scmething is amiss.
Although historically agents have had few incentives to expose
fraud by their clients, ccmpanies have recently established new
profit-sharing programs changing the agency-campany relationship
and creating new incentives for fraud detection (see chapter
three) (5].
5.1.4 ARBITRMORS
Judges c ar bitrators who settle many claims may, in the
course of their review, notice discrepancies or even similarities
among claims which suggest patterns of fraud. A New Orleans
judge reviewing auto Ixdily injury claims observed similarities
in treabment of five men allegedly injured in an accident.
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Further investigation uncovered fraudulent charges submitted by
doctors treating the five claimants. The oversight afforded to
judges permits them to recognize patterns of fraud which might
not be recognized by claim processors working on a case by case
basis (New Orleans Times-Picayune October 10, 1978).
5.1.5 COMJNITY GEUxPS
Frauds discovered by ccmmunity groups tend to be frauds in
which the consequences of fraudulent action spill over to third
parties. Camnunity groups are active primarily in the area of
arson and arson prevention. Buildings burned for insurance
profit blight entire neighborhoods and, thus local residents have
stakes in fraud prevention. Although insurance fraud as a motive
for arson is clearly a part of the camnnity agenda, it is fire,
not insurance fraud, which lies at the base of their concern.
One of the earliest cxmminity groups formed around the arson
4. Acording to a text on management fraud, auditors have only
limited obligations to detect management frauds. There
appears to be a distinction between responsibilities for
detecting fraudulent financial statements and
responsibilities for detecting frauds or other illegalities
immaterial to the financial statements. Obligations to
expose frauds are far more limited for the later category of
frauds. (Eliiott and Willingham, 1980;16)
5. Sane campanies are trying to involve their agents directly in
fraud detection. One campany offers tonuses to agents for
gcod lcss ratios (losses to premiums collected) . These
carpanies argue that agents have incentives to uncover fraud
sirce undetected frauds increase their loss experiences and,
thus, their loss ratios. Since fraud directly affects their
abilities to collect bonuses, they have greater incentives
for control.
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issue was the Symphony Road Tenants Organizing Project (STOP)
formed after a number of fires in Boston's inner city areas
devastated entire city blocks. Tenants in that area, already
involved in camunity organizing, formed a group to research fire
code violations and property ownership. With their basic
research in hand, mebers of SOP pressured state and FAIR Plan
officials to act against suspected arson offenders (6].
While the exact effect of comunity pressure cannot be
measured, one can hypothesize that, in sane instances, ccmmunity
pressure draws attention to frauds that might have passed through
the system unnoticed. In another Boston case, community
residents called a meeting with the Attorney General/s office
demanding that they investigate a rash of fires in their area.
As a result of that meeting, and several others, the insurance
carmnunity agreed to finance an investigation. According to
investigators involved, it is unlikely that investigation into
those particular f ires would have been forthcoming without the
well-publicized meeting with the Attorney-General (interview
no.68).
Camiunity groups have also been successful in preventing
fraud fires simply by exposing the potential for fraud. In
Newark, IUT a biilding showed all the signs that it was going to
6. There is no way of telling, for sure, whether without
caununity pressure, extensive investigation would have
resulted.
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burn. (See Urban Education Systems, 1981 for arson indicators.)
Tenants had moved out. Small fires had been set scaring those
who remaimed. Stoves and plumbing equipment had been removed and
services were no longer provided. Fearing that their building
would burn during the night, tenants took over the building.
They displayed banners listing the deplorable conditions from
their windows. Comnunity leaders believe that by making the
housing violations publicly visible and exposing possible motives
for fraud, they were successful in preventing the fire (interview
no. 44).
5.1.6 LAW ENFOCEmNr
As they are often the first to respond to "loss scenes"
(burglaries, accidents, fires, etc.), police are positioned to
notice suspicious circumstances surrounding loss events which
might indicate fraudulent intent. A New Hampshire police
sergeant, for example, came across an abandoned vehicle and from
the conditions of the car deduced that insurance fraud was
involved.
"This guy took off the tires and rims and put the lugs back
on carefully. Now what car thief is going to take off the
rims and then put the lugs back on." (New Hampshire Times.
July, 1980;l)
Despite their vantage points, it appears that instances in
which law enforcenent officials discover insurance frauM and pass
on their suspicians to the apropriate investigative agency are
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relatively rare [7]. The reasons most often cited
for law enforcenent's norr-involvement in cases of insurance fraud
are the informal or formal rules against exchanging information
with private investigators or insurance ccupany representatives.
Issues of propriety with respect to information exchange between
law enforcement and private interests are less relevant to
exchanges between different law enforcement agencies (e.g. the
Divisions of Insurance Fraud and local police). Here too,
however, one finds traditional law enforcement reluctant to get
involved in fraud cases. Of the 58 fraud cases reviewed as part
of the field site visit with Florida's Division of Insurance
Fraud only 16 ( 27%) cases were referred to the Division by law
enforcemnent. According to Division personnel, that percentage
reflects an increase over previous years which is credited to
training efforts and greater exposure of Division activities.
Since law enforcement personnel are at the scenes of losses
and, thus, are in position to notice scmething peculiar in the
loss circumstances, efforts are being made to get law enforcement
more actively involved in fraud detection. Florida's Division of
Insurance Fraud has been trying to establish effective liasons
with local police officers. In Massachusetts, "CARS Seminars"
(Ccoruonwealth Autotheft Reduction Seninars) are. being held to
train police officers in auto theft fraud detection. Although
7. Although in many jurisdictions filing a false police report
is a penal infraction, there were no examples found in this
research to indicate that police pur.sued this option when
they suspect fraud.
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information necessary to evaluate the success of these programs
is not available, at least one fraud discovery is credited to the
training program. Just two days after participating in a CARS
seminar, a police officer stopped the driver of a Jaguar for
speeding. Interested in trying out what he had just learned, the
officer searched auto theft records and discovered that the car
was listed as stolen and never recovered. Investigation revealed
a trail of fraud involving this car and several others (interview
no. 22).
Interestingly, the Division of Insurance Fraud's success in
achieving convictions may have led to an increase in law
enforcement referrals and an apparent increase in insurance fraud
(at least per official law enforcement statistics). This
increase cannot be explained merely as an instance of "you find
what you are looking for" nor can it be attributed to changed
attitudes towards insurance fraud, although these may be factors.
Law enforcement may beccme increasingly involved in fraud
detection when they realize its potential to bring individuals
targetted for their involvement in other criminal matters into
the criminal justice system. Prosecution of insurance fraud may
increase as law enforcement personnel realize its potential as a
"proactive" strategy for the developuent of ccuperative witnesses
through prosecution on the more minor offense of insurance fraud.
(Hagen, Nagel and Albrnetti, 1980 on the use of similar
"proactive" methods for the prosecution of other forms of
white-collar crime.) Insurance fraud may became a crime similar
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to tax evasion, an easy way to convict saneone already targetted
because of other suspected criminal activity.
5.1.7 'IME MEDIA
The media have been most active in exposing doctor-lawyer
frauds typically involving ambulance chasing and inflated
automobile bodily injury claims. The Chicago Sun Times along
with a local Chicago television station exposed a large fake
accident ring operating in their city. In 1976 "60 Minutes," the
popular television news magazine, exposed Miami, Florida as the
insurance fraud capital of the world. According to one of the
insurance industry trade journals the t.v. story had
"Exposed blatant and widespread corruption which
implicated not only insureds, but organized rings
of doctors, lawyers, automobile repair shops whose
activities were bilking the insurance industry and
the insuring buying public. . ." (Snyder,
1981;6)
Not long after that story was telecast, the Florida state
legislature established the Division of Insurance Fraud to
investigate and prosecute insurance fraud offenders. A federal
probe was initiated into a Florida doctor alleged to be a kingpin
in the ambulance chasing operation. The US attorneys office
launched a probe into a New Orleans doctors following an
investigation by the local state insurance ccmnissioner which was
itself prcnpted by a ser ies of ar ticles in the New Orleans
Times-P icayune (OCtober 10, 1978) .
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Because fraud is hidden from view and information about
insurance fraud, in particular, is not likely to surface without
media exposure, we may be perceiving a greater influence than is
actually there. This research does not provide a definitive
answer, however, my analysis suggests several reasons why the
media have been such significant forces in exposing fraud. Until
recently, there was little organized effort, either by the
insurance ccmunity or law enforcement, to expose the kinds of
frauds which tend to be exposed through the media. While
insurance ccnpanies were relatively successful at discovering
individual attempts to defraud campanies, discovery was limited
to individual cases, not to larger organized rings. Insurance
cnmpany officials cite insufficient resources, and legal
constraints on information exchange as reasons why traditionally
they have been unable to expose patterns of fraud running across
different insurance cnmpanies and individuals. Law enforcement,
for their part, tended to shy away from insurance related crimes,
claiming to lack the resources and expertise for what they
perceive as a private, insurance ccpany problem.
Time and again, fraud investigators claimed that fraud rings
were cracked by infiltration or by inside information.
Investigative journalists have the resources and expertise to
affect this type of discovery and, thus, are powerfu1 forces in
fraud exposure. With their noses for stor ies, f inancial
resources, and often fewer constraints on their actions than
would be placed on public law enforcement or even private
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investigators working on civil cases, the media are in unique
positions to discover certain types of frauds.
5.1.8 SPECIAL INTEREST FRAUD INVESTIGAORS
As of January 1981, three states-Florida, California and
New York- had established special units to investigate insurance
fraud cases. Investigators in these units do not simply react to
frauds suspected by insurance personnel. They search existing
data bases of claim information for patterns of activity that
might indicate fraud.
In Florida, all crnpanies are required to sutmit information
on bodily injury, fire, and stolen property claims to the Florida
Division of Insurance Fraud for input into camputerized files.
(More detail on Florida's Fraud Division can be found in the
appendix). Division claim indices are used to detect
victimization.
5.1.9 INFOFONI'S
Through the information they provide, informants expose
fraudulent activities that might otherwise remain concealed.
Informants can be culled through law enforcenent channels (secret
grand juries, mnretary incentives such as rewards for information
leading to the arrest and conviction of. . .) , or they can
simply appear an their own volition (8]1. Fraud informers tend to
fall into four types: (1) individuals who are "turned,"
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targetted or picked up for other, often minor offences; (2)
"whistle-blowers" who either want out of the fraud operations or
want to indict their former colleagues; (3) public spirited
individuals who believe it- is their duty to inform the
appropriate authorities when rule violations occur or (4) regular
police informants who stumble on insurance fraud operations.
5.1.9.1 Turned, Targetted Or Picked-up Offenders -
Typically, these informers are picked up for related
crimes-i.e. arson or auto theft-and provide information on the
kingpins of their operations. A torch charged with arson might
inform on the individuals who hired him. In the Suffolk County
arson conspiracy trial in 1978 thirty-three people were indicted
on the testimony of one torch who "turned." After a Florida man
was arrested for selling stolen stereo equipment, he agreed to
testify against a friend, who he says actually gave him the
equipnent to sell. The friend filed a phoney theft report with
his insurer (caseno. 18). In a separate case a man was arrested
for possession of a stolen tractor-trailer. This man, a relative
of the original owner, told police officers that the owner had
arranged to have the vehicle stolen as part of an insurance fraud
oper ation (case no. 31) . Two attorneys in Baltimore pled guilty
to tax evasion, a lesser charge, in exchange for testimony
against other attorneys involved in a personal injury fraud ring
8. The use of informrers raises issues about legitimacy and
reliability of information provided.
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(ICPI Reports July/August 1980;6)
5.1.9.2 Whistle-blowers -
Occasionally, insiders to a fraud operation will inform on
their colleagues. An inside informant: touched off investigation
into an auto theft fraud operation involving a Braintree,
Massachusetts salvage yard operator (Boston Globe 8/29/80),. The
Insurance Crime Prevention Institute reports that a chiropractor
quit his job with a Los Angeles clinic and then told authorities
about falsified billing schemes because "he didn't like what was
going on." (ICPI Reports May, June, July, 1979;15) The ICPI also
reports that an "irate" former employee of a Chicago driving
school tipped local authorities to the school director's habit of
inflating accident claims (ICPI Reports. March/April 1979;8).
5.1.9.3 Public Spirited Individuals -
Most investigators interviewed in this research, no matter
what their auspice, cited anonymous tips as a significant source
of fraud discovery. In a Florida case a neighbor told local
police about a couple who had not lost their jewelry as they
claimed to both the police and the insurance anpany, but had
stored those items at a relative's hame instead. The case was
referred to the Division of Insurance Fraud for investigation
(case no.13). In another Florida case neighkrrs told officials
of the state enplcymrent bureau that a man receiving workers'-
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canpensation benefits was actually working. Again, the Division
investigated (case no. 64). Insurance campanies receive tips
about false claims or information about where allegedly stolen
items can be recovered. People call, for example, and inform
claims representatives that "the car they are looking for can be
found on the corner of Cherry and Cedar" and then hang up the
phone (interview no. 20). Because these tips are anonymous,
there is little information about who these people are and what
miotivates them to inform. How often these tips result in further
investigation or how accurate or reliable data are cannot be
determined given existing data sources.
5.1.9.4 Police Informants -
Police informants on other matters may bring insurance
frauds to the attention of local law enforcement. The Insurance
Crime Prevention Institute was asked to cooperate in an
investigation after an insurance carrier paid $500 for
information on a murder and insurance fraud operation. According
to ICPI, the informant had taken his information to the police
before selling it to the insurance campany (ICPI Reprrts
May/June/July 1979). An ex-convict was approached by a fire
insurance claimant who wanted to kill one of his employees for
cooper ating with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobbacco and Firearms.
The ex-ccnvict took that information to the author ities and began
working for then in an undercover role to expose the arson
conspiracy (ICPI Repor ts. June, 1980) .
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5.2 THE EFECS OF LOCATICON ON DISCOVERY OPPORTUNITIES
Discovery agents differ in their structural location
vis-a-vis fraudulent transactions and the claim process. One's
structural position creates different incentives to look for
fraud and permits exposure of different fraud types and fraud
offenders. Claims personnel, for example, are able to notice
discrepancies in claim facts, but are limited in recognizing the
claim as part of an on-going pattern of fraud involving many
cnmpanies. A claims personnel's incentive to look for fraud is
associated with job pressures and rewards that emerge directly
from the insurance organizatian. The nature of claims processing
as street-level bureaucracy is often inconsistent with fraud
exposure and control. According to Lipsky's (1980) assessment of
street-level work, the routinization typical to street-level
functions reduces a bureaucrat's chance to discover unique
circumstances requiring flexible responses (1980;122). Thus, by
the nature of their work, claim processors are often limited in
fraud discovery and response.
Although conventional law enforcement is structurally
located to notice inconsistencies in loss events which might
indicate fraud, they appear to have few incentives for making
that information available to the apropr iate investigative
agencies. It would appear that police officers either are not
xonvinced that insurance fraud is a crime worthy of their
attention or are unaware of the signals or red flags which
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suggest that an insurance fraud has cucurred.
On the other hand, camunity groups and the media have
incentives for exposing selected frauds. In that sense they are
moral entrepreneurs exposing frauds which express the moral
outrage of interested parties. The resources and vantage points
afforded to the media and cannunity groups provide access into
fraudulent transactions which is often unavailable to traditional
claim processors and often not of interest to law enforcement.
Informants are a tremendous resource in fraud detection, but they
remain a relatively unpredictable source of fraud information.
Thus, the different structural locations and actors provide
different lenses through which to view fraudulent activity.
Although standing alone each agents sees only a piece of the
fraud picture, ccmbined the discovery agents could be an
effective collective discovery mechanism. Nevertheless, there
appeared to be relatively few instances of collective action
beyond the establishment of samll fraud units.
The analysis suggests that improvements in fraud detection
will rely on changing the vantage points of sane claim evaluators
and changing the incentive structures of those already
well-positioned to notice conditions suggesting fraud. The
develcoment of claim information indices (for example those
developed by the Florida Division of Insurance Fraud) have
exponentially increased the amount of information available. By
increasing the organizational memory of the industry as a whole,
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claim irdices increase the potential to recognize patterns of
behavior that might indicate fraud. However, as will be
discussed in the section which follows, this strategy is only one
of many available for fraud divnvery and is limited in terms of
the type of offences and offenders that can be exposed.
5.3 THE 'ECHNIQJES OF FRAUD DISCOVERY
The following section examines different techniques for
detecting insurance fraud. Discovery mechanisms can be grouped
under the following categories: audits, tests, strategic data
searches, development of informant networks and accidents. In
addition to describing the different discovery mechanisms
available to discovery agents, I consider how the insurance
process and the nature of fraud impinge on the effectiveness of
these strategies and contrast different methods in terms of their
incidence and effectiveness.
5.3.1 AUDITS
The discovery strategy most often discussed by claim
personnel was same form of audit. Audits are designed to expose
discrepancies or peculiarities in the arrangement of claim
details or presentation of claim settlements. Auditors typically
urcover single instances of fraud or repeated attenpts at
fraudulent behavior by a single fraud offender. Two forms of
audit are anon: (1) the financial and (2) the operational.
5-206
Financial audits assess the fairness of companies' financial
presentations, while operational audits determine whether
organizational goals are being achieved effectively-i.e.
econcmically and efficiently (Elliott and Willinghan, 1980). Of
the two audit forms, the operational is most relevant to this
discussion.
5.3.1.1 Post Claim Audits -
Supervisors typically review a portion of an adjuster's
caseload. Swift (1975) notes that over fifty percent of "desk
adjustments" are reviewed by indepEndent adjusters or appraisers,
while another twenty-five percent are "spot-checked" by
supervisory personnel.
Although, in many cases, audits are performed as a measure
of managerial control over employees, supervisory audits also may
disclose incidents of fraud. Successful fraud offenders deceive
insurance personnel into believing that their claims represent
cxnpensable losses. As adjusters become part of the offender's
manipulation of events, their actions require review. Since file
construction is a key element in the claiming process and all
adjuster actions are well ckcumented, file reviews may uncover
past mistakes and instances of fraud.
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Supervisory wditors may also detect instances when
insurance employees are involved wittingly in the deception.
Having noticed that a large number of auto physical damage claims
adjusted by a particular claim representative were repaired at a
particular body shop, investigators might check to see if there
were any non-professional associations between the adjuster and
the body shop to indicate that bribes or payoffs were offered and
accepted (interview no. 24),.
Internal auditors verify claim settlements through this use
of "audit letters" sent to claimants after settlement drafts have
been issued to them. The claimants are instructed to verify that
- they recieved settlements issued by the insurance cczpanies and
that the amounts received were equal to the amounts settled.
Although not helpful when claimants are part of the fraudulent
schemes, audit letters are useful when claimants are unaware of
frauds on their behalves. Discrepancies between what claimants
say they received and what the campany records show as paid have
uncovered irregularities on the part of attorneys, doctors and
other third parties who profit from claimants' losses by skinning
off part of the settlements. (US Department of Ctnerce, 1977)
5.3.1.2 Pre-settlement Fraud Audits -
In Massachusetts where auto theft fraud is estimated to
account for ate quarter of the theft claims sutnitted to the
state's insurers, the large insurance ompanies have established
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special auto theft fraud units, Similar units have been
established in areas where auto theft and auto theft ftr3and
incidence are high (for example, the New York metropolitan area,
Los Angeles and Chicago as well as other large cities). A small
group of "fraud specialists" focus exclusively on the
investigation of suspicious auto theft claims. The units differ
with respect to number and type of personnel involved and to the
unit's location in the claiming process (see appendix).
Associated with special investigative units for auto theft
fraud is an auditing system for auto theft claims. Profiles of
auto theft fraud have been developed to assist claim adjusters in
discovering fraud attempts and passing on their suspicions to
special fraud investigatir,. These profiles outline sets of
factors which tend to accrpany different fraud scenarios [9].
Caupanies differ with respect to exactly how these profiles are
used. Same cxpanies simply list the factors as red flags to
sensitize adjusters to the possiblities of fraud as they pursue
normal claims adjustment. Other ccmpanies have developed a
formal point system to analyze the import of any suspicious
items.
Interestingly, insurers now take items which were once asked
only for suspicious claims and ask them routinely for all auto
thef t claims. The rew auto thef t claim system assumes that a
large portian of clajirs will be fraudulent and, thus, claimants
9. The auto thef t prof iles developed by the SIUl staf f were
identical in each campany visited durting this research.
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are asked, at the outset, to supply adjusters with information
that would have been asked previously only if the claims required
further investigation. New claim forms and procedures enabling
adjusters to capture ali information necessary for fraud
assessments at their initial contacts with claimants have been
developed. As additional data items are identified, they are
incorporated into the system. For example, when it became clear
that claimants subnitting phoney auto theft claims had no way to
account for how they got home after their cars were allegedly
stolen, companies incorporated the question "how did you get
home?" into their claim procedures. If claimants say with a
friend or by cab, that information can be easily verified. Thus,
the fraud audits are designed to evaluate current claims by
collecting all data which past experience suggests will be
relevant to insuranc personnel. Using the profiles as guides,
adjusters make inferences about fraud [10]. Although the current
claim may be ocnpared to previous claims, it is the eventual
disposition of the current claim which is of primary concern to
those using the fraud audit system.
10. One problem with the audit system is that it might
"over-sesitize" adjusters so that they lvk for fraud in
every claim. Fraud investigators note that "a little
education can be a bad thing" when adjusters overstep their
bonds and play amateur detective. Although, formally, the
adjuster's role is to detect fraud and leave the
investigation to specialists, adjusters may over-react and
try to prove the case of fraud themselves, often with
disasterous results-e,g, when fraud investigation was not
warranted and the claimants instituted bad faith actions
against the insurer.
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5.3.1.2.1 Example: The Fraud Audit System For Auto Theft -
Since the fraud audit system is most developed for auto
theft claims, it will be used to illustrate the system. Red
flags indicating the possibility of fraud are clustered around
five categories: the claim, the claimant, the loss, the risk
insured, and the conditions of vehicle and insurance purchase.
These red flags are designed to sensitize claim evaluators to
possible discrepancies in claim details. Although it is rarely
possible to deny a claim on the basis of any one red flag, the
existence of several red flags outlines the set of circumstances
fram which fraud can be inferred (i.e. the circumstantial case).
The forty red flags are assigned weights ranging from one to
five. If any of these items are present in a claim, the
associated score for the items is tabulated. A total claim score
of three or more indicates the possibilty of fraud and suggests
further investigation by the adjuster or referral to the fraud
specialist. According to the audit system, items weighted three,
four and five (thirty-three out of the forty items) are red flags
in and of themselves and suggest more investigation. Examples of
the types of indicators used to assess fraud are listed below.
The list is not identical to that used by insurance personnel.
It is illustrative, not exhaustive.
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TABIE 5-3 ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF FRAUD INDICATRS
1. Inconsistencies- e.g. signatures that don't
match, dates which do not jibe, missing details-are
examples of red flags associated with the claim
document. Adjusters ccmpare claim docients to other
documents, for example, police reports, to determine
whether the story remains the same each time it is
told.
2. If insurance coverage was obtained or increased
innediately before a loss, the profile suggests that
the claim bears further scrutiny.
3. If claimants avoid contact with insurance personnel
by giving incorrect hcne addresses, being unavailable
or in other ways not cooperative with insurance claims
representatives, the profiles suggest there may be
intent to comit fraud.
4. Actions which suggest that the claimant is nervous
about claim settlement, e.g. pressuring for a quick
settlement or avoiding the US mails when claim filing
(avoiding possible mail fraud charges), are other
indicators that suggest the claim may be fraudulent.
5. A claimant's ince, debts, or other signs of
financial distress could suggest a motive for fraud.
Claims representatives try to assess whether a
claimant's incame could support the claim that was
filed.
6. The timing and location of losses may suggest
fraud. Losses which occur late at night in secluded
spots shortly after insurance was purchased require
further investigation.
7. Cars recovered totally burned are immediately
suspect as are cars recovered with ignitions intact and
no sign of the keys. *
8. Car features which make the vehicle a likely
candidate for a fraudulent claim (e.g. gas guzzlers)
or items which could be used to inflate the value of a
claimn (e.g. expensively custcnmized vans) are also red
flags.
9. Cars that are allegedly retuilt, previously stolen
and recovered, or recently involved in a collision are
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suspect. If the claimant has comprehensive (theft)
coverage, but no collision, claims personnel are
instructed to investigate further.**
10. Actions which might indicate that fraud offenders
are hiding the prior condition of the car, the amount
paid for the car or actual ownership are also red
flags. Cash payments, duplicate or unavailable titles
submitted as proof of ownership, out of state purchase,
insurance purchased immediately before a loss or
purchased fran an agent far away from the claimant's
home or business also raise questions about a
claimant's intent.
* Cars cbn't burn
Unless the car
have to "pop" the
point B.
totally unless the fire has been set.
was started with a key, auto thieves
ignition to move cars from point A to
** This flag suggests that claimants may
collision coverages for the accident
inventing stories of theft in order to
for the damages under theft policies.
not have had
and are now
collect money
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Clearly, red flags do not provide absolute proof of
fraudulent intent. In fact, nearly all of the circumstances
which are red flags for fraud can be explained in legitimate
terms. Economic and property conditions do change, while
policyholders innocently forget to keep their insurance carriers
informed. Thus, while red flags sensitize claims personnel to
irssible frauds, they have limited value in actually proving
fraud, since most red flag items can be justified by offenders
wise to the system. The discrepancies in claim facts which the
red flags highlight can be used as annunition in negotiating
claim settlements. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in claiming
behavior can be employed as a threatening device to force
claimants to settle early and for less.
5.3.1.2.2 Requirements For A Successful Audit System -
Although some conpanies have established profiles for other
auto frauds (e.g. bodily injury, collision, etc.) a similar
system did not appear to be in place for other property frauds
nor for casualty related frauds. Sane cxnpanies did indicate
that a system was being developed for hcmeowner burglary claims.
Interestingly, claims personnel had limited confidence in the
success of the burglary system because (1) unlike cars which are
often recovered, items stolen in hczne burglaries are rarely
recovered and (2) unlike cars which have title systems to
&nruent cownership, personal property is hard to trace. The
difficulties in establishing an audit system for hamieowner
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burglary claims points to same essential requirements for audit
systems and suggests reasons why an audit would lead to discovery
in one context and not another.
.Discovery through an audit system relies on the ability to
predict and standardize losses so that deviance from the norm is
easy to recognize. In order for routinized procedures to be
effective, the data elements which are collected need to be
standard, clearly defined and easily verified so that they can be
quickly evaluated. Thus, only certain types of losses, those
with a limited and easily identified set of causes and effects
are amenable to a fraud audit system.
Because claims personnel know enough about cars to easily
assess damages, claims involving autos are more likely candidates
for a fraud audit system than claims involving damages which are
harder to assess (e.g. bodily injury). Since cars don't burn
fran front to back unless an accelerant is used to ignite the
fire, cars recovered totally burned are suspicious. One 1978
Cheverolet looks very much like another. A solid understanding
of the mechanics is possible so that an appraiser can isolate
damage and offer judgment, based on a limited set of
pssibilities, as to what caused the loss. An appraiser can tell
whether a car was dr iven with a key or without, whether damage
was new or old or what ecpuipment had been on the car at the time
of the loss (interview no.16) [11] . The great var iety of items
stolen in hare burglar ies arnd the significant dif ferences in hame
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design, defy adjusters' attempts to become similarly acquainted
with all the possible problems and defects that would allow for
easy evaluation and verification of home burglary claims.
The ability to quickly assess losses through physical review
or easily accessed documentary evidence is also important to
routinized audit procedures. Although many frauds are confirmed
only after lengthy document searches (the paper chase), most
discovery appears to rely on the "quick hit." Cars, unlike home
furnishings, have relatively public existences which can be
researched. Cars are registered and inspected by the state and
serviced at local gas stations. No similar history, beyond a
simple receipt, documents the existence of home furnishings.
5.3.1.2.3 Neutralizing The Audit System -
Routinizing the audit/discovery mechanism, unfortunately for
insurance capanies, provides fraud offenders with information on
how to beat the system. By asking for specific data, claims
representatives provide potential offenders with the necessary
requirements for building legitimate claims. Several years ago
insurance canpanies began requiring receipts for car accessories
and items stolen in home tnrglar ies. Ncw everyone subnits
receipts, legitimate or otherwise, in suppor t of their claims.
Because everyone submits receipts, they are far less useful as a
11. One Flor ida Division of Insurance Fraud case was initially
discovered when an appraiser noted that a specialized winch
claimed by the plicyholder could not have f it on the car in
the first place.
5-216
screening device for detecting potential offenders nor as useful
for verifications of ownership.
The fraud audit system provides the structural outline for
the manipulation of loss images. Claimants are able to provide
claims adjusters with all the correct (i.e. legitimate) claim
respcnses. Individuals aware of the claims process know what
items tend to be disallowed and why. Many claiants know that
they are not covered for items stolen out of a vehicle unless
there are clear indications that the car was entered by force
(broken windows, broken locks). If claimants wish to submit that
type of claim, they may create the breaks themselves. Several
claimants interviewed in this research noted that on their second
claims they knew when receipts were needed and when not and they
manipulated their claims accordingly. Labelling a piece of
jewelery as a family heirlcrn, for example, can negate the need
for a receipt.
A coxpany's system of control can be subverted by claimants
when they use the system to add credibility to their claims.
Insurance cuIpanies often accept photographs as documentation
that items now claimed as stolen were actually in the claimants
pssession at the time of loss. One f raud of fender bor rcwed
proper ty (a television set, stereo, silver) , planted it in his
own hcne, took a picture and returned the proper ty to his f riend.
Shorwtly ther eaf ter he reported that he had been robbed and that
his television set, stereo and silver were taken. The claimant
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used the photos to document that he had possession of the items
at the time of the burglary (interview no.7),.
Sane insurance ampanies have started sending verification
letters to prior owners of cars now claimed as stolen and
unrecovered. These letters are used to document the existence
and prior cxnditicn of the vehicles. By providing a check on
part of a claimant's story insurance personnel hope these letters
will deter claimants from inflating tha value of their cars and
catch instances where cars never existed in the first place [121.
According to one fraud investigator, as soon as that procedure
became routinized, professional fraud offenders developed a
system to neutralize it. By selling the cars to each other for
nominal consideration (similar to the approach taken to inflate
the value of property in arson for profit schemes), fraud
offenders can build a title history for the vehicle. Since one
ring miber sells to another, all prior owners listed on the
vehicle's certificate of title are part of the ring. Thus, prior
owner letters are sent to miers of the fraud ring who will
always substantiate the value and condition of the car and, thus,
the claim. The intent of the prior owner letter is subverted
when fraud offenders use the system to add credibility to their
fraudulent claims.
A similar scenar io may acaompany the institution of
12. Ore claims manager who used the pr ior letter form on all
theft cases noted that cxompliance was high. He estimated
that 80-90% of all letters sent elicited responises.
(interview no.13)
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gift/donor letters. Because many claims include "gifts" for
which no verifying receipts are available, insurance campanies
are considering asking claimants to provide the names of donors
who can verify that the items were actually given as presents.
Although copany officials believe that engaging a third party
(the donor) into the fraud will deter same claimants from
cxmitting fraud, others note that same fraud offenders will use
the gift/ donor letter to add additional credibility for their
false claims.
5.3.1.2.4 Efficacy Of Fraud Audits As A Detection Technique -
By formalizing the audit system fraud investigators have
limited their effectiveness in discovering certain types of fraud
ccmitted by certain offenders, primarily professionals. Amateur
fraud offenders, often the one time defrauder, are most likely to
be discovered through the routinized audit system simply because
they are unaware of the claims procedures. Professionals who are
aware of the system have a greater chance of beating it.
Methods designed to deter potential fraud offenders, in
particular strategies to engage innocent third parties into the
deceit, may actually work to build credibility for the offender.
Claimants" fraudulent statements about proper ty owner ship, and
cunditian are verified by third parties who willingly aid the
claimants in defrauding insurance carriers. Third parties may
participate because they are part of a larger fraud operation or
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simply because they see no moral wrong in helping a friend get a
"little extra" from the insurance system.
Fraud audit systems also are limited because their
effectiveness depends on recognizing deviance in otherwise
predictable sets of events. Only certain types of losses are
associated with that degree of predictablility-losses involving
standard, easily identifiable property. Losses which involve
unique sets of risks (individuals) for which cause and
ansequences are uncertain are less amenable to the fraud audit
system.
The use of an audit system, therefore, implies a choice in
the type of offence and offender detected and deterred. The
implicit choice is to detect a greater number of marginal
offenders at a relatively low cost per detection and hope that a
smaller number of larger fraud offenders will be detected through
other means.
5.3.2 TESTING
Insurance frauds may be discovered through tests similar to
those given by employers to test the honesty of their employees
or law enforcement and constner groups to expose bad business
practices. (See, Jesilcn and O'Brien (1980) for a study of
testing as a system for deterring auto repair fraud.) Tests are
used nost often to detect rule breaking in decisians to grant
publicly mandated benefit programs (pensions, state disability
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systems, medicaid and welfare) and to test the quality and
quantity of service provided by third parties (particularly
doctors and hospitals in medicaid claims). New York City's
pension medical board was tested by the city's Department of
Investigation when an undercover detective filed a fraudulent
disability claim using x-rays from another person's back injury.
The Department of Investigation provided the board with films
that showed the claimant playing sports and lifting heavy boxes
while he was allegedly disabled. Despite the evidence, the board
awarded a disability pension for over $20,000 a year.
Interestingly, the pension board doctors were not cited for
wrongdoing. An overburdened case load was cited as the reason
for what was described as insufficient attention placed on each
claim request ( Boston Globe April 15, 1982;21.)
In the property-casualty fraud arena the testing strategy
was discussed in reference to testing the credibility of body
shops. An accidental case of testing eventually led to criminal
investigation when an insurance agent uncovered a fraud ring
while trying to get his legitimate car damage repaired.
Personnel at the body shop, probably unaware of his occupation,
"propositioned" the agent to engage in a bodily injury fraud
scheme (ICPI 1eports March/Apr il 1979;8) . In this case the agent
reported the solicitation.
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5.3.3 STRATEGIC DATA SEARCHES
Another form of discovery-strategic searches of data
bases-has been enhanced by cnoputer technology. Searches are
conducted on data bases which include information on all claims,
legitimate or otherwise, filed with certain cupanies, in certain
geographical areas or for certain types of losses. Typically
strategic data searches are used to caoipare two or more events in
order to find out aditicnal information about a particular
person/event.
Centralized data bases increase the organizational memory of
the industry as a whole and, thus, increase the potential to
recognize patterns of fraud. Without such centralized data
bases, fraud offenders could disperse their frauds amcng a number
of ccrpanies and no one aonpany, or particular branch office
necessarily would have the fraud experience to recognize the
claim or claimant as part of a fraud scheme. The combined
experience of a centralized data base increases, exponentially,
the information available for cxmparative claim analysis.
5.3.3.1 Cmputer Indices -
In Florida, the Division of Insurance Fraud maintains a
XNmputer index of all bodily injury and stolen property claims.
When current claims are input into the index, information on
previous claims is output. Similarities are noted and relayed to
the approprilate insurance personnel.
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Florida investigators also use their indices to ferret out
violations that cut across many seemingly dissimilar claims.
Investigators might examine their data base to see if a
doctor-lawyer ocxxbination appearing on one claim systematically
appears on many other claims. If so, investigators may detect a
pattern indicating the operation of a fake accident ring. Since
the crjuter search generates a list of claims involving the
targetted canbination, the search also provides a list of
potential aomplainants, both insurance canpanies and
policyholders who may be unaware of the extent of the claims
filed on their behalves [13] .
The Property Claims Service of the American Insurance
Association, an umbrella organization for property-casualty
insurance capanies, has developed a cxxnputerized registry of
property, mainly fire, claims. Four hundred and ninety-one
campanies subscribe to this service which went "on line" in
January, 1980 [14]. Adjusters are required to subit receipts of
all fire losses exceeding $500 to the Property Insurance Loss
Registry (PILR). Claim information is maintained for five years.
13. This is a form of third-party exploitation of losses. A
policyholder may know only that the claim payment was sent to
the attorney and that the thousand dollar paymnt, coverUing
the policyholder's legitimate costs, was, in fact, received.
What the policyholder might rot know is that the doctor and
lawyer padded the claim to the tune of ten thousand dollars.
When the payment was received by the attorney, one thousand
dollars was sent to the policyholder . The attorney and
doctor then split a handsane nine thousand dollar prof it.
14. The service began collecting information, hcwever, in
December , 1979.
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The Property Insurance Loss Registry is used to inform
subscribers of other recorded claims which bear similarities to
recent claims. Four computerized searches are conducted
routinely for fire claims submitted to the index. These searches
provide information regarding: undisclosed insurance (attempts
to claim the same loss fram different campanies); previous
claims involving the insured; previous claims emanating from
current loss locations; claims reported fram policyholders'
previous addresses; and other claims which include any
combination of names involved in the current loss (e.g. named
insured on current loss appearing as a mortgagee or contractor on
a subsequent report). If any of the searches bears fruit, a
report is issued listing previous losses with characteristics
similar to the current loss.
PfLR information is provided only to the officers of the
subscribing cxmpanies as there is sone concern that the
information may be abused.
"It is expected that the recipient of the Register's
information will be in supervisory level and will retain the
file, only passing along to subordinates pertinent data
therefrom with instructions for its use. Since the Register
staff has no means of verifying [the] accuracy of data
subnitted by adjusters, and the purpose of the Register
reports is to alert subscribers to the need for further
investigation and [to] caiience building a civil defense,
circumstantial evidence file, it will be necessary for
subscribers to use their initiative in verifying and
building upon the information sent to themi." (W.D.Swif t, VP
Claims-Amer ican Insurance Association-, January 15-16,
1980.)
Although many claims personnel interviewed here suggested that
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the PILR system could provide assistance in detecting fraud,
there was little indication that the system was used very often.
Limited use may be explained by the fact that the system had only
recently started operating when this research was conducted,
however, and, thus, may not reflect a negative evaluation of
PILR's efficacy in detecting fraud.
The National Auto Theft Bureau (NATB) is a clearing house
for information on vehicle theft and salvage. Many states have
adopted legislation requiring law enforcement officials and/or
insurance personnel to submit auto theft reports to the National
Auto Theft Bureau (NATB). The agency maintains records of all
vehicles reported stolen and all vehicles reported "totalled" and
sold as salvage. (Acording to insurance definition a car is
totalled when the cost of repair exceeds the book value of the
car.) These records can be used to detect "paper car schemes."
Fraud offenders who employ this scheme purchase the certificate
of title for a salvaged vehicle, use the title to insure the
non-existent car and then report the car stolen. Since the cars
never existed, they can never be recovered. When a new auto
theft report is entered into the NATB system, a routine search is
conducted of the existing data base to determine whether the
Vehicle Indentification Number of the car now reported stolen had
heen previously entered as a total loss. A match, suggests that
the new claim involves a paper car. As an indication of the
insurance ccnmunity's growing awareness of the auto theft fraud
problem and acceptance of the use of carjuterized indices to
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detect their own victimization, meiber capanies increased their
use of the salvage information data base by one hundred percent
from 1978 to 1979 (NATB Annual Reort, 1979;6).
Operationally, the use of ccupter indices raises sce
serious questions, particularly with respect to what gets
detected and the reliability of the information provided. We
know, for example, that if fraud is attempted at the first
opportunity (i.e. the first claim), it will not be detected
since the index system relies on carparison to previous claims.
Because indices are supported by "mamer cpanies" one also
wonders whether data fran ron-member ecompanies is excluded and,
if so, the importance of that exclusion. Are non-member
cipanies without the financial incentives and/or resources to
support the index system defrauded more often or are they less
able to discover frauds? Are other fraud situations similarly
ignored? If so, over-reliance on a cnputer index may result in
categories of fraud which are systematically ignored.
Similarly questions can be raised about cnmpliance. One
claims manager noted that claims personnel are unlikely to fill
out the necessary index forms unless they can be certain that,
should they need the index information, it can be obtained in a
useful and timely fashion. He noted that few entr ies are sent to
the burglary index (a manual system) because no useful
information is derived f ran that index (interview no. 14) . Are
data about certain types of claims and/or claimants
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systematically missing from these data bases? One must review
the quality of the data as well. What are the error rates? Are
these rates serious enough to cause one to question the
reliability of aicruter "hits?"
Access to these data bases typically depends on one or more
predetermined variables (e.g. claimant's name, claim number,
etc.). Ccmputer access requirements may limit the usefulness of
such searches if arcess variables can be easily manipulated. For
example, indices which focus on name searches may be neutralized
by the use of multiple names. If cars are registered under
different family neubers' names, corporate names or even aliases,
it is unlikely that the cmputer index will recognize the link
between individuals. An example of an index system gone awry is
the Massachusetts Merit Rating Board. The system was designed to
add surcharges to insurance premiums of policyholders or car
operators who were involved in accidents. People are changing
names, getting phoney licenses, all in order to beat the
surcharge system. Over-reliance on couputer systems for fraud
detection may permit same offender types to systematically beat
the system.
Despite the level of use or problems associated with
camputerized searches, the mere existerce of ccmputerized
mechanisms for indexing claim repor ts may have significant
deterrent effects which are hard to measure but which cannot be
ignored. The deterrent factor may be wore symtolic than real as
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people tend to ascribe to caputer systems fantastic powers of
deduction and detection which may or may not be technically
realizable. However, the symbolic threat of "crputer
surveillance" may be significant enough to overcome the practical
problems cited above and to deter the marginal offender.
5.3.3.2 Personal Information Networks -
Strategic data-base searches are not limited to the
computerized systems described ainve. In one large metropolitan
area, special auto theft fraud investigators meet on a monthly
basis to discuss fraud cases involving stolen vehicles. These
meetings can perform the same informational function as
compaterized data search systems. The meetings are used as a
forum to discuss suspicious cases and, through open discussion,
to discover cases in which the same claim is submitted to several
coapanies or cases in which the same car is used for a number of
different claims. Investigators might report on all claims
submitted for thefts of Lincolns, Mercedes and Corvettes, car
types orcnnly used in auto theft frauds. Investigators might
also report on individual claimants of whcm they are suspicious
and ask their fellow investigators for any additional information
about these individuals (interview no. 23) r15].
Virtually every special investigator interviewed credited
15. Recently the Massachusetts state legislature passed an
imunity statute for the exchange of information nmng
insurance campanies investigating auto theft fraud.
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this type of information exchange with helping their efforts to
*over auto theft fraud. On the other hand, consumers might
have same cause for concern over the free exchange of sometimes
confidential material. It is not known what criteria prompts
investigators to release the names of claimants or if names are
released on an ad hoc basis. One investigator canented that it
would be "troublesane if the public knew what was going on in
these meetings" (interview no. 23).
5.3.3.3 Efficacy Of Strategic Data Searches -
Strategic searches appear to work best in detecting
sophisticated fraud operations involving many participants over a
relatively long period of time. More often than not, strategic
searches are conducted outside of the normal adjustment process
either by insurance personnel designated specifically as fraud
specialists or by outside agencies. The methocl used to select
likely fraud offenders varies from routine spot checks of
cmuterized indices to information generated by other fraud
investigators or law enforcement agencies or informants.
Although data to address questions of efficacy are not
available currently, future research should consider the
following. Under what cxnditicns are cxzputer searches
eplayed-e.g. when a fraud specialist's case load is low?, for
political reasons? What criteria are used to select targets?
Are save offender types systematically included or excluded?
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What are the expected outomes of these searches? Is the
information generated to be used in the claim process, for claim
denials, or for criminal prosecution? How successful are these
forms of discvery-i,e, how often do they achieve their expected
OutMes?
5.3.4 CULLING INFCR1N1S
As exposing fraud rings often requires the testimony of
those who have knowledge of ring activities (see Chapter 4,
Section 2.3), the developnent of informant systems can be a
useful strategy for fraud exposure. Informants can be coerced
into providing information with threats of arrest on other
matters (see section 1.8 above). Investigators have used the
threat of subpoena to "convince" investigation subjects that they
should "willingly" provide information (interview no. 65),. The
establishment of secret grand juries can also be used as an
investigative device for discovering information on fraud and
other business-related crimes. (See Marx, 1980 for more on the
developient of informant networks to discover hidden and dirty
data.)
Insurance cmrrpanies have begun to formalize the public
informant system thrcugh the development of TIP Arson Award
Programs. In Michigan $1,000 is offered for information leading
to the arrest and conviction of persons responsible for
particular fires. Acxrrding to Arson News (January, 1981) , since
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its inception in July, 1975, twenty-six payments have been made
by the Michigan program. Insurance cxzrpanies may also take
advantage of existing informant networks for the recovery of
stolen property to discover possible frauds. Klockars (1974) and
Lipson (1975) recognize the existence of organized informant
systems by insurance investigators.
5.3.5 AMIDENAL DISCOVERY
According to a majority of the fraud investigators
interviewed here, a large percentage of frauds are discovered by
accident. Unfortunately, accidental discovery is hard to typify
because it is a chance, usually one-time event. Typically the
discoverer is not looking for fraud, but stumbles on to it.
Accidental discovery can occur within the insurance claims
process, for example, when a filing clerk notices a discrepancy
on the claim form. Several claim managers related stories about
frauds discovered in casual conversations among adjusters. In
one case an adjuster was having a problem with a claim and
mentioned the name of the claimant when describing his problem to
a fellow adjuster. The second adjuster recognized the name from
other claims he had worked on while employed at another canpany.
The two canpared notes and the fraud was exposed. In another
case fraud was exposed when two adjusters fram different
carpanies covering the sane risk arrived simultaneously at the
same loss scene (interview no. 10) . This double dijping might
have gone undetected except for the chance meeting of the two
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adjusters. Frauds by a cnpany adjuster were discovered when a
report by the adjuster was found in an unmatched claim file with
the file jacket missing. While searching for the correct jacket,
other adjusters exposed discrepancies and similarities in other
claims adjusted by this individual which implicated him for his
part in defrauding the ampany (156-255).
In Cleveland, a local news station reported on the bizarre
circumstances of a recent robbery. Two individuals had been
robbed while parked in their car. The thieves allegedly
handcuffed the pair to the steering whecl before taking off with
their spoils. One of the victims had an unusual name which was
recognized by an adjuster listening to a news broadcast covering
the bizarre incident. The adjuster located the insurance carrier
involved with the loss, cnmpared notes and discovered that the
claimants had fabricated that same robbery story on several
occasions and had submitted claims with several insurers (ICPI
Reprts Jan/Feb/ March 1980;6).
Many frauds perpetrated by third parties on behalf of
policyholders who have no knowledge of the claims are discovered
when policyholders actually have occasion to submit claims.
Then, much to the surprise of the innocent policyholders,
ad justers question then alnut their previous claims.
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Frauds may also be exposed in the course of other
investigations. In Los Angeles, an insurance fraud ring was
exposed when an undercover agent involved in obtaining illegal
prescriptions was solicited by a doctor to participate in an auto
accident scheme. (ICPI Reports July/August 1980;1.) In Florida,
a phoney boat theft operation was discovered after a boat
operator was picked up on Fish and Game charges. Detectives
noticed that the boats serial numbers had been filed off.
Checking the stolen property index they learned that the boat had
been reported stolen and a claim paid for it several years
earlier (R79-152).
5.4 TE WFECT C' 'ECHNIFJE _ UECICXDETE OPPQRI NITIES
The implementation of one or another discovery strategy
suggests an implicit choice in the kinds of offenders/offences
that may be exposed. Discovery strategies are not universally
effective, nor as was shown in the first section of this chapter,
universally accessible. Discovery strategies also differ
according to the types of information that may be disclosed and
the relative certainty that the information is a good indicator
of a claimant's intent to deceive. Finally, discovery strategies
differ in terms of their departure fram normal claims process and
their easy implenentation into routine claims prcedures.
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Audits do not depart significantly fran the tradition of
claim verification. The questions asked may be different, the
orientaticn to the claim may change, but the tradition of
questioning claim facts remains within the boundaries of routine
claims prxcessing as claimants expect to be asked to elaborate
claim details. Opportunities to discrver frauds through an audit
system can be built directly into the insurance system. Audits
are limited however, because they depend on the standardization
of losses and loss crsequences which is not typical of the
uncertain and contingent conditions for which insurance is
usually obtained. Additionally, routinization of the audit
system provides the seeds for its neutralization. Clients learn
how to use the system and how to beat it.
Strategic data searches rely on predicted or expected
behavior patterns as well. Cmputer ized systems are progranned
to match specific data items. Over-reliance on conputer
technology to detect victimization may cause frauds which do not
fit the expected pattern to go undetected. Thus, there is an
inherent limit to the types of fraud that may be detected through
canputer searches. Questions regarding claimants' rights to
privacy and unrestrained and unregulated information exchange may
be raised as well.
Testing for fraud was not a strategy that appars to be used
very often in cases of insurance fraud. One can speculate that
it is limited in terms of volwre of cases discnvered since it
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often is employed for specific offenders over short periods of
time. The developrent of informant networks also appears as a
detection strategy when specific offenders and sets of events
have been identified previously as saewhat suspicious.
Aocidental discovery was discussed quite often by
investigators participating in this research, however it is hard
to typify and to predict. Although one can structure sare
activities to increase the chances of accidental discovery (e.g.
encouraging more informal discussions aiong adjusters), for the
nost part, aridental discovery cannot be planned.
This discussion raises question for further policy analysis.
To what extent are choices made amng types of offences/offenders
exposed, who makes the choice and how are these decisions
reached? Discovery decisions may focus on which frauds do the
iost damage or which are the easiest to catch. We would expect
variation to depend on the discoverers' goals in exposing deceit:
apprehension of fraud suspects, deterrence of future frauds, or
simply generation of information useful to claims process.
Future research should assess whether insurance cnmpany goals are
different and perhaps in conflict with their clients' goals or
with nnre general enforcement goals.
The next chapter examines the enforcement ovpt ions available
to social control agents once fraud is detected. The cvtions
social control agents chcose often depend on the quantity and
quality of information provided through the discovery process.
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CHAPTER 6
UNRAVELLING ECEPTIG
Individuals who suspect fraud react to their suspicions in
different ways. Sane ignore fraud and, in so doing, implicitly
discxunt their own suspicions. If frauds are ignored, they
remain hidden from all but the initial detectors. Others who
suspect fraud disclose their suspicions and investigate in order
to prove their suspicions right or wrong. In this chapter I
examine what mechanisms are available for unravelling deception
[1]. In the following chapter I outline the enforcement options
and indicate how insurance process, fraudulent behavior and
available investigatory techniques influence enforcement
dCcisions.
Individuals responsible for investigating suspected
1. Investigating claim facts to determine fraud is a different
order phenneron than examining claims for technical
violations. Adjusters routinely are resprnsible for
ascertaining whether a claimant coplied with the claiming
procedures aM, if not, the claim is denied. Negating a
claim because of a technical violation is not the same as
proving misrepresentation or fraud. Investigators have
suggested that on ocrasion, suspected frauds will be denied
on the basis of a technical violation, if no other means for
claim denial is available.
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insurance fraud are connected to one of six organizations types:
(1) claims representatives who, in the course of conventional
claims adjustment, unravel frauds; (2) salaried employees of
insurance campanies (typically part of special investigative
units); (3) private investigators working under contract to
insurance ccnpanies; (4) investigators employed by one of a
number of profit or not-for-profit insurance service
organizations (e.g. the not-for-prof it Insurance Crime
Prevention Institute); (5) erployees of one of five state fraud
bureau or (6) public safety officials-local police, fire
marshalls, state or federal law enforcement. Organizations
specializing in fraud investigation are described in greater
detail in the Appendix.
The first section of this chapter examines questions raised
by the three types of fraud defined in Chapter One. The second
section looks at the general strategies for unravelling deceit.
Factors influencing the choice of a particular strategy are
considered in section three.
6.1 wJES1WS RAISED BY FALSE CAIMS
Insurance claims are accounts of victimization eligible for
cxmpensation fran insurance carriers. A fraudulent claim is one
in which loss details and circumistances have been manipulated so
that an ineligible or non-existent loss appears to be one that is
eligible for insurance ccompensation.
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Claims can be divided into oncrete, verifiable facts and
story-lines or threads which tie the facts together. An example
of a set of facts would be the following. My car is worth
$5,000. On October 1st my car was parked on the corner of Maple
and Cedar. My car is missing. A "thread" or "story-line" might
relate these facts to each other in the following way. My car,
worth $5,000 was stolen fram the corner of Maple and Cedar where
it was parked. Although investigators can verify that facts, as
stated, are or are not correct, story-lines or threads are often
non-verifiable. Thus, while one can establish that the car is
not there, it is harder to prove that it is not there because it
was stolen.
Fraud investigators try to discount claimants' stories or
images by presenting others. If a claimant states that she
visited a clinic on five separate occasions, investigators verify
those visits and, if they cannot, they try to show that the
claimant was actually samewhere else when she says she was at the
clinic. If claimants say that they are sick, investigators may
try to prove that they are healthy. If claimants say that their
businesses were thriving and the fires totally destroyed them,
investigators might try to establish that, in fact, the
tusinesses were failing even before the fires.
The three fraud types-exploiting losses, inventing stor ies
and creating losses-point to slightly different questions that
need to be addressed in fraud investigation. If investigators
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suspect that losses are exploited, they will try to determine
whether specific claim details "match" loss details obtained fran
other sources. Claim facts are at issue. If offenders invent
stories of losses that never happened, investigators will try to
determine that the loss-events did not or could not have occurred
by suggesting alternative stories of loss. At issue is the
explanation of events (e.g. this jewelry is not here because
there was a burglary). For the third type of fraud, created
losses, the issue is one of responsibility. Investigators try to
determine whether the losses were irduced and whether the
claimants are resgonsible [2]. These questions are not mutually
exclusive. Questions raised by a lower-order frauds, (e.g.
exploiting losses), are addressed in investigations of higher
order frauds, (e.g. created losses), when investigators fail to
answer the more complicated questions.
2. Arson investigations typify thoise designed to prove that
losses were created. Investigators examining fraud f ires
refer to the process of investigation as the "arson
triangle." Corpis delecti (establishing that the fire was
set) is the point ofCtEtriangle. The bases of the trilangle
are the subject's nntive and exclusive opportunity to set the
f ire (Karp, 1978).
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6.2 STRATEGIES
The strategies employed to address questions raised by false
claiming activity fall into one of the following categories:
dcumenting facts
creating counter images
setting up new cpprtunities or inducements
Strategy refers to a pattern of investigatory conduct which may
encxrpass a number of individual techniques (e.g. interviewing
and/or document research).
The three strategies reflect different temporal orientations
to unravelling deception. Again, these distinctions are
analytic. The investigation can include past, current or future
behavior. Documenting claim facts tends to involve the
investigation of past behavior (Was the car parked here?).
Creating counter images may include investigation of current or
past behavior (Were you financially healthy? Are you now in
financial ruin?). Setting up new ortunities for fraud
anticipates future behavior (Given the oprtunity, will you
comit fraud?).
The three strategies also dif fer in terms of the pr imary
focus of the investigation. Investigaticns into rule breaking
behavior can focus o the offence (what rules are broken), the
offender (who broke the rules) or same cxnbinatio of txth. For
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the most part, fraud investigations, unlike conventional law
enforcement activities, focus on the offence-what happened-
rather than the offender. According to an officer of the
California Highway Patrol,
"An insurance fraud case is different from other criminal
cases. In a standard criminal case, you have a crime which
has occurred and your problem is to figure out who did it.
In an insurance fraud case, you know who did it and your
problem is to prove that a crime occurred." (Los Aneles
Times August 7, 1980.)
Documenting claim facts and creating counter images tend to be
oriented to the offence, while setting up new opportunities for
fraud are strategies typically aimed at offenders.
Table 6-1
Investigatory Strategies
by Tenporal Dimensions and Focus
Offence -- Offender
Temporal Dimension
past document claim
facts
creating counter
current images
set up new
future opportunities
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6.2.1 DOCUMENrING CLAIM FACTS
Insurance claim facts can be related to any one of three
categories: the insurance policy (what's covered? for how
much?); the loss-event (who, what, where when and how?); and
the damages sustained. A fraud investigation may focus on any
one or all three of these categories.
6.2.1.1 Facts Surrounding Insurance Purchase -
Investigators examine the details of insurance purchase in
order to verify incxnsistencies between what is being claimed and
what was allegedly insured. Inconsistencies in claim facts often
involve the value or the existence of the risk insured,
ownership, or the timing between policy inception and loss. At
issue are events and behavior which are related to insurance
purchase (e.g. determining proprty value, or ownership) not
specific policy items.
In a Florida case involving an alleged auto theft fraud,
investigators checked into the legitimacy of a policyholder's
proof of sale used to establish vehicle ownership and to purchase
insurance. Investigators believed that the car never existed.
Using NATB records, they determined that a car with the vehicle
identification number stated on the "proof" of purchase was never
manufactured (case no. 32) . In another Florida case a innan
claimsd that her engagement ring icrth $1,000 was stolen.
Insurance wcipany personnel were suspicious of the claim.
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Investigators interviewed her estranged husband who provided
documentation that the ring was worth far less than the $1,000
claimed.
A discrepancy in property value was discovered accidentally
when fraud investigators interviewed a claimant's insurance agent
for policies covering property other than the $25,000 customized
van now claimed as stolen. (Insurance agents are standard
witnesses to a claimant's financial status, and other claim
experiences). Investigators learned that the claimant originally
tried to insure the vehicle in question for $9,000 but was
refused coverage because the agent did not represent cnrjanies
willing to accept such risks. When the claimant actually
purchased the $25,000 worth of insurance from a different agent,
he submitted a receipt for van customizing which, if legitimate,
would have increased the van's value. Investigators interviewed
personnel from the van custamizing crmpany and discovered that
the so-called receipt had actually been a quote-the work had
never been completed. The two facts- that the claimant had
originally tried to insure the van for $9,000 and that the
custmizing work was never cwrpleted- built a solid case of
fraudulent statements against the claimant (case no. 64).
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6.2.1.2 The Loss Event -
Investigators will check into all details of the loss as
claimed by the insured. As a first step investigators often
interview public safety officials (police, or fire officials) to
determine if the facts as stated by the claimants are consistent
with the officials' versions of events. Witnesses to the loss
events will be interviewed for their stories of what happened.
Discrepancies are noted and further research firms or denies
witnesses statements.
In several cases of alleged hit and run accidents, Florida
Division of Insurance Fraud investigators checked the license
number of cars the claimants stated hit them and found that the
plates were never issued. Since claimants may develop any one of
a number of justifications for why the numbers they provided were
incorrect -e.g. It was dark, maybe I really didn't see it
clearly-, false numbers may not be sufficient proof of fraud.
Nevertheless, they suggest that further inquiry is required.
In cases of "past posting" investigators may focus on the
date of loss-did the loss happen when the claimant said it did.
A Florida claimant stated that two gold rings were stolen from
his vehicle when he was moving out of his girlfriend's house.
Investigators interviewed the girlfriend and learned not only did
he nove out on a date different than the one claimed, but his car
had ben repossessed prior to the date of the loss. Bank records
confirned the date of repossession (case no. 15) .
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A wman claimed that her car had been stolen from a
restaurant parking lot where it had been parked overnight. She
stated that she left the car there because she seemed to have
sane engine trouble. The restaurant owner verified that the car
had been parked there. The date he recalled, however, was
significantly different than the one claimed. Further
investigation located the car in a garage on the night it was
allegedly stolen (case no. 17).
An anonymous tip to fraud investigators provided information
leading investigators to conclude that a reported auto theft was
actually a case of insurance fraud. The informant provided
investigators with the location of an allegedly stolen vehicle.
Investigators identified the vehicle as the one claimed as
stolen, interviewed the current owners and obtained a copy of the
check the current owner used to pay the claimant for the car
(case not. 41). In another case, investigators located items
allegedly stolen in the possession of a divorced spouse (case no.
22) [3].
6.2.1.3 Facts About Damages -
Policyholders typically dctnent their loss damage with
receipts, doctors' reports of injury, rredical bills, letters of
3.. This case has prcmpted investigators to routinely interview
divorced spouses for information on the whereabouts ard value
of property allegedly stolen.
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lost wages, pictures, etc. If investigators suspect that a claim
is fraudulent, suporting documents, whose authenticity can be
verified, are cxnvenient starting points for fraud
investigations.
In a case reported by the Insurance Crime Prevention
Institute, investigators researched receipts for surgical
equipment subnitted in what they suspected was a phoney bodily
injury claim. Personnel at the surgical equipment store noted
that such equipent was receipted routinely on forms quite
different than those subnitted by the claimant (ICPI
Reports-August/September 1979;3). Fraud investigators in Florida
discovered a case of phoney receipting by interviewing store
owners who could document that the prices stated on the
claimant's receipt were not correct and that the items were not
in stck until after the date of the receipt (case no. 35). In
one case investigators checked store receipts and discovered an
instance where a claimant had photcxpied a legitimate receipt
and then substituted her own name. In still other cases
investigators have learned that what claimants submitted as
receipts were actually estimates, work orders or "lay away"
slips.
Lost wages can be ver if ied with arpany personnel off icers.
On rare ocasions, public investigators have used the IRS wage
reporting system to determine that an irdividual claiming lost
wages from mne campany was actually being paid full-time wages
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fran another (O'Neal) .
Neighbors and individuals who service property can be used
to verify the existence of property now claimed as stolen. In
one Florida case neighbors testified that they never saw the
specialized auto part now claimed as stolen. In other cases
attendants employed at gas stations where cars are routinely
serviced have provided information about the car's prior
condition.
In another case neighbors reported that a moving van was
parked in front of a claimant's house several weeks before an
alleged break-in. Investigators interviewed the juveniles
charged with breaking and entering into the claimant's home.
While admitting to stealing sae of the items, they denied even
seeing sane of the others. Officials from the moving crmpany
confirmed that many of the items allegedly stolen were actually
stored in a nearby warehouse.
6.2 2 CREMING IUNTER GES
Because it is often difficult to prove that a loss did not
happen (e.g. that a theft did not occur) or that the facts of a
loss are not related in the way they are claimed, investigators
Muast rely on their abilities to create alternative scenarios of
events. Counter images are means to undermine or question the
veracity of a claimant's account by portraying claimants and/or
their losses as scmething other than what they appear to be.
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Counter images rarely provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that claimants engaged in fraud but they can provide
circumstantial evidence, or add to a preponderance of evidence,
fran which guilt may be inferred.
Counter images are sometimes related to loss-events or
consequences of losses. For exanpie, investigators might try to
establish that a bodily injury claimant is not really injured.
They may show movies of the claimant playing football or lif ting
a heavy box at the time he or she is claiming total
incapacitation. Investigators may try to show that merchandise
now claimed as stolen simply could not have been because it never
existed or because it couldn't have been transported. Counter
images also may be character related and only indirectly
associated with the claim. Typically these images center on a
claimant's financial status before and after the loss.
Investigators might try to establish that a claimant who says he
is a pillar of society is, in fact, associated with known
criminals. Investigators might try to establish that a claimant
is not financially healthy but is, in fact, in sane financial
distress.
Cunter images may reflect current or past behavior.
Ccarpare these tbo situations. A claimant says she was healthy,
but as a result of her loss she is nw sick. Investigators
typically will try to prove that she is not in sick. The
dispute is rot whether she was healthy in the past, but whether
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she is now sick. In another situation a claimant may state that
he was financially healthy, but the loss financially ruined him.
Investigators may try to prove that he was destroyed before the
loss. In this case the dispute is not whether he is now
financially ruined, but whether he was solvent before the loss
occurred.
6.2.2.1 Loss-related, Past Images -
These images are drawn to show that loss facts, as related
by the claimant, cannot "hang together" as claimed. They are
used to undermine the claimant's version of the story of loss-to
raise doubts.
Florida Division of Insurance Fraud investigators undermined
a claimant's story by establishing that the merchandise reported
stolen fra a truck could never have fit in the truck in the
first place. In this case the merchandise was all purchased from
one mail-order business. Investigators obtained copies of the
receipts describing the material, including the serial numbers.
They then checked the store's catalogue and found the exact
dimensions of the items stolen. After measuring the cab of the
trick they were allegedly stolen fran, the investigators
determined that the cab's cubic feet was significantly smaller
than the total cubic feet of the merchandise. By establishing
that the nerdhanidise aould not have fit into the truck in the
first plawe, they undermined the claimant's story of loss (case
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no. 35).
In a different Florida case investigators were checking into
the circumstances of an alleged auto theft. The claimant stated
that on one day she travelled from point A to point B. Her car
was stolen at point B. Investigators measured the distance
between point A and B and determined that even if the car was in
perfect working order, it could not have been driven from Point A
to point B in the time allotted (case no. 17).
In some instances theft and fire claimants will argue that
"vandals" are resprsible for stealing their items or lighting
their, obviously, incendiary fires. Investigators may try to
prove otherwise. For example, in an arson case investigated by a
private firm, investigators were able to undermine a claimant's
version of events by showing that the building was locked prior
to the fire, that the claimants were the only ones with keys and,
thus, they had exclusive ortunity to set the fire. They
determined that all the doors and windows were secure when
firefighters arrived at the scene, that there was no evidence of
forced entry, and that the alarm was in working order and did not
go off until after the fire had started and firefighters entered.
If the fire was incendiary, who set it? From the evidence- they
collected, investigators established that vandals could not have
set the fire, and, by inference, that the claimant was
responsible (case no. 74) .
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In a case involving an alleged theft, investigators tried to
counter the defendant's story that the merchandise was stolen by
showing that it was inpossible for anyone to have broken in via
the only apparent route. Aconrding the claimant, the thieves had
entered through a hole in the wall, which in summer housed an air
conditioner, but othertimes was covered by wood boards.
Investigators examined the area closely and found undisturbed
cobwebs oovering the entire space. If the thieves had used this
as their route of acess (and it seemed the only likely
candidate), how did they manage to enter without disturbing the
webs (case no. 72)?
Investigators tell stories of claimants who smash their own
windows and then claim they have been robbed. Often these
claimants stand inside their hones when they break their windows
and all the glass falls outside. Investigators looking at that
particular loss scene can quickly establish a different loss
scenario.
In a case cited earlier a man filed a claim against his
parents' homeowners policy for a slip and fall in their hame.
The adjuster assigned to the case was suspicious because of what
appeared to be a recently damaged vehicle parked in the
claimant's front yard for which no claim had been filed. The
case was turned over to an investigator who examined the
circwmstances of the auto accident. Interestingly, investigators
did not fcuas on what was claimed-i.e. whether or not the
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claimant fell in the bathtub-since that would be nearly
itmossible to prove. Instead, they tried to build an alternative
story of loss. They reviewed local police department and towing
records and learned that the car in question had been in an
accident several days earlier and that the claimant was the
driver. The doctor who treated the claimant verified the
treatments, but stated that he understood the injuries were
sustained in an auto accident. Further, the doctor claimed the
date of treatment was not the date the claimant said he fell,
but, rather, the date of the auto accident. As a result of this
investigation, the claimant was arrested on insurance fraud
charges.
6.2.2.2 Character-related Past -
In general, character-related past images show that the loss
could not have been responsible for the claimant's current
crndition because the condition was evident before the loss
occurred. Although financial health is not the only
characteristic that is subject to investigation, it is most
typical since there is often more accessible documentation of
one's financial character than documentation of other personal
characteristics.
Claimants try to hide their previous financial statuses by
destroying records or creating their own images of solvency. Tob
counteract these pictures, investigators often wade through
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records of business incorporation, tax statements, credit
records, or civil court records of suits brought against the
claimants for nor-payment. If the claimant owns a business,
statements are taken fran employees or contractors who might
provide information on moneys owed. Neighbors are interviewed
for their impressions of business operations-e.g. how many
hours per day the business operated, or number of custcmers).
Standard procedure for investigators involved in arson cases
is building an account of the claimant's financial status prior
to the loss. Successful arson investigations depend on
establishing (1) that the fire was incendiary (2) the claimant's
notive and (3) the claimant's exclusive opportunity to cause the
fire. Since financial distress is considered a strong motive for
arson fires, it is critical for investigators to determine a
claimant's financial health before the fire occurred.
Investigators may also look for past associations which
could link two, allegedly, unrelated actors. A standard arson
scenario is the sale of property for a naninal cash downpayment.
The original owner holds a substantial, and inflated, mortgage.
Several subsequent "transactions" inflate the property value and
the nortgage. Eventually the building burns. In Massachusetts
and in many other states, the mcr tgage holder is entitled to
recover the mortgage amouint regardless of whether the f ire was
set and the proper ty owner irrplicated in the arson [4] .
4. Without such protection, it has been claimed, banks and other
investors would not be likely to extend credit.
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Those who hold the mortgage are protected unless a link between
the fire, property owner and mortgagor can be established. In
several of the arson indictments in Suffolk County, Massachusetts
(1978) investigators examined volumes of financial documents to
draw the links between property owners, mortgagors and arsonists.
Indications of previous associations were used to weave a case of
arson conspiracy against the indicted individuals.
In Clifford Karchmer's Arson Enforcement Manual (1981;354)
the author suggests thc.t one should examine the disposition of an
insurance settlement to help build a picture of a claimant"s
guilt or innocence as it often provides a picture of a claimant's
intent in filing the claim in the first place. Karchmer notes
that evidence that funds have been "laundered"-i.e. passed
through multiple bank accounts-, could provide circumstantial
evidence of a policyholder's guilt.
6.2.2.3 Current, Loss-related -
These images are often used to provide an alternate account
of loss consequences. Typically current loss-related images are
concerned with personal injury and are generated as a result of
surveillance. Images may be used to docnment that a condition is
not what it appears to be and/or to suggest avenues for further
investigation. For example, in Florida, investigators watched
claimants, allegedly incapacitated, as they went to and from
their new jobs. The investigators approached the arployer and
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obtained records verifying that their disabled claimants were, in
fact, working. Ocasionally, nving pictures are taken to
document the free rmnement of supposedly disabled claimants.
Movies are expensive as they require minute by minute annotation
if they are to be used in court. As a result, movies are not
used very often, if at all.
Unobtrusive surveillance is not the only means to create
counter images. Investigators will conduct what they call
"activity checks" on their physically injured claimants. They
arrive at a claimant's hoe, unannounced, for a spot check on the
claimant. If a totally disabled claimant is found gardening,
investigators inquire further. As part of their routine activity
checks investigators might also canvass the neighborhood asking
neighbors if they are aware of the claimant's movements.
Although a standard insurance task, neighborhood canvassing is
more useful for developing investigatory leads than for creating
counter images directly.
Scmetimes the counter image is derived by accident. The
Insurance Crime Prevention Institute reports that an insurance
fraud was exposed when a private investigator happened to be
passing by a park and noticed two bodily injury claimants he was
supposed to he investigating tossing a football arourd. ( ICPI
Reports. April/May 1980;5)
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6.2.2.4 Current, Character-related -
Investigators may also try to create counter images which
show claimants to be different than their own images suggest.
For example, investigators may try to create a counter image of a
fire claimant as a "shady" character connected to the
"underworld" at the same time that the claimant tries to
establish himself as an upstanding citizen "victimized" by
cr ime/arson.
Investigators might also try to prove associations between
two alleged adversaries in a claim situation. The Insurance
Crime Prevention Institute reports that investigators followed an
individual suspected of being part of a staged accident ring.
The man was followed to a hotel roxm where investigators learned
that he and the man he was supposedly responsible for hitting
were actually living together. Further investigation uncovered
the entire staged accident operation. (ICPI Reports.
March/Apr il 1979;7)
6.2.2.5 Questionable Practices Associated With Counter Images. -
One can raise same legitimate questions about how far
investigators should go in establishing counter images. Activity
checks, neighborhood canvassing and surveillance all intrude on
individuals' pr ivacy. Although claimants are required, under the
insurance contract, to "assist" investigators who are examining
their losses, it is unclear in what situations, if any, that
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assistance extends to being subject to surveillance.
According to one former claims adjuster, investigators may
provide teptations for allegedly injured claimants in order to
induce them to act in a way that is inconsistent with their
injuries. For example, investigators may drop money in the path
of a claimant who says he can't bend down and wait to see if the
claimant picks it up. Chernik (1969) suggests that investigators
have offered free skiing weekends, and weekends at dude ranches,
to "encourage" claimants to throw away their pretense of
disability. What if claimants were truly injured and still
enticed to try out exotic weekends? Serious injuries could
result. Chernik (1969) tells a story of a very sick, old lady
who actually won a free trip to Las Vegas. As part of her
winnings she was given a bagful of coins to gamble in the slot
machine. Investigators saw an opportunity to prove, once and for
all, that she was not truly injured. They took movies of their
claimant pulling the slot machine levers with vigor. Then the
woman collapsed. According to Chernik, she alnust died. This
story suggests that money is a powerful lure that at times can
induce people to do things they ought not do. Used as a strategy
to create counter images of disabled claimants such inducements
pose serious ethical and practical questions.
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6.2.3 SETTING UP NEW OPPOR NITIES OR INDtCEtIIS FOR FRAUD
It is not clear how often opportunities are created to catch
insurance fraud offenders. The relatively few instances in which
this strategy was used in the sample of cases reviewed here
suggests that such undercover activities are limited.
Investigatory strategies setting up new opportunities for
fraud can be analytically separated into those which target
claimants and those which target the supporting fraud
organization (lawyers, doctors, auto body shop owners, etc).
When claimants are the foci of the investigatory activity the
"sting" strategy is eTployed. Investigators help set-up the
supporting fraud organization. Control agents provide the
trappings and wait to see if someone falls into the net. In
cases where the fraud organization is the foci of investigation,
investigators infiltrate the existing fraud organization by
posing as "innocent" loss victims who may be swayed into
participating in the fraudulent schemes.
Strategies to set up cpprtunities for deception also can be
distinguished by the degree of target specificity. In the first
example presented below the sting is aimed at a fairly specific
target. Agents are trying to catch an identified individual
aomitting a specific crime. In the second example investigators
reach aut to net a subset of what is assumed to he a pcol of
unkrown offenders.
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The Insurance Crime Prevention Institute reports that after
a businessman reported that he was approached by a fire broker,
investigators set up a building as a likely candidate for arson.
An undercover agent from the United States Treasury Department,
equipped with a concealed recording device, contacted the fire
broker who promised to arrange for the fire. Subsequently,
investigators videotaped the arsonist saturating the building
with an accelerant. The "torch" and broker were arrested before
the fire actually did any damage ( ICPI Reports. May/June/July
1979).
In a Worcester, Massachusetts investigation, nicknamed
"operaticn humanity" state police set up a "civilian operative"
in a job at a hospital where suspects in an auto thef t fraud
operation were enployed. The job enabled the operative to make
contact with persons involved in the crime ring. Eventually he
became a ring msnber. His job was to act as a receiver or
middleman for allegedly stolen vehicles. Car owners contacted
the undercover agent to have their cars "stolen" or torched. In
return, the car owners received nominal sums and the
opportunities to file auto theft claims with their insurers.
Ring members kept the cars for resale, and export. In April 1980
state police arrested ninety-nine individual car owners who had
participated in the fraud operation. ( ICPI Report April/May
1980;8). A similar sting operation in Buffalo ret cner 100
individuals (ICPI Reports, August/September 1979; 5). Both
investigatios led to the arrest of a large number of "otherwise
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honest" policyholders who participated in insurance fraud.
Whether these policyholders would have engaged in fraud without
the opportunity presented to them is unclear.
Property stings initially designed for other purposes could
uncover instances of insurance fraud as well. A "set-up" fencing
operation might net individuals who try to sell their property at
the same time they report it stolen.
Most examples of undercover infiltration into organized
fraud operations are related to the investigation of
doctor-lawyer schemes. In such cases loss victims are solicited
into fraud rings by unscrupulous lawyers who refer the victims,
some of whom are not even hurt, to particular doctors. The
doctors inflate the amount of treatment necessary for the
specific injuries involved. Inflated bills for the often
unnecessary treatments are submitted to the victim's insurer,
sarnetimes even without the claimants knowledge.
One strategy for infiltrating this type of operation is to
have an undercover agent pose as an accident victim. Through the
use of concealed microphones, cameras, and other devices, the
agents can docunent the processes leading to fraud. In
Minnesota, a Deputy Sher if f posed as a welfare recipient involved
in a traffic accident. He approached a particular doctor for
treatmrent, admitting to the doctor that he wasn't really hur t.
The doctor asked him tow bad he wanted to be hurt. The doctor
then referred him to a lawyer who arranged the insurance
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settlement. The case ended after the doctor pled guilty to
charges of attempted theft by swindle and medical assistance
fraud and the lawyer was found guilty of attanpted theft by
swindle (ICPI Reports October/November/December, 1979; 1).
6.3 CKX)S2G AN ]NVESTIGATORY STRATEGY
Investigatory strategies can be canpared along several
dimensions: resource requirements, intrusiveness and scope of
net cast. Dimensions can be thought of as evaluative criteria
used in decisions to investigate suspicious claims.
Although exact figures are unavailable, we can rank
investigatory strategies by the costs they might impose.
Documenting claim facts is assumed to be least costly while
setting up inducements incurs the greatest costs. At the very
least, documenting claim facts will require fewer personnel than,
for example, setting up an elaborate sting operation (5].
Documenting claim facts also requires less specialized knowledge
than either of the other two strategies. While inducements and
counter images often necessitate the use of sophisticated
surveillance technologies, documenting claim facts typically
involves less specialized document research and interviewing.
(Note that saie finarcial detecting requires specialization in
business acxounting. Acxxunting skills would appear to be nore
readily available to financial institutions such as insurance
5. Ccupare the cost of a sting to the cost of putting X ntuiter
of detectives in the field to track down information.
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cxmpanies, than sane other nore sophisticated investigatory
techniques.)
The three strategies address different questions raised by
the three types of fraud outlined in Chapter One. When
investigators document claim facts they directly confront the
possibilities that loss details have been distorted (exploited
losses). When claimants invent stories of loss, investigators
try to build a counter image or alternative explanation of loss
events. Finally, when claimants create losses themselves
investigators may offer inducements to see if the deviant pattern
will emrge again. Thus, the three investigatory strategies cast
very different nets. Documenting a claim fact typically involves
a relatively small and narrow net. Investigators search for
specific pieces of information to answer specific claim
questions. For example investigators might look for information
to document the date of an automobile accident. Police records
or towing service records might be researched by investigators.
When creating counter images investigators are typically
searching for a preponderance of evidence from which samething
can be inferred. Although focused on particular individuals or
sets of events, the scp of information collected is relatively
vast. Investigators are engaged in "fishing expeditions."
Inducements, on the other hard, are often offered to net a large
nwmnber of offerders on specific items (e.g. sale of a car to an
udercover agent) .
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Investigatory strategies also dif fer according to the
inherent intrusiveness of techniques and their integration into
routine claims process. Whereas verifying loss details is
ronsistent with the routine of claim settlement procedures,
unobtrusive surveillance extends beyond what claimants are likely
to expect as part of the claiming process. Setting up
inducements for fraud are clearly activities divorced from any
given claim amtext. The relative separation fran what is
routinely expected as part of claims process is, in some measure,
an indicator of the intrusiveness of the strategy employed.
In decisions to choose one strategy over another
investigators appear to be influenced by their auspice and by the
expected outcmes of their investigations. Investigators will
evaluate strategies along the dimensions cited above and choose a
strategy or group of strategies to reflect their organizational
interests. Private investigation is conducted to ascertain
whether a claimant is entitled to acpensation for a given loss
and the cpAMany's defence of a claim denied. Public
investigation is oriented towards the arrest and conviction of
insurance fraud offenders in efforts to deter future fraudulent
behavior.
If the expected outaxme of an investigaticn is claim denial
or defence of a civil suit brought by the claimant, investigators
may choose to fncs either on documenting claim facts or creating
ccnter images or toth. These two strategies tend to be the
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least costly and the most focused on particular of fences or
claims. Since claims handling is a case by case affair, it is
unlikely that private resources will be expended to deal with the
prevention of future frauds or to frauds whose effects the
private crmpany does not feel directly [6].
Claimants' roles as insurance cxpany clients may also
influence the decision to employ a particular strategy. While
checking into claim details may be viewed as an appropriate
insurance function, creating counter images or setting up
inducements might be seen as directly offensive to insurance
clients. Interests in claimants future premium dollars could
restrict claim investigators to documenting claim facts and leave
the other strategies for non-insurance personnel.
Law enforcement personnel tend not to get involved in
insurance fraud investigations unless they can expect a criminal
conviction [7]. Documenting a claim discrepancy is rarely
sufficient proof of criminal fraud. Investigators must be able
to prove that the offenders intended to deceive when they
6. This may help explain why sae frauds are tolerated. If the
effect of fraud is dispersed among policyholders-or even
other insurance ccmpanies-no one oampany will necessarily
face a concrete dispute. The idea that oampanies do not
investigate claims because claim costs are shared among the
ccmpanies has been suggested in the Massachusetts Governor's
Task Force on Auto thef t (1980) as well as other task force
reports examining the insurance fraud problem.
7. The lcn probabilty of cr iminal convictions was the pr imary
reason cited by boith law enforcerent and insurance personnel
for public sector avoidance of insurancoh fraud
investigations.
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"misfiled" claim details. Thus, criminal investigations often
require implementation of strategies to assess an offender's
motive and opportunity for the fraudulent behavior. Thus, law
enforcement cncerns may lead them to choose strategies which are
more clearly concerned with controlling offenders rather than
offences. They may choose strategies to net multiple event
frauds rather than single event fraud and strategies to net
organized rings rather than isolated individuals. As a result,
we can expect to see law enforcement relying more directly on
strategies designed to "set-up" new inducements for fraud or
attempts to create counter images so that suspected offenders can
be "caught in the act."
As me might expect, public and private distinctions are
often blurred in the real world. The investigation and control
of fraudulent claims reflects the blurring of public and private
legal mechanisms. This is seen most clearly when insurance fraud
cases involve a crime in addition to filing a false claim. The
following chapter examines the range of enforcement options
available to social control agents once they suspect that claims
are indeed fraudulent.
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CHAPTER 7
DFALING WITH THE DECEIVERS
This diapter examines the enforcement options individuals
and organizations face when confronted with what appears to be
fraudulent behavior. Two questions related to fraud enforcement
are explored. First, what enforcement options are available to
control specific incidents of fraudulent behavior? Second, to
what extent are these options influenced by the insurance context
and the nature of deceptive activity?
Enforcement in the insurance context differs fra
conventional law enforcement in terms of both the number of
enforcement options available and the variety of enforcement
agents who may respond. Unlike decisions to arrest or not
arrest, enforcement in the insurance context can take one of four
forms: (1) ignoring fraud-nn-enforcement, (2) mitigating a
suspected fraud by adjusting the dollar amount of a claim to a
lower amunt, (3) denying the claim or (4) prosecuting the
alleged offender.
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Each enforoement option redefines the problem in a slightly
different fashion. Ignoring fraud (i.e. not acting upon
discovery) redefines the potential criminal violation as no
problem at all. Adjusting what appears to be a false claim in
order to reduce capany liability defines the situation, not as
fraud, but as a difference of opinion to be mitigated through
normal claims process. By denying suspected false claims, an
insurance conpany asserts that it has been a fraud target. Fraud
is defined as a civil wrong instead of, or in addition to, a
cr iminal violation.
The enforcement options available to social control agents
reflect both private and public interest. As a form of theft,
insurance fraud is a public wrong to be handled in criminal
court. As a breach of cxntract, insurance fraud is a civil
matter to be mitigated by the private parties directly involved.
The differences in public and private interest are best expressed
in the operations and style of associated legal mechanisms. In
his discussion of fraud and consumer camplaints, Eric Steele
(1975; 1108-1109) distinguishes law enforcement (public
interest) fran mediation (private interest). Law enforcement
agents identify offenders whose future actions can be controlled.
They serve the public interest in so far as they protect the
interests of the public any of whain could be a victim sane time
in the future. In cntrast, one can respond in a manner that
deals with private interest. Mediators focus on the resolution
of disputes concerning kromn and identified interested parties.
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The mediative stance focuses not on the deviant, but on the
concrete dispute. Here, the emphasis is on the offence-what
happened and how it can be corrected.
The ambiguity inherent in white collar of fences (Aubert,
1968), defies easy categorization of the behavior as either civil
abuse or cr iminal violation (Edelhertz, 1970). As a result,
enforcement activities may be carried out simultaneously in the
two spheres. A multi-enforcement network may be tapped for any
one set of fraudulent transactions. Law enforcement agents may
be investigating a charge of arson, while private investigators
are looking for evidence to deny a fire claim. Multi-level
enforcement efforts may result in some frauds falling through the
cracks, if each enforcement agency believes that the other has
jurisdiction, or if the efforts of one agency undercut the
efforts of another.
Insurance fraud investigators may change options during the
course of their investigations. An investigation which is aimed
initially at claim negotiation may ultimately end as a claim
denial. Investigations aimed at claim denials may be downgraded
to claim negotiation or upgraded to criminal processing. In sae
instances criminal matters are down-graded to civil matters (11.
1. This may reflect a more general trend in the enforceient of
business-related crimes. The introduction of civil RIO) and
enforceient of "technical violations" may he important as
well.
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Whether an investigation is upgraded or downgraded depends,
in part on the available evidence, and auspice of the
investigators. If private investigators cannot make a case for
claim denial, they will work to limit a company's liability to
pay by excluding same portion of the claim. If public officials
cannot make a criminal case against the suspected offenders, they
may try to pursue a civil option [2].
Civil outcomes may affect criminal ones. A civil settlement
surrounding behavior generally recognized as a type of white
collar crime may negatively affect successful criminal
prosecutions.
".: . .the victim will no longer be a whole-hearted
witness for the prosecution,. . .any defense counsel
worth his salt will find sae way to make the jury
aware that the case was mooted by civil settlement.
." (Edelhertz, 1970;30)
In same cases, however, criminal charges are brought only after
civil settlements have been reached. In 1971, a fire destroyed a
vending machine warehouse. The FAIR Plan extending insurance
coverage for the property argued that the warehouse owner was
responsible for the fire and refused to pay the claim. The
2. There may be scmething else here. People's ideas of where
justice can be served may have changed. Crime victims, for
example, may use a civil court mechanism to achieve their
notion of justice. The privately funded Crime Victims
Advocacy Institute counsels victims who wish to file civil
suits against their assailants. It is not just the of fender
who is subject to suits. Municipal and state governents
have been sued for failure to provide adequate protection and
supervision. For example, a widow sued the state of
Washington af ter her husband was killed by a state pr ison
inmate while participating in a "Take a Lifer to Dinner"
prcqram. The widow was awarded a substantial settlement
Parade Maazn March 16, 1980.)
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claimant sued the aqpany for claim recovery. In 1974 a jury
found in favor of the plaintiff and the FAIR Plan was ordered to
pay the claim. After the payment was received and cleared
through the banks, the property owner was indicted and convicted
on federal fraud charges. If the claim had not been paid, it is
unclear that federal fraud charges could have been brought
against the offender. The issue was no longer whether the FAIR
Plan should or should not pay the claim, but whether the claimant
was guilty of using the mail to defraud an insurer. As a result
of the cr iminal ionvictions, the FAIR Plan was able to void the
original civil decision and the property owner was ordered to pay
back the monies awarded to him.
The sanctions associated with each response differ in kind
and severity. Ignoring fraud imposes no sanction. The only
sanction associated with claim adjustment is a reduction in claim
value; even so, claim reductions may be perceived as legitimate
claim procedure rather than as a form of punishment. When claims
are denied, the entire claims, not just portions of them, are
invalidated. In such cases offenders stand to lose all the time
and expense that was put into creating the false claim in the
first place. The most severe sanctionrfines and/or prison
sentences are associated with criminal action [3].
Data are not available to make inferences about the
distribution of enforcement options. Those interviewed during
the course of this research had trouble even estimating. The
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difficulties stem, in part, fran the fact that most actors do not
see the enforcement process in its entirety. Once a claims
adjuster suspects fraud and the decision is made to investigate
further, that case may be taken out of his or her hands and the
ultimate dispostion may never be known. Nevertheless, I can use
data fran the interviews to make inferences about how often each
enforcement option is employed.
There is no easy way to estimate how often frauds are
ignored. Ignoring fraud is a private decision. No one but the
initial detector need suspect that samething is amiss. In fact,
decisions to ignore fraud may not be conscious ones, as adjusters
may simply choose to avoid looking for problems. It seem likely,
given interview data collected, that small frauds are processed
in this way.
As insurance cxmpanies becme more aware of fraud and the
effects of fraudulent behavior we may see an increase in the
number of fraudulent claims which are denied, rather than simply
adjusted. The growth of special investigators almost assures an
absolute increase in denied claims as more personnel are engaged
in activities aimed at claim denial. Nevertheless, the
3. The severity ranking established here is cxrnsistent with
court decisions regarding double jeopardy.
"In a civil action ty a goverrnent agency following a
cr iminal conviction, the convicticn is generally conclusive
as to issues established against the defendant because of the
government's higher burden of proof in the criminal
prceedings. An acquitted defendant, however, must fully
relitigate all issues because the sane goverrnental proof may
meet the civil prceedings lower burden." (Fiske, 1980;191)
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proportion of denied claims to total claims remains small.
Estimates from one of the larger insurance campanies were as
follows for 1981: 31,000 auto claims were handled by the local
office; 346 cases were assigned to the Special Investigative
Unit as potential frauds; 206 (60% of the cases they reviewed,
but less than one percent of all auto claims) were ultimately
denied (interview no.16).
It appears that criminal prosecution of fraud offenders is
an unusual or rare event. Most claims managers admitted great
reluctance to turn a case over for criminal prosecution. Even in
Florida where the state has established a special bureau to
handle fraud cases, criminal prosecution is a relatively rare
event. The Florida Division of Insurance Fraud reviewed hundreds
of cases in fiscal year 1979-80. Only 58 cases were presented
for prosecution and only 45 were ultimately prosecuted. Note
that these numbers include all types of fraud, not just
policyholder frauds against carpanies. A small percentage of the
Division's case load included frauds by insurance agencies and
brokers.
What accounts for the enforcement decisions? Other studies
of discretionary enforcerment inform my analysis, but are limited
because they are empirically grounded in behavior and situations
that are inapplicable to the insurance fraud context [4].
Previous models of selective enforcement cxnsider conventional
cr ines whicth have the follcwing character istics not found to be
7-272
true of insurance fraud: (1) the offence is apparent (i.e. "a
smoking gun"); (2) the offence is a discrete event; (3) the
lines separating victim, offender and social control agent are
clear; and (4) social control agents have effective power over
offenders. By contrast the following conditions apply to
insurance fraud. (1) Deviant transactions appear no different
than conventional ones, and, thus, they are hard to recognize.
(2) Fraudulent claims are processes which take place over time.
(3) The lines separating victims and offenders are not clear as
offenders mediate their crimes through the intended targets of
deception. (4) Victimization is often diffuse. (5) Caplainants
and enforcers may be one and the same and, as a result, the
stigma of being a fraud target impinges on the enforcement role.
(6) Finally, fraud offenders exert sane power over social control
agents.
Although a defendant's power and legal resouces to fight
criminal action is central to arguments of selective or
non-effective enforcement of crimes cnmiitted by corporations
(Braithwaite and Geis, 1982; Clinard and Yaeger, 1980; Stone,
1975), explanations for controlling such crimes are not easily
4. Studies of policing focus on social control agents'
discretion to evoke cr iminal process (Goldstein, 1963;
Pilivan and Br iar , 1968; Black and Reiss, 1970; Bittner ,
1970; Reiss, 1971, Lurdman et. al., 1978, Smith and Visher,
1981 as well as others.) These studies tend to cite: the
characteristics and demeanor of suspects (Pilavin and Briar,
1964; Black and Reiss, 1970; Sykes and Clark, 1975; and
Lurdman, et. al, 1978) ; ccomplainant char acter ist ics (Black,
1970; Lurdman, et. al. 1978) or the specif ic enforcement
context of police-citizen encounters (Smith and Visher, 1981;
Manning, 1977 as well as many others.)
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aplied to the insurance fraud context. Insurance fraud is not
corporate crime as it has been studied conventionally, since the
corpration is not the direct offender. Instead, the offence is
mediated through the corporate entity. Insurance fraud
offenders' powers to avoid enforcement rest, not in their
individual attributes, but in their client status or in their
participation in ongoing business activity.
My analysis is aonsistent with those studies which argue,
implicitly or explicitly, that enforcement is limited because
both rule breaking and control are located in conventional
business activities which often neutralize enforcement efforts.
Katz (1979), for example, notes that when crimes occur within
legitimate organizations, the legitimate enterprises often
diffuse and cover-up criminal intent. He suggests ways in which
the forms of deviant transactions thwarts enforcement.
Braithwaite and Geis (1982) and Ogren (1973) as well as others,
note that the coplexity of white collar offences (typically
complicated econmic transactions) renders conventional criminal
enforcement more difficult and other enforcement responses
necessary. Finally, sane studies of white collar crime recognize
that enforcement decisions are not based in discrete events, but
in ongoing, legitimate transactions. (See, for example, Walsh,
1980.) The effects of enforcement on business relationships and
on inrncent third par ties must be considered (5]1.
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I argue that the business of insurance limits the incentives
to control fraudulent behavior. Cost factors and other
organizational goals discourage potential social control agents
from exerting control even when they suspect that fraud is
involved and enforcement would be appropriate. Difficulties in
attributing fraudulent intent to a specific set of claiming
behaviors further limits enforcement. In the following sections
I will examine the enforcement options and suggest how each is
influenced by the insurance process and by the nature of
fraudulent behavior.
7.1 IG(RING FRAUD
Non-enforcement is typical when the costs of enforcing
insurance rules exceed benefits in a particular case. Some
claims, fraudulent or otherwise, are too small to invest time or
moey into further inquiry and they are paid [6]. Paying claims
rather than investigating, even when fraud is strongly suspected,
is considered sound business practice when the expected outcxme
of the investigation is negligible (i.e. a small reduction in an
already small claim),. Note that this decision strategy reflects
only cost to the cmpany and does not reflect indirect or less
tangible costs (e.g. the loss of a building to caommunity
vitality, individual suffer ing accompanying intentional in jur ies,
lost homes, etc.) or benefits (long-term deterrence) . If
investigatory costs differ by fraud type (the analysis developed
in Chapter Six suggests that they do) then we can expect to see
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different thresholds for ignoring fraud depending on fraud type.
One can imagine situations where many small frauds are
perpetrated by an organized fraud ring. Each claim,
individually, may be too small to warrant further investigation,
but taken together the corpany may be defrauded of a large sum.
Unless the ring is discovered by scmeone outside the system
(typically af ter the claim has been paid) , the small dollars
associated with the individual claims may permit the ring to
continue its operations undetected.
Other, larger, non-routine claims are treated as if they
were small and routine because of adjusters' workload constraints
prohibiting more in-depth investigation. Adjusters overburdened
with cases may choose to pay sane claims just to relieve their
workloads. If Ross' (1970, revised 1980) assessment of
5. The enforcemient of some white collar crime has broader
implications which impinge on the livelihoods of innocent
third parties. Non-enforcement of health safety regulations,
for example, could result in injuries to innocent workers.
Enforcement has its costs as well. Walsh (1980) poses the
dilemna for smne enforcement officials.
"Those put in the position express great
discamfort and cocern at being asked to be
econcmic policymakers. . .should I as an
enforcement official be empowered to decide
that 8,000 people will be put out of work."
(p. 51)
6. This figure will vary by canpany and claim department as well
as tby type of claim. Ore can imagine that the large
ccmpanies can afford higher limits on small, routine claims
surply because their underwriting base is higher. On the
other hand, ecxncmdes of scale in the large ccmpanies may
lcmer the cost of investigating claims and, thus, ccrpanies
can afford to investigate lower dollar claims.
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incentives facing adjusters is correct, we can assume that sane
adjusters, pressured to close cases quickly, will close them at
the expense of more careful investigation. (See Chapter Three
for more detail.)
7.2 RBX@IZING FRAUD BUT ADJtSTING THE CLAIM NCETHELESS
Once fraud is detected, claims personnel look for ways to
limit their companies' obligations to pay the claims. Carpanies
can limit their obligation by negotiating with the claimant and
arriving at a lower claim figure [7]. A description of the claim
process can be found in Chapter Three.
If adjusters suspect fraud, but don"t believe they have the
resources (time, money, or even evidence) to prove so, they may
try to disallow certain claim items they believe are
illegitimate. A study of arson incidence confirms the use of
negotiation as one option when fraud is suspected. Researchers
for the All Industry Pesearch Advisory Council included as "arson
claims" those in which
"A compromise settlement was made based on facts within
the claim investigation sufficient to indicate
incendiary origin, but insufficient for criminal
indictment." (All Industry Research Advisory Council
1982; 2)
7. Most property-liability claims can be limited by negotiating
a lczwer cbllar value for the loss. Workers' Ccmpensation
claims, however, are wore or less value fixed. Claims are
limited by shortening the length of injury time-i.e. proving
that a claimant is no lorqer injured.
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Sane claims suspected to be fraudulent are negotiated
because the insurer is obligated to pay a significant sum to
third parties, regardless of the claimants' actions. For
example, in the case of scame fire insurance fraud the insurance
cmapany is obligated to pay the mortgage holders, regardless of
the claimant's involvement in the loss. If fire totally damages
a building insured for $100,000 and the bank holds an eighty
thousand dollar mortgage, the insurer is obligated to pay the
$80,000 no matter what caused the fire, unless a link between the
mortgagee, the claimant and the fire can be established. Since
they are obligated to pay the $80,000, the costs of a lengthy
investigation to prove fraud might outweigh the $20,000 expected
savings [81.
Consumer legislation, in particular Unfair Claims Practices
legislation establishing time limits for claim settlement, are
cited as important factors in determining whether to investigate.
Several claims managers noted that their abilities to investigate
suspicious claims are often thwarted by legislation which demands
that claims be settled quickly. However,, it appears that in
practice, cmpanies are not as limited as they would like us to
believe. Although required to inform claimants of claim status,
camrpanies reed only tell them that their cases are under
8. Of course if tie courts upheld claim denial, the insurer
could sue the claimant for the amocunt they paid the
mocrtgagee. Although on paper this seems like a fairly nice
option, in practice these suits are rarely instituted since
there is little pssibility of collecting.
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investigation and refer claimants to the state regulatory agency
if they wish to file a complaint. In most instances, the state
Departments of Insurance will stand behind a company's claim
handling procedures. According to one claims manager, "If you
can"t handle an over-aggressive insurance department, then you
have bigger problems." Thus, while many claim managers cited
consumer legislation as a constraint on their ability to take
action against potential fraud offenders, they could provide few
instances when they have been sanctioned for investigating claims
[9].
Some suspected frauds are negotiated or adjusted because the
costs of claimants' reactions to denials and costs associated
with wrongfully denying claims are outside campany control and
potentially great. The uncertainties in claims processing lead
to two types of errors: false negative errors (denying
legitimate claims) or false positive ones (paying illegitimate
claims). Since false negative errors are potentially quite
costly, claims personnel, faced with uncertainty, will make every
effort to avoid them. In their efforts to avoiC denying
legitimate claims, processors may actually increase their
9. One cvtion insurance cmpanies have is to refer a case to the
Insurance Crime Prevention Institute. Three hundred
cxxrpanies suppor t this agency designed to br idge the gap
between the insurance cnrrrnnity and law enforcement. ICPI is
mandated to evaluate fraud cases in terms of their likely
cr iminal prosecution. They do not provide investigatory
services for routine claims handling. According to several
claims managers, they are reluctant to refer cases to ICR(
precisely because ICPI investigators cannot and will not
supply them with information useful for claim settlemtent
(i.e. in a timely fashion) .
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acceptance of illegitimate ones.
False negative errors can impose significant costs if a
claim is denied and the claimant sues for recovery. Although
civil suits are relatively rare (only a fraction of all claim
denials end up in civil court- approximately five percent of all
denied claims according to one claims investigator), the threat
of a civil suit greatly influences adjusters' claims handling
decisions. The civil court outwres could exceed the original
claim miount if juries find that the original settlement was too
low. If the claim is eventually found to be legitimate, the
additional investigatory expense will prove unwarranted. Suits
for punitive damages when a claimant has been wrongfully accused
could result in payments up to three times the amount of the
original claim [10]. Although it is not clear that punitive
damages have been awarded very often, if at all, processors note
that the mere threat of the treble damage award is enough to make
them think twice before pursuing claim denials (interview no.
14.)
Processors also might be pressured to avoid false negative
errors because the costs of such errors are not as easily
recovered through rate relief as are the costs of false positive
ones. False positive errors simply increase the loss experience
10. For example the Massachusetts' Consumer Protection
Legislation-<General Law 93A states that "If the cour t f inds
for the petitioner, recovery shall be in the amrount of actual
damages; or up to three, but not less than two, times such
annunt if the court find that. . .the act [e.g. claim
denial] was a wilful or knowing violation."
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upon which rates are based. The claims are paid as if the losses
were legitimate. False negative errors, on the other hand,
increase operational costs which may or may not be included in
rate calculations (interview no. 44).
Incorrectly labelling a legitimate claim as fraudulent also
may have damaging reputational consequences. Ccnpanies which
pride themselves on fair claims service may be reluctant to
accuse "otherwise honest" clients' of fraud unless they are
certain that they can prove fraudulent intent. As noted in
Chapter Four, proof of intended wrongdoing is often difficult in
cases of deception. Many methods used to construct deceptive
claims may be justified as legitimate mistakes. In situations of
uncertainty, therefore, insurance personnel may avoid the risks
of false accusations and pay claims which they suspect are
fraudulent.
Finally, even if claim denials could be successfully
defended in civil court, the cost of court may pressure insurance
ccunpanies to settle out of court. Recognizing that claim denials
may ultimately end up as negotiated settlements anyway,
processors may opt for a negotiation strategy in the first place.
The interviews with claims managers do suggest that personal
style influences individuals' choices to "play out their
hunches." White sane claims managers take a conservative approach
(i.e. negotiating a claim when they are uncer tain of their
abilities to prove fraud), others will take small risks. As one
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claims managers cnriented, it is often hard to make a fraud case
on a few inconsistencies, but "you can bluff it out scmetimes."
(interview 9)
Campany size may be a factor as well. The larger canpanies
may be more likely to take steps to fight suspected fraudulent
claims simply because they have more resources to do so. Smaller
campanies, however, may choose the expensive course of action
just to prove that resources do not affect their claim
procedures. In the words of one claims managers for a small,
local property insurance crpany
"Fran an insurance standpoint, it is very important for
small opanies like ourselves to take a strong stand
for no other reason then to get the reputation as a
campany that fights back." (interview no.9)
Thus, the data suggest a number of organizational reasons
why suspected frauds are mitigated through normal claims
adjustment rather than denied outright or criminally processed.
(1) Proof of fraud may be difficult and costly to obtain.
Adjusters may lack the resources (time or money) to engage in the
necessary investigation to support claim denial. The evidence,
primarily that confirming conclusions about a claimant"s motive
and intent to defraud, is often privately held and intractable.
Withouit specialized expertise, these data are hard to access.
(2) Conflicting processing goals to minimize costs and, yet,
service po±icyhoflder/clients may lead processors to cnmpraminse,
even when they think the claimant is lying. Negotiation provides
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a means to fulfill two goals at the same time. Adjusters can
limit their cirpanies' obligations to pay claims while, at the
same time, they can provide a sense of servicing their clients.
(3) Claim managers suggest that consmer legislation enacted to
protect claimants opens up avenues for consumer abuse if it
impinges on the careful evaluation of claim facts. They
indicated that legislation limiting claim settlement per iods did
not provide sufficient time to investigate claims they suspect
are fraudulent. Rather than run afoul of onsumer legislation,
adjusters capramise.
Overall, a conservative strategy for meeting profit oriented
goals prevails. Individual claims personnel and departments
pursue the safest way to reduce claim costs even when
alternative, more risky, strategies coulO save more company
dollars. Given the uncertainties involved, processors focus on
those activities over which they can exert same control-e.g.
decisions to allow or disallow claim items. Because the costs
associated with claim denial are uncertain, that strategy is
often avoided even though a successful denial is the most
effective way to limit cxxnpany liability. Negotiating a
settlement is more certain than civil or criminal process, as the
amnpany will surely pay sanething less than the or iginal amount
claimed. A degree of cer tainty is exchanged for absolute dollar
savings.
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7.3 DENtING CLAIM
Denying a claim is a direct challenge to claim legitimacy.
Unlike adjustments or negotiations involving claim value (how
much a particular claim is worth), denials are direct
implicatirs that the claims are illegitimate, if not fraudulent.
Claims are denied because the contract has been violated, because
the cxrrpany "denies" liability for the damages or because the
company can document the claimant's fraudulent intent. The
standard of proof is a civil standard. Only a preponderance of
evidence is needed to develop a case for claim denial.
Citing a policy violation or denying liability may be a
"quicker route" to claim denial than proving fraudulent intent.
Consider the following. A man saw an advertisement in an
out-of-town newspaper for a Mercedes selling below market price.
He bought the car and paid for it in cash. The car was delivered
to him. The next day it was stolen. Insurance personnel
examining the claim discovered that the certificate of title was
a fake. They don't know whether the claimant ever had the car,
whether he was duped and simply "ripped off" or whether he is
part of a larger fraud operation. They are suspicious, however,
and are trying to deny the claim based soley on the fake title.
The ampany argues that since the title was fake, the claimant
has no "insurable interest" in the loss. If successful, the
axmpany can deny the claim without having to ascer tain or prove
any fraudulent intent on the part of the claimant.
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In sme cases claims are withdrawn before a formal denial is
issued. A reporter from an insurance industry trade journal
surveyed lawyers who defend insurance ccnpanies'claim denials in
civil courts. He reports the outcane of his survey.
"Of the cases assigned to lawyers and after the
preliminaries with the insured, 40% of the insureds withdrew
the claim, meaning no payment. Twenty percent of the files
[sic] went to trial. Of the cases that went to trial, the
insurance ccpany won 75%" (Coppock, 1981;22)
This study suggests that cnrpanies fare better in civil court
than one would have guessed given interviews with claims
personnel. What we see, however, may be the product of the
insurance cupanies' conservative approaches to claim denials.
If insurance cxpanies select for civil court only those cases
which they feel relatively certain of winning, we should
interpret the seventy-five percent success rate in a more
negative light [111.
Because claim denials require more intensive investigation
than is typically undertaken in the normal claims process,
special investigators are often employed to examine these claims.
Several insurance companies have established special
investigative units to investigate suspicious auto claims.
Pr ivate investigator s are of ten hired as well.
11. Other research suggests that when civil court cases involve
individuals versus organization, organizations tend to have
more favorable outcxrmes (Galanter, 1974). Wanner (1974,1975)
conducted a study of 7900 cases and found that corporate
plantif fs win more, settle less and gener ally lose less than
individual plaintif fs.
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Typically, when ccnpanies onsider claim denial the
investigation is turned over to an outside attorney. The
attorney directs the investigation making sure that investigators
coiply with rules of evidence and rules against unfair claims
practices. (Should a copany be found to have engaged in unfair
claims practices, punitive damages could be awarded to the
ccnplainant.) By turning its investigation over to an attorney,
the insurance ccmpmny protects its investigation as a "work
product" covered under attorney-client privilege. Although not
an absolute barrier to discovery should claimants consider civil
action, the work product privilege is an additional obstacle to
claimants' attempts to recover. The work product privilege also
protects an investigation by limiting the information available
to claimants and, therefore, preventing them frcm creating data
to support a position that counters that developed by fraud
investigators.
If benefits accrue over time, campanies may pursue civil or
criminal options even when the cost of doing so exceeds direct
savings. For example, it may be politically expedient to pursue
criminal prosecution of certain claimants if such prosecutions
build a ccopanys reputation, attract new legitimate clients
and/or deter fraud offenders from filing claims with the cxripany
in the future. Public statements about insurance industry
activity against fraud offenders recognize such long range
benefits to stringent claims handling. However, with the
possible exception of established special investigators for auto
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theft, it does not appear that the long range benefits are part
of an individual's calculus for determining ha claims are
processed.
Future research should acdress what appears to be a mismatch
in corporate and individual goals around the issue of fraud.
Fram the corporate standpoint illegitimate claims should not be
paid. In practice, hoever, individuals pay illegitimate claims
because their success is measured in terms of their abilities to
limit cipany liability and they choose the safest path for doing
so [121.
7 . 4 CRIMINAL PKCESSING
Insurance fraud can be prosecuted in a number of different
ways depending, in part, on who discovers fraud and the
jurisdiction within which the frauds occurred. Although only a
minority of states have penal sanctions against filing false
insurance claims, insurance fraud may be prosecuted under a
number of general fraud, larceny or theft statutes where
appropriate. Insurance fraud offenders in Massachusetts have
been prosecuted for crimes ranging froi larceny or arson to
12. Part of the issue is that ccorpanies project data on
aggregate canpany per formance and do not focus on individual
decision-making. If a comnpany says it is "getting tough on
claims" that may simply mean that they have assigned one
parson to investigate fraud. That one person may cover a
territory that averages many thousands of claims yearly.
Nevertheless the campany projects the image that it is
policing its own backyard and doing scmething airut fraud.
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defraud an insurer to simply filing a false insurance claim. A
sample of indictments generated by the US District Court in
Massachusetts shows that although the type of activity differed,
all cases were presented for prosecution as violations of Title
18, US Code, Sections 1341 and 1342, the mail fraud statutes.
Interestingly, the Florida Division of Insurance Fraud which
has an insurance fraud statute at its disposal, has found that
the grand theft statutes, often used in conjunction with the
insurance fraud statute, have been most successful in the
prosecution of insurance fraud. Acording to Division
investigators, prosecutors are more familiar with the nuances of
the theft statutes and are more likely to accept insurance fraud
cases if they can be easily understocd as theft. Furthermore,
since theft statutes emphasize that insurance fraud is a form of
stealing, investigators believe they are easier for juries to
understand and convictions involving scme form of punishment are
more likely [13].
The federal RIO) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization) Acts and the state legislation modeled after it
have also been used against insurance fraud offenders. RIO)
makes it unlawful for an "enterprise" (defined in the legislation
as an individual, partnership, corporation, association or other
legal entity) to cxnduct its affairs through patterns of
racketeering activity. A recent Supreme Court decision that RIO)
13. The snail sample of Flor ida cases reviewed did not permit
acmpar ison of sentencing by charge type.
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was not limited to criminal organizations which take over and
infiljtrate legitimate businesses upheld the Justice Department's
broad interpretation of RIOD to cover many types of organized
criminal activity. (The New York Times. June 18, 1981). In
adition to criminal penalties, the RIOD statutes have associated
civil "remedies" as well. For example, Florida's state attorney
general's office filed civil charges under the Florida RICO
statute against the Florida No-Fault Insurance Agency. Florida
No-Fault had been criminally charged with "schemes to defraud," a
third degree felony, for "sliding" additional coverages on the
auto policies of its custarers and hiding the cost of those
coverages in the premium. If convicted on the civil RICO
charges, fines up to three times the total dollar amount charged
as having been derived frcm illegal activities can be imposed
against the capany.
Whether the great number of options for the prosecution of
insurance fraud helps or hinders prosecutors' efforts is unclear.
Generally, however, the task forces that have looked at
insurance-related crimes conclude that jurisdictional problems
and lack of specificity in statutes have made prosecutions more
difficult. One study of the states' efforts to cambat white
collar crime indicates that despite state legislation against
deceptive trade practices and/or specific legislation against
fraudulent practices, state activity has been piecemeal in
reaction to specific schemes rather than cnprehensive in an
overall effort to canbat fraud. The study authors conclude that
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the lack of a specific plan to combat fraud has resulted in
inefficient use of law enforcement resources. (Hanna, Swerin and
Amos, 1977)
Insurance companies, as ccmplainants to the fraudulent
action, can take their cases directly to law enforcement
officials. Claims managers interviewed here indicated their
reluctance to do so, although all would cooperate with an
investigation if asked to by law enforcement officials. Although
they favor criminal prosecution of fraud offenders, claims
personnel seemed unprepared to stand as complainants in criminal
matters against their policyholders. As one claims supervisor
said, "This is insurance. You don't go booking people."
Cczpanies' refusals to sign caplaints reduces their chances of
getting a case prosecuted (interview no.16) [14].
In Florida, investigators from the Division of Insurance
Fraud can act as sworn caoiplainants relieving companies fron
publicly accusing their clients. However, investigators in New
York's fraud bureau will not serve that function. The director
of the newly formed Insurance Frauds Bureau advocates for
policies which force insurance canpanies to sign ccmplaints as he
14. Interestingly, the one exception to the cnmpany's refusal to
sign coiplaints was a large auto fraud case involving a
number of the state's larger car insurers. This suggests
that while the a-Apany may be reluctant to damage its
reputation by pursuing cr iminal prosecution, it is willing to
cxxoperate with a group effort tcnard that end in which no one
campany is singled out as being particularly tough on claims.
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believes that "insurance ompanies have a moral obligation to
face facts !about their own victimization.]"
Campany preferences for handling fraud privately rather than
publicly (in criminal court) may be part of a more general trend
in business-related crimes. Business reluctance to participate
in criminal action against offenders has been discussed most
frequently in reference to emloyee thefts (Robin, 1970, Ditton,
1977). Studies indicate that criminal prosecutions are avoided
because they incur additional costs with no clear return on
investment [15]. Public prosecution is also avoided to escape
the publicity that might result, or to avoid public disclosure of
conpany practices. Finally, canpany reluctance to avoid public
recognition of their victimization may also be related to the
company's or public's perception that the target may have, in
same way, facilitated the criime [16].
According to some claims managers and fraud investigators,
even when they want criminal action, cooperation from local
prosecutors is not always forthoming. Investigators, in
15. Robin's (1970) analysis of cxmpany reluctance to prosecute
employees who steal argues that canpanies prosecute only when
they recognize the advantages of doing so. Robin argues that
an employer
". .r.may be wore cnncerned with simply
eliminating the cause of profit loss than with
revenge, expecially if the defalcation is srmall
and/or if further investment of time, money and
effor t involved in prosecution is not econanically
justified." (Robin, 1970;124)
16.. For a discussion of how the "rape nodel" fits to some white
collar cr ime situation see Walsh and Schram (1980) .
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particular, felt that personal influence was necessary to
convince prosecutors that criminal charges were warranted. Even
in Florida where a law enforcement agency was established to
investigate insurance fraud exclusively, investigators still
found themselves convincing prosecutors to handle their cases.
Public authorities cite the length of time it takes to
investigate insurance related cases compared to the expected
outcame as one reason they avoid insurance fraud investigations
altogether. Given standard criminal justice performance measures
and scarce resources, it is unlikely that a local law enforcement
agency will spend six nths to a year investigating two or three
individuals on insurance fraud charges when they can use that
time on several, shorter investigations which net more arrests
and convictions. Of course, in sane situations, for example,
when per forimance is measured by variables other than arrests, the
longer investigation may be politically expedient.
Organizational priorities also help define the types of
cases investigated by special fraud units established by public
authority. Since these bureaus are evaluated in terms of
successful arrests and convictions, one can imagine that case
acceptance is influenced by sane measure of potential for
prosecution. In addition to cr iminal justice per formance
measures, fraud tureaus must rely on organizational reputation to
maintain funding. They must cxrvince the relevant funding
authorities that they are acting in the furders' interests and
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are "successful" in their operations. Cases will be selected, in
part, in terms of their abilities to meet that criteria. When
the Director of New York's recently established Insurance Fraud
Bureau began operating, he was advised to begin operations with a
big fraud, preferably an insurance broker fraud because both
insurance caipanies and the public are victimized and outraged.
This piece of advice points to the important relationship between
organizational reputation and type of case investigated.
Funding for criminal investigation may depend on the private
sector's willingness to pick up at least part of the cost of
investigations. According to the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of Suffolk County, Massachusetts' largest arson conspiracy
trial, prosecutor ial success could not have been achieved without
private sector funding. The Massachusetts FAIR Plan provided the
money and manpower (in the form of private investigators) to
supplement state police investigation. Private monies covered
the cost of keeping the prime witness in protective custody for
eighteen months as well as all overtime costs accrued during the
course of the investigation (interview no. 39). Unfortunately,
we cannot estimate how often private funds are used to finance
public investigations, although we can speculate that in times of
fiscal austerity, public investigations into insurance fraud will
rely heavily on pr ivate sector funding if they are to occur at
all (17] .
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Overall, criminal prosecutions of fraud offenders seem to be
rare events. Prosecutions are most likely in situations where
insurance cupanies can join together as complainants or when
specialized agencies advocate for prosecution of fraud offenders.
Otherwise, false claims tend to remain private matters handled by
the parties directly involved. The Florida Division of Insurance
Fraud and the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute are examples
of agencies which perform that latter function. In general, law
enforcement personnel seem reluctant to get involved in fraud
cases other than arson (note: the fire is a crime in itself),
unless the frauds involve large conspiracies and significant sums
or if they involve other criminal matters.
7.5 FACICES INFLUENCING ENFORCEMEN'
The fraud enforcement option pursued often depends on one of
four factors: the certainty that what one believes is fraudulent
is actually fraudulent; current workloads of fraud investigators
and other enforcement personnel; the consequences of wrongfully
accusing a claimant of fraud and the cost/benefit ratio of
enforcement. It appears that the most severe sanctions will be
placed on fraud offenders only when social control agents are
17. Whether pr ivate campan ies will suppor t cr iminal
investigation is unclear . Early inpress ions suggest that
crimpanies do not feel it is "their place" to under take that
type of financing. Interestingly, the insurance industry was
prepared to lobby for the continuation of A TF when that
agency's demise appeared ininent. The reason was simply
that ATF, a public organizaton, conducted fire scene
investigations useful to the insurance industry (interview
no. 4) .
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certain of the claimants' fraudulent intent, and the consequences
of an incorrect (or overruled) accusation of fraud are assumed to
be trivial. However, certainty that a crime/fraud has occurred
is undermined by the ambiguity of the crime itself. Both the
methods used to construct fraudulent claims and the organization
of fraudulent activity hinder efforts to determine that a fraud
has occurred and to assign culpability for the fraudulent action.
Since claims processors are both fraud targets and
enforcers, they are constrained in their abilities to take
action. As targets they are often structurally disadvantaged in
terms of their abilities to acquire information that would enable
them to recognize their victimization and to assign guilt.
Individual claim processors, for example, may not have enough
informaticn about claims filed with other ccanpanies to enable
them to identify the current claim activity as part of a pattern
of fraud. Processors have limited information on how losses
occur which then limits their abilities to determine that the
claimant's story could not be true.
Although insurance personnel could identify few instances
when insurance canpanies have been fined for incorrectly
labelling a claim as fraudulent, the threat of pontential
aonsecquences, both direct dollar costs (treble damages) and
anticipated costs (damage to ongoing business relationships)
appears to he sufficient to create situations of enforcement
avoidance. Rather than r isk incurr ing costs greater than the
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initial claim, processors will either negotiate a lower dollar
figure or pay the claim at face value.
Finally, insurance companies are profit-oriented enterprises
and they will not enforce rules against fraud unless there are
clear benefits to doing so. My analysis suggests that the
benefits of fraud cxntrol to individual ccnpanies may not be
enough to outweigh the costs since fraud effects are diffused
through the system. Because fraud costs are often shared among
ccmpanies, no one capany has the incentive to protect itself
against losses. The moral hazard argument which has been
introduced to explain why insurance subsidies cause policyholders
to reduce self-protection and to incur greater losses, may
explain ccupany laxity in fraud enforcement.
Again, through their actions, or non-acticns, insurance
actors make implicit choices about how and when fraud should be
controlled. Those directly affected by fraud (e.g. insurance
consumers and conmunity residents) need to critically assess
enforcement incentives and performance in cambatting fraud.
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CHAPIER 8
OCtNCLUSIONS
This thesis takes a broad view of the processes involved in
the manufacture and control of fraudulent insurance claims. I
have argued that insurance fraud, the manipulation of loss
circumstances and reports to obtain benefits unlawfully, can be
usefully conceptualized as rule breaking or crime ccmmitted
through or mediated by organizational structures and activities.
Consequently, the study of such behavior is appropriately focused
on the interaction between rule breaking, rule enforcing and
conventional business transactions. Sets of transactions, rather
than individuals or organizations, provide the empirical context
for studying the interaction between insurance process,
fraudulent behavior and attampts at fraud control.
The prcesses used to construct, detect and investigate
false claims have been described in light of two questions.
First, sinre insurance fraud offenders use the insurance process
to obtain benefits unlawfully, to what extent do insurance
organizations and activities influence the construction of false
claims? Second, to what extent do the processes of image
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manipulation and the relationship between deceiver and insurance
organization influence the incentives and abilities to detect and
control fraudulent behavior?
Opportunities for rule breaking in the claims-making context
are analyzed in terms of (1) opportunities to deceive, (2)
opportunities to conceal offences and (3) limits on fraud
recognition and control. These factors are apparent in the
structures and activities of insurance process and the nature of
deception.
My argument for "criminogenesis" in the insurance claims
process rests not simply in structural explanations. Offenders
are not passive agents as they often act to manipulate insurance
structures to their advantages. Thus, my research is, in sane
sense, a synthesis of the structural and interactive perspectives
in deviance and social control.
The ntdel of fraud and fraud control developed in this study
argues that fraudulent behavior persists because of features of
insurance process and deceptive behavior which (1) permit the
manipulation of loss images and reports and/or (2) dissuade
potential social cxntrol agents from exerting control. Insurance
fraud can not be explained simply in terms of the rational
puirsuit of expected gains, as the econcanic theory of moral hazard
would asstme. Fraudulent behavior is a consequence of the
contradictory character of insurance activities and
relationships. Furthermocre, the analysis suggests that limits on
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fraud enforcement are not due simply to lax control or poor risk
selection and screening. Limited enforcement can be viewd as a
mismatch between the fluid processes of image manipulation and
fixed structures of enforcement. Insurance goal onflicts as
well as diffused fraud effects further limit incentives and
opportunities for control.
8.1 OPPCORTNITIES 1T OECEIVE
Insurance fraud offenders manipulate facts so that it
appears ns if they are eligible for insurance carpensation when,
if the true facts were kncmn, ccmpensation would not be
forthcming. Since the key factor in the deception is the
manufacture of an insurable loss, insurance frauds are
distinguished by the ways in which offenders construct their
fraudulent loss scenarios. Three fraud types are
identified-exploiting losses that already h n, inventing
stories of losses that never happened, and physically creating
losses.
Overall, the opportunities to distort loss events and
reports are present in the activities of insurance claixs service
and can be understcxxd in terms of paths and incentives for
deception. Insurance provides paths for deception by creating
latitde or encouragemenit for deceit and by providing the data or
activities to divert attention away from possible claim
discrepancies (e.g. by providing the mechanisms for enhancing
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claim credibility). The insurance business increases the
incentive for fraud in so far as it provides the profit motive
for deceptive activity and when, by their actions, insurance
personnel permit violators to feel justified in assuming their
rule breaking behavior.
8.1.1 INCENTIVES FU ECEPICN
Chapter One introduces the notion of a moral threshold for
fraud. I suggest that claimants' participation in the insurance
process or, in sane instances, knowledge of others interaction
with claims processors, increases the acceptance of deception as
a legitimate interactional strategy. Insurance ccnpanies provide
moral opportunities for their own victimization, not simply
because they are big, impersonal financial institutions, but
because of the nature of claims activity itself. The bargaining
and negotiation which is part of crnventional claim activities,
sets up a framework for the use of deception. Fraud is perceived
as the only way to "get even," given insurance practices of
depreciating property and negotiating lower settlements.
Insurance campanies may be responsible for their images as
legitimate fraud targets to the extent that they fail to provide
the "protection" that their advertising suggests they will
deliver. Conflicts over what cxrstitutes acceptable "protection"
or even "crmnpensatian" in the event of losses may provide
incentives for rule breaking by "otherwise honest" policyholders.
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The insurance business also creates fraud incentives when it
inadvertently provides the profit motive for fraud. One profits
from fraud when insurance cmpensation exceeds loss values.
Insurance cxmpanies are directly involved in maximizing profits
when they knowingly create conditions where the value of
insurance is greater than the risk insured. The lure of
investment profits may create situations where underwriters are
less careful in their risk selection and implicitly agree to
accept "fraud prone" risks just for the premium generated.
Investment inccme may offset future claim payments.
(Nevertheless, the loss still occurs.) The pursuit of agency
coxTnissions has led historically to the overinsuring of
properties when agents receive scne percentage of the total
premium collected. Since the insurance coverage is worth more
than property value, over insurance is cited as one motive for
fraud. Thus, segmentation in insurance tasks may create
conditions encouraging scne actors to over insure or provide
insurance when it should not be provided and, in so doing, to
contradict the concerns of other insurance actors trying to
minimize losses and loss consequences.
8.1.2 PATHS TO0 EECEIT
Insurance is a trade in the perception of r isk and
protection. Since cromndity sales of ten depend on intangible
perceptions, there is significant latitude in defining what is
tought and sold. Just as insurance industry officials can shape
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the meaning of the services they provide through advertising,
policyholders may shape the percepticns of their need. The
uncertainty in the ccmnodity- what is bought and sold-provides
scme margin for those wishing to undermine the process.
Opportunities to manipulate loss events and reports can be
associated with the contingencies of loss events and with
uncertainties in claims-making as well. Since claim service
takes shape only after losses occur, fraud offenders are able to
mold loss events and reports to their advantages. Because losses
are contingent events, evaluators must be prepared to accept a
range of possible loss outcomes. Although insurance officials
can predict that one building out of a hundred will burn, they
cannot predict, with any degree of certainty, that a particular
building will burn nor exactly what shape the associated loss
will take. Since claim evaluators lack certainty about what
shapes losses should take, deceptions are hard to recognize.
One way cxmpanies have tried to cnnpensate for the
ccoplexity of loss events and claims 4; to routinize the claim
process. Routinization has an inherent irony. It permits client
learning. Knowledgable fraud offenders learn exactly what should
or should not be included in the claim of loss and work their
manipulation within the framework of acceptable behavior. For
examrple, in a case cited earlier, fraud offenders knew just hcw
long to fabr icate a hospital stay in order to keep it within the
boundar ies of acceptable treatments for the injur ies they
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allegedly sustained. Again, because of the contingencies of
losses, claim evaluators must be prepared to accept a range of
respxises to their requests for claim details. Although claim
evaluators may insist on receipts to document property, they
cannot determine what form those receipts should take. Thus,
claimants are at an advantage in creating documentation for their
losses as it is difficult to exclude documentary evidence without
extensive investigation.
The activities of service delivery-the claim process-also
set up opportunities to manipulate loss images and reports.
Claim evaluations can be understood as a series of negotiated
decisions based on the social reconstruction of loss events.
Each party to the process seeks to reconstruct events in ways to
further their position. Since neither side oversees the other's
documentary processes, there is a certain latitude for deception.
Negotiation processes also provide offenders with the boundaries
of tolerated outoamwes. By providing a range of acceptable
behavior, negotiations implicitly "teach" violators just how far
they can manipulate the system without tipping the balance
against themselves.
The structure of claim service as a form of street-level
bureaucracy opens up possibilities for fraud and abuse. The
discretion afforded to street-level workers may be subverted by
powerful claimants whose influence over adjusters' decisions may
be greater than that exerted by the insurance organization. The
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bureaucrat's strategies for coping with conflicting goals in a
campiex working environment may limit their incentives for fraud
recognition, and, thus, provide offenders with a relatively
risk-free environment for deception.
The association between reducing claim costs and the sale of
salvage material is illustrative of ways in which insurance goal
conflicts provide opportunities for fraud. In Chapter Three we
learned that claim departments attempt to recoup same claim costs
through the sale of salvage. This has led to some instances
where insurance officials accept the highest bid for salvage even
when they suspect that the salvage material will be used to
construct a fraudulent claim smetime in the future.
Finally, insurance cxompany fraud enforcement decisions may
actually contribute to the success of false claims. Claim
evaluators, faced with uncertainty can make two types of errors:
false positive errors (paying illegitimate claims) or false
negative errors (denying legitimate claims). I have argued that
processors tend to avoid false negative errors because of the
negative consequences of unwarranted denials. In their efforts
to avoid denying legitimate claims, processors increase their
acceptance of illegitimate ones.
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8.2 OPPCRTUNITIES 'IO CONCEAL FRAUDS
Unlike conventional crimes where the offence is apparent and
the task is to discover who ccomitted the crime, fraudulent
activity is often concealed. Investigators may know who
cxrrritted the violation, their job is to figure out how it was
done and why. The abilities to ascertain whether claims are
legitimate, given the rules of the insurance contract, are
limited because of the contingencies and uncertainties of losses
in the first place, the inherent nature of deception which makes
it hard to recognize and the features of insurance process which
limit data available to claims processors for informed evaluation
of events and reports of events. Finally, the organization of
fraudulent activity as it is mediated through conventional
insurance organizations and actors, shields fraud offenders from
their targets and potential enforcers.
The ambiguities and uncertainties associated with loss
events opens up many possibilities for fraud offenders to
manipulate the meanings of their actions in a given situation and
to neutralize control. Knowlege gaps or uncertainties about the
relationships between cause and event thwart efforts to determine
fraudulent intent. It is diff icult to prove that dzages or
injuries sustained were not caused as claimed by policyhoilders if
no alternative theory of causation can be developed with greater
certainty. Claim evaluators rarely have sufficent information to
develop alternative theories of loss.
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Certain methods used to deceive are hard to distinguish from
legitimate interactions and, thus, fraudulent intent is nearly
impossible to prove. Proving intent to defraud on the basis of
cnitted date, for example, may be extremely difficult since the
claimant can almost always cite a legitimate or credible reason
for the anission-e.g. "I made a mistake." Insurance ccrranies,
keenly aware of their negative reputations, are not likely to
want to perpetuate or extend that image by swearing out
cmplaints against their clients who claim they made simple
mistakes when filling out caplicated claim forms. The
acceptance of deception as a legitimate negotiating strategy may
also act to cover-up fraudulent intent. Deceptions with the
intent to defraud are hard to distinguish from those that are
"expected." Overall, the ambiguity surrounding insurance fraud as
a criminal or even moral wrong gives the benefit of the doubt to
the claimant. If a claimants story seems plausible, it will,
often be believed.
Mediators pass along and legitimate images of victimization
and, thus, substantiate, add credibility to claims, and often
conceal fraudulent transactions. Mediators can be part of the
fraudulent organization or they can be unwitting acccmplices to
the deceit. By reporting a burglary to the police or an injury
to a doctor, claimants build credibility for their claims. While
many insurance adjusters may be ccnfortable in doubting an
irdividual policyholder's story, they are less willing to
question the public record or a doctor's assessmient of loss.
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Several insurance investigators interviewed in this study noted
that it would be difficult and often uncomfortable to doubt a
professional's judgment.
Interestingly, sane of the methods to deter potential fraud
offenders, in particular those strategies designed to engage
third parties into claim verification, may actually enhance the
mediator's position in fraudulent schemes. The prior owner
letters sent to the previous owners of cars now reported stolen
and not recovered, and the gift - donor letters described in
Chapter Five may actually build credibility for false claims.
Fraudulent statements about property ownership, for example, can
be verified by third parties who willingly aid claimants in
defrauding insurance campanies.
The strength of ties between fraud organization members will
influence abilities to conceal fraud. The bonding mechanisms
holding fraud organizations tcxether reflect different types of
relationships between members. Since detecting and unravelling
frauds often require the bre-aking apart of intricate fraud
organizations, the strength of Yhese ties will influence the
opportunities to conceal or expose the fraud.
Fraud offenders also conceal their participation in rule
breaking by distancirng thenselves from fraudulent activities or
by disasscciating themselves fram loss events. Placing distance
between themselves and their targets shields them from accial
control efforts. Sane property owners involved in arson insulate
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themselves fran fraud by establishing "straws" or "fronts" for
their property ownership. Others hire "torches" to set the fires
for them. Policyholders who conveniently leave their automobiles
where they know they will be stolen also insulate themselves from
the loss event.
Insurance fraud activities can also be concealed within
larger business operations both legitimate and illegitimate.
These operations can themselves provide opportunities to insulate
and cover the fraud offenders and to buffer social control.
Legitimate business, organized crime and even law enforcement
have acted in this capacity.
The insurance process helps conceal frauds by limiting the
vantage points of potential discovery agents and their incentives
to look for fraud. Discovery agents are differentially located
throughout the claiming process. Since one's vantage point
determines, in part, what frauds can be seen, discovery agents
are limited in terms of the frauds they expose merely by the fact
of their positions vis-a-vis the claims process and the claimant.
Discovery agents also differ in terms of their incentives to
discover frauds. For example, the media and cmnunity groups
have incentives to look for selected frauds that reflect their
particular interests. Claim prcessors' incentives for exposing
fraud are embedded in larger insurance goals that often conflict
with fraud exposure.
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Sane frauds are concealed because detection strategies are
not well designed to capture the fluid processes of image
manipulation. The processes of deception afford to those who
deceive certain opportunities to change imagery during the course
of a claim and, in so doing, to neutralize discovery mechanisms.
I have suggested that attempts to make the discovery process more
predictable through standardized audits and standardized computer
matching programs have an inherent weakness. Knowledgable
offenders learn the system and use that knowledge to manipulate
their images of loss and conceal their frauds.
8.3 LIMITS CN ENFORCEMENT
Even if ame could identify fraud, it is not clear that under
all circumstances, insurance claims personnel or law enforcement
wish to control fraudulent behavior. My analysis suggests
several reasons why same frauds may be tolerated: (1) fraud
effects are diffuse, (2) the costs of fraud enforcement may
exceed any direct benefits to enforcers, (3) pressures to handle
the matter internally and/or (4) fraud control might negatively
affect other aspects of the insurance business.
8.3.1 DIFFUSEEDEFEYIS
Insurance crompanies can shzre the r isk of paying excessive,
and even fraudulent, claims through joint associations and
reinsurance mrechanisms which allcm canpanies to share the cost of
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fraud and other high risk business with other campanies (see
Chapter 2 for more discussion on these mechanisms). No one
ccnpany need feel the burden of fraud, since the cost of such
activity is spread among participating campanies. Thus, there
may be little incentives to investigate. In fact, in criticizing
the Massachusetts Reinsurance Facility for auto insurance, the
Massachusetts Governor's Task Force on Auto Theft notes that
"Sharing losses reduces the incentive for individual
campanies to design special and innovative approaches to
theft claims control." (Massachusetts Governor's Task Force
on Auto Theft, 1980;27)
Fraud effects are diffused in yet another way. Fraud
targets may recoup sane of their losses through rate
relief-passing the costs back to the consumers. Just as store
owners capture the cost of shoplifting in the price of their
goods, insurance cotpanies capture some fraud costs in the price
of their corcnxity. Premium rates are calculated, in part, on
the basis of loss experience, a measure of claim frequency and
severity. Since successful fraudulent claims increase loss
experience they indirectly increase future premium rates as well.
While the increase in individual premiums may be so small that
individual consumers do not feel the effect directly, the
aggregate effect may be substantial (estimates range in the
millions of dollars) .
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8.3*2 EFORCEMENT CnSTS
Small claims are often paid with little or no investigation
since if the claim is small enough, it is likely that the cost of
investigating will exceed the claimed amount. The exact cut-off
figure for a more-or-less automatic payment is not known.
However, one might expect that the figure will vary across
crnpanies, since econcnuies of scale may reduce investigation
costs for sae cipanies and not others.
Although denying small claims may not produce benef its
directly, it may produce a deterrent effect which can benefit the
individual copany and/or industry in the long run. It appears,
however, that corporate long-term strategies for tough claims
handling are not necessarily transmitted to the street-level
bureaucrats who must contend with heavy workload and other
organizaticnal pressures to limit costs for specific claims.
Proof of fraud may be difficult to obtain. When evidence
cxmfirming an offender's motive for fraud is privately held and
difficult to extract, specialists are often needed. Since
outside investigatory assistance is expensive, ccrpanies may
prefer to limit same of their claim liability through routine
claim process rather than expend the extra resources denying the
claim and possibly facing a civil suit by the claimant.
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Job pressures may force adjusters and other social control
agents to ignore sane frauds or to conduct only limited
investigation into claim legitimacy. Texts on insurance note
that suspected claims require more careful scrutiny and, thus,
wore work for adjusters (Webb et. al., 1981; Swift, 1975).
Since most adjusters are juggling many claims at the same time,
they may be reluctant to take on extra work unless they can be
sure of a payoff.
Interestingly, the develognent of special investigative
units for auto claims has taken sane of the pressures off
adjusters since now when fraud is suspected, the claim file is
sent to those newly created units for further investigation.
However, the mere volume of claims that would require more
intensive investigation relative to the manpower available to
investigate, assures that only a handful of cases will be
investigated. An individual special investigator for auto theft
fraud, for example, can handle between seven and twelve cases a
moxth. The larger special investigative units only had four or
five investigators. Thus, one unit can handle only same fraction
of suspected frauds. The rest are handled through the normal
claims process.
Claims managers suggest that legislation designed to protect
consumners f ran unfair practices by insurance ccanpanles actually
limit their abilities to cnnbat fraud. They argue that
legislation limiting claim settlement per iods does rot provide
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adequate time for investigating suspicious claims.
Unfortunately, data were not available to confirm or refute this
argument.
Cost and expected outome will also influence public
agencies' willingness to take on insurance related cases. Public
agencies are not likely to expend scarce resources unless the
payoff (measured in number of arrests for large scale frauds) is
substantial. In addition, many law enforcement officials suggest
that insurance fraud is a private matter and that camipanies
should be responsible for policing their own backyards [1].
8.3.3 HANDLING 'HE WMTIER INTERNALLY
Ccmpany preferences for handling fraud privately rather than
publicly (i.e. in criminal courts) may infuence the choice of a
particular enforcement option. Criminal processing is avoided as
indicated by capany reluctance to sign criminal coplaints.
8.3.4 HURTING OIHER ASPECTS OF INSURANCE BUSINESS
The intense competition for insurance business may be
associated with limited fraud enforcement if it leads insurance
caopanies to "turn the other cheek" when certain clients submnit
1. I suspect that this attitudie changes depending on who cnommits
fraud. While public authorities may not be irclined to
prosecute onetime amateur fraud offenders, they may be
extremely interested in large doctor-lawyer frauds or
systematic arsonists whose activities extend well into the
public arena.
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suspicious claims. Insurance choices are often based on claim
processing reputations. I have indicated in Chapter Two that
campetition for clients historically has led to liberalized claim
settlements. Although the association between liberal claim
settlement and fraud can only be inferred, my analysis suggests
that insurance cclnpanies may want to maintain clients with whcm
they conduct substantial amxnts of business so that small
digressions fran legitimate practices may be ignored.
Maintaining good relations with clients may place limits on
the use of investigatory strategies. The suspect 's role as
insurance client may permit the questioning of claim facts,
whereas other tactics, e.g. setting up inducements for fraud,
are perceived as inappropriate to the insurance service context.
If as suggested in Chapter 6, more aggresive investigatory
tactics are necessary to document that losses are ficjitious or
physically created, they may not be employed in deference to the
claimant's client role and, thus, the fraud will not be exposed.
8.4 GENERAL THEMES AND FTIUR RESEAIO!
My analysis of insurance fraud as an example of crime
m]e iated by or through corporate entities suggests that such
behavior can be usefully understcood by examining the ways in
which organizational activities and structures both facilitate
rule breaking and limit arxtrol. I have suggested certain
conditions favor ing the use of deception as a strategy for
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unlawfully obtaining insurance benefits.
others,:
These include, amnRg
1. The crntingent quality of losses.
2. The lack of precision in the insurance camrdity
3. The nature of claim process as a form of
"street-level" wor k.
4. Claim negotiation tactics which encourage the use
of deception and ease moral doubts about rule
violation.
5. The qualities of deception which make it hard to
evaluate.
6. Limits on the number and quality of vantage points
for fraud recognition.
7. Diffuse fraud effects which limit control
incentives.
8. Insurance goal conflicts which discourage social
control efforts.
9. Mismatches betwen fluid processes of deception and
fixed structures of conventional social control.
These themes which I have suggested are useful for
understanding property-casualty insurance fraud can be applied
more generally to four broader sets of inquiry.
1. Deception As A More Generalized Form of Rule
Breaking
2. Client Rule Breaking in Street-Level Delivery
Systems
3. Theft Frau Claiming Systems-Deception as a new
currency of exchange
4. Creating Certainty in Cauplex Social Control
Settings
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5. Use of Carputers to Detect Rule Violations
8.4.1 Deception As A More Generalized Form Of Rule Breaking
I have suggested that deceptions to claim insurance benefits
unlawfully have certain characteristics that hinder conventional
social cntrol efforts. Because deceptive transactions appear no
different than onventional ones, they are hard to recognize.
Equally difficult are attempts to impute illegal motive on the
part of those who erploy deception since many deceptive actions
can be justified as "innocent" misunderstandings. Future
research might ccrpare property-casualty insurance frauds to
other frauds and then to other theft types. In so doing, one can
determine whether the characteristics of deception identified in
this research fit fraud types other than those studied here. One
might campare frauds against different types of victims to draw
out the effects of victim facilitation. Fran such an inquiry one
might also develop more generalized conceptualizations of
opportunity. Additionally, by canparing insurance fraud to other
thefts where the dmninant strategy is not deception, but rather
violence or force, one might isolate those behavioral
characteristics unique to deception as a strategy for crime.
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8.4.2 Client Rule Breaking In Street Level Delivery Systems
This research has suggested that the complex working
environent of insurance claims adjusters opens up avenues for
client rule breaking. The thesis argues that environmental
complexity-e.g. workload constraints, bureaucratic goal
conflicts-helps provide opportunities for powerful clients to
manipulate the discretion afforded to street-level bureaucrats.
Previous research has focused on systems where the power
advantage rests with the bureaucrat. Future research could
caipare different street-level settings in order to assess
whether oprtunities for client rule breaking suggested in this
research are characteristic of street-level systems involving
clients with relatively different levels of power.
8.4.3 Theft Fram Claiming Systems
As benefits supplement and/or replace wages and other
traditional forms of property, the econamy has come to rely on
systems of claims-making and insurance. Future research should
consider the problems of social order that accampany the shift
fran market-based to insurance-based econnies. As social
interaction organizes around claims-making, deception, in the
form of insurance fraud, emerges as a significant source of
social disorder. Examining other forms of insurance frauds-e.g.
health insurance, welfare-ane can begin to develop mrore
generalized concepts for understanding this form of rule
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breaking. Since my thesis argues, in part, that conventional
social control strategies are inadequate or mismatched for fluid
processes of deception, one needs to critically assess other
measures of social cxtrol performance in claims-making contexts.
8.4.4 Creating Certainty In Cmplex Social Control Settings
In their efforts to control coplex sets of transactions,
social control agents have developed measures to routinize the
process. My thesis has suggested that routinization has an
inherent irony. It allows potential offenders to easily acquire
the knowledge and means to subvert the system to their
advantages. Historically, attanpts to rationalize social control
have focused on the agent-i.e. how to control agents'
discretionary authority. As formal social cxntrol measures have
expanded to include coplex white-collar crime situations, new
attapts to rationalize the process are being introduced which
focus directly on the offence and the context of rule breaking.
These new efforts appear to be aimed at creating certainty that
offenders intended to cxmit the offences and had clear
opportunities to do so. Future research might explore the
variety of techniques social control agents have employed to
rationalize or routinize crime control situations. Through such
an inquiry one might be able to assess whether similar
copportunities to subver t the system accxrpany ef for ts to create
certainty in cxrplex rule breaking settings.
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8.4.5 The Use Of Caputer Technology To Detect Rule Violations
As everyday transactions beccmr ccnputerized new means of
policing those transactions are being developed. The use of
ocuputers to detect rule breaking in both private business and
public programs has been heralded as one of the most innovative
and cost-effective social control strategies available to
goverrynent and business. However, xcputer policing raises new
questions for conventional law enforcemnent and organizational
acxtrol. Caputer technology has increased opportunities for
identifying certain types of rule breaking, but what types of
violations are actually being exposed? What types of offenders?
Computer policing will introduce changes in the occupational
characteristics of social control agents. How will this change
social control management? The expansion of computer technology
into areas of social control also raises questions about
individual privacy and civil rights. Future research needs to
delineate types, goals, and targets of the new ccmputer police
strategies. Urderstanding the variation in ccmputerized policing
activities will inform public debate on the benefits and costs of
aplying caputer technology to policing transactions.
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IIw0
1.0 SPECIAL INVESTIATIVE UNITS
Many of the larger insurance catpanies have responded to the
growing incidence of fraudulent auto insurance claims and, in
sacme cases, fraudulent fire claims by establishing units
specializing in fraud detection and investigation. These units
operate out of regional or branch claims service centers in the
larger metrcpolitan areas (Boston, New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, for example.)
During the course of this research interviews were conducted
with at least one staff meber in eight different special
investigative units operating in one major metropolitan area.
Officials from two units refused to be interviewed. Two special
investigators permitted me to observe their daily routine.
Observations were limited to a few days in each case.
1.1 The SIU Concept
The special investigative unit cxcept emerged out of an informal
association of twelve insurance carriers writing a substantial
part of the automobile insurance market in Massachusetts. The
Massachusetts Auto Theft Camittee was formed to address the
growing incidence of auto theft and auto arson in the state [1].
1. One SIUS supervisor tfrught that then Insurance Ccmunisssioner
Stone pressured the insurance wrvinity into forming the
association af ter placing sume of the responsibility for
increase] auto thef t on the shoulders of the insurance
industry.
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The cannittee's goal was to pursue policies to decrease the
incidence of auto theft and auto arson and to decrease insurance
campany liability associated with preventable, and scmetimes
fraudulent, auto claims. Their campaign was waged in the
legislature (e.g. lobbying for legislation to increase penalties
for auto theft and to change parts of the regulatory environment)
as well as with the public (e.g. public relations campaigns
encouraging insurance cxnsumers to help prevent auto losses).
The cnittee also discussed strategies for restructuring claim
procedures to combat the increase in fraudulent claims. This
discussion included the establishment of special investigative
units in the larger insurance crpanies.
Public statements by insurers establishing SIUs tend to cite
increased fraud incidence as the major justification for the
specialized units. Although never documenting precisely the
increase in insurance fraud incidence, "industry estimates"
indicated that twenty-five percent of the auto theft claims filed
with Massachusetts insurers were fraudulent and the problem was
growing. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing whether those
figures are accurate.
Industry ax crmnpany news releases cite increased fraud
costs, ultimately torne by insurance campanies, as the raison
d'etre of the new units. Cynics might note that the
establishmrent of SI~s appeared to have as much to do with
increased copn costs as with increased consumer costs. Direct
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csts to insurance cxpanies were increasing because rate relief
no longer adequately covered the increases in loss exposure [2].
Rising cxmpany costs also can be associated with the unique
characteristics of fraudulent auto thefts. Auto theft frauds
tend to involve a high percentage of unrecovered vehicles. When
policyholders allege that their cars are stolen, but, in fact,
ditch these cars into quarries, burn them or have them crushed
into useless metal, the insurance campanies have no salvage to
sell after they pay the claim. Carpanies not only pay for these
illegitimate claims, but, equally important, they are unable to
get back scire of what they paid through salvage sales. Since
conpanies are paying illegitimate claims without any means to
recoup some of their losses, they had strong incentives to start
their fraud campaign with auto theft.
Coupled with rising cost was the insurers growing
recognition that fraud investigation required scne specialized
expertise. According to one memo outlining the "need" for SIUs
in a certain large insurance capany.
"We have tried to surface this type of claim with our
regular adjusting staff but because of demands of their
other work, we have not been able to fully investigate
and follow through for the best results. It is
therefore, necessary to develop a Special Investigative
Unit (Sill) whose sole function will be to thoroughly
investigate auto thefts that give rise to suspicions."
(H-March, 1979)
One might argue that insurers only identif ied the need for
2. At least the flat rating structure in Massachusetts would not
allow insurance cripanies to charge higher rates for selected
risks.
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specialized expertise after they assciated a reduction in fraud
costs with their relative abilities to deny, rather than adjust,
fraudulent claims. The orientation to suspected frauds shifted
from simply reducing claim costs (adjusting) to negating
liability (denying claims). In theory, the increased cost of
investigation would be more than offset by savings associated
with denied claims. [3]
Although the SIU concept developed around the idea that the
investigation of fraudulent claims required specialized
expertise, azmpanies differ in exactly how specialized
investigation meshes with normal claims adjustment functions.
(1) In sane ccupanies, if a claim is suspicious, it is removed
fran the normal adjustment process until such time that SIU staff
detemine its legitimacy. SIU staff review the files. If further
investigation appears to be warranted, it is pursued. If not,
either because the claim seems legitimate or no clear path to
proving claim legitimacy is available, the claim is returned to
the original adjuster who proceeds with normal adjustment. (2)
In other ccrpanies fraud investigations are conducted
independently and concurrently with normal adjustment. Copies of
claim doctnents are sent to SIU staff for further analysis.
However , the adjustment prccess continues as if the claim is
legitimate. The special investigator'"s evaluation of claim
legitimacy is passed back to the adjuster with a recaouendation
3. This is not to suggest that cxxrpanies were not denying claims
before SItS were established, but that the fccus or
orientation to claims processing shifted.
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for further acticn (e.g. denying claims or disallowing certain
claim items). (3) In at least one cxmpany the SIU stafff member
reviews suspicious claims and continues processing them until
their onclusions/settleimwts. Once the SIU staff mmer reviews
the file it "belongs" to him and does not return to the adjuster
who initially referred the case. (See wcoxmpanying diagram for a
map of the processes descrited above.)
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The crganizational meshing of fraud investigations and
claims adjustment reflects different orientations to the role of
formal investigation in claims processing. Although,
theoretically, all claims are evaluated or reviewed, there is a
subtle distincticn between claim verification or evaluation and
investigation. Claims personnel recognize a difference between
taking a second look at a claim and actually investigating a
claim suspecting it to be fraudulent. The questions they ask are
different and the processes used to collect information will
differ as well. While adjusters focus exclusively on claim
details, investigators examine loss circumstances and possible
motives for fraud. Adjusters are the "front line" detecting
possible fraud frcm the claim documents, while the SIUs
investigate to ascertain whether the suspicions of fraud are, in
fact, correct. Ccmpanies that rewove SIU operations out of
claims processing, either by physically locating SIU personnel
away fran the claims operations or by distinct functional task
differentiation, confirm, organizationally, the distinction
between adjustment and investigation.
Separating fraud investigation from adjustment allows
insurance company personnel to quietly examine its suspicions
without raising unnecessarily the wrath of its policyholders. In
a publication prcduced by the Insurance Ccxrnittee for Arson
Control, the ccrmittee suggests that fraud investigations should
be thorcugh, ". . .'leaving no stone unturned.' However, it
should be discreet and confidential to avoid defaming the
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insured's reputation and character." (Insurance Canittee for
Arson Control, 1982; 5) Ccpanies aware of their reputation for
claims servicing may prefer to maintain sme distance between
claims adjustnent and investigation, only bringing investigatory
techniques to the foreground when they are certain of their
suspicions. SIU units that are part of the normal claims
adjustment cperation can not distance theselves in this way.
1.2 Mandate
All but ame of the special investigative units were
established to review exclusively suspicious auto claim,
although some units take on a few non-auto claims as well. Most
of the carpanies with special units require SIU review of all
claims involving unrecovered vehicles or vehicles recovered
totally burned as these conditions are often related to auto
theft fraud. Other types of fraudulent auto claims are subuitted
to the SIUs at the discretion of field adjusters. Typically,
unit investigators estimated that ninety-five percent of the
cases they receive involve claims for auto physical damage or
auto theft. Whether the SIU crncept will expand into other areas
remains to be seen.
Interestingly, the idea of special investigative units
within carpanies has not, with a few exceptions, accarpanied what
is cxnsidered a ser ious fraud problem, arson fraud. Although
frequently referred to as reaching "epidemic" proprtions,
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recognized fraud fires remain a relatively small proportion of
the fire claim subnitted through local branch offices. The
exception is the FAIR Plan where there is a cnncentration of high
risk business in the first place, and only one service office for
a state or group of states. Because arson fires are relatively
rare events for particular claims offices, arson experts are ofen
callec in only as needed. Sene cpanies have fire specialists
on staff, loated at wopany headquarters, who can provide
assistance to local offices. Although the effects of a single
fraud fire may far exceed the effects of a single phoney auto
theft claim, the relatively greater number of poney auto theft
claims sumnitted to a single claim office renders local fraud
specialists an optimum solution for auto theft fraud and a less
desirable one for arson frauds.
This research did not uncover any similar specialized units
for personal injury/liability claims. A standard check into the
legitimacy of a personal injury (third party) claim is routinely
conducted by adjusters, examiners or private investigators. Note
that, unlike first party claims (fire and auto theft, for
example), these claims involve suits against the
policyholder/client. Thus, the insurance cpany investigates
claim, rot sinply to determine their value, but to see whether ,
in fwct, their policyholders are liable for the losses claimed.
The issue of liability requires, at the outset, more intense
investigation. Claimants are visited at Wame and! interviews with
neighbors are conducted to establish that individuals are injured
329
as claimed. Whether these checks are conducted inhouse or by
outside private investigators depends, in part, on available
cxrpany personnel as well as the degree of surveillance
necessary. While an adjuster might be well equipped to interview
claimants and neighbors, outside consultants/investigators might
be necessary for surveillance over several days or through
extraordinary means, e.g. video-taping [4]. Thus, while cxmpany
officials di not indicate that any specialized unit conparable
to the SIU was in place for investigating fraudulent liability
claims, carpanies may employ individuals who specialize in this
area. Unfortunately, access to axrpany employees who specialized
in liability frauds was not forthccming.
1.3 Personnel
4. When ccupanies suspect that claims are fraudulent they may
hire investigators to take notion pictures of claimants
showing the claimants engaged in activities that would negate
their claims of injury. According to one claims investigator
(Chernick,1969;126), a favorite film scene is the trip to the
doctor. The insurance ccmpany either arranges a doctor's
appoinbment for a certain day or finds out about a scheduled
apointment. Investigators take pictures of the claimant
leaving the house and going to the doctor. According to this
investigator,
"Many a movie of a claimant shows him spryly
walking out of the house, no limp, no pain,
nothing. He clirtnbs into his car like a teen-ager
and zooms away. Next scene, the doctor' s parking
lot: the slcm, torturous descent fram the car,
the suffering; walking on crutches, limping,
half-dead. The same scene when returning to the
car . . . Then, back at the hcnse"-no more
crutches, a enowth walking gait..."
Carpanies may recruit individuals who specialize in this type
of activity. One formrer polce officer, now a metber of an
SIU, used to conduct "activity checks" for the cimpany.
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Special investigative units varied in size frcm one
investigator to four or five. In the larger units a supervisor
was responsible for case assigrnments and review. SIU staffs
bring to the units a varied array of backgrounds and prior
experiences. Same units are staffed by former claims
representatives who have proved to be solid investigators. The
larger units often include a cobination of former claims
personnel and former law enforcement agents. The ideal situation
seems to be a cambination of claims personnel and property
appraisers who bring insurance experience to the unit and former
law enforoetent officials who bring investigatory training and
law enforcenent crntacts to insurance investigations.
Individuals are not recruited directly into the special
investigative units unless they are recruited fran the ranks of
former police officers. Insurance personnel who enter the units
do so only after a significant period of employment as insurance
adjusters (no less that five or more years).
1.3.1 Case Referral -
Cases are referred to the special investiative unit from
field or desk adjusters examining loss documents or even loss
scenes. Field adjusters have been alerted to several "red flags"
or signals for fraud that are suggested by their claim
departments. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discuession of red
flags.) Certain types of auto theft claims, cars recovered
totally burned or unrecovered, are referred iwuediately to the
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SIrU.
Decisions to take a case for investigation depend on the
quality and quantity of evidence. Investigators note that their
cases are only as good as the initial information provided by the
adjuster. However, sine the SIUs have limited manpower, sane
cases are refused or accepted, not on their merits, but on the
relative workload of the investigators. If workload constraints
prohibit investigators from taking on a case, they might suggest
possible paths for the adjusters to follow up on their own.
1.4 Outames
One of three decisions is possible. (1) SIU investigation
can reveal no fraud on the part of the claimant and the claim
will be paid. (2) In the course of their review, SIU personnel
may discover that certain parts of the claim are, indeed,
fraudulent and those pieces may be disallowed in the settlement.
(3) SIU staff may suggest that the entire claim be denied. One
SIU operation consisting of one person has investigated only 172
cases in its three year history. 92 claims (slightly more that
fifty percent) were ultimately denied (interview no. 23). All
SIUs report that their cperations have led to net savings for
their cxopanies.
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Whether cr not a unit is cxrsidered cost effective depends
on its dollar savings to the cxmpany. Savings are calculated by
tabulating the claim dollars that would have been paid if not for
the actions of the SIUs. Ccupanies calculate savings by
totalling the figures for claims that were denied outright plus
dollar differences between clains submitted and actual claims
paid. Thus, if after SIU investigation a claim was reduced from
$100 to $50, the cnmpany would cite a $50 savings. Ccanercial
Union, one of the SI leaders, noted that the fist nine months of
their two person operation racked up almost a quarter of million
dollars in "savings." (Beacon August/September, 1978;3) The
problems with this type of measurement are twofold. First, it is
not clear that these savings would not have occurred without SIU
intervention. Second, with respect to claims denied, it is not
clear that the cmpanies would have paid the total claim. In
fact, normal adjustment might have reduced the claim by fifty
percent. If so, the savings attributed to the SIU would be far
less than claimed. Finally, we do not know whether the claim
denials will be upheld in civil court, and, if not, if the
capanies will ultimately pay more than the original claim. Many
of the cases have yet to cae to trial and, thus, their ultimate
disrsitins are not known.
In a few instances SI personnel have taken their
infcrmaticn to local prosecutors who have initiated cr iminal
investigations. This path is not taken often, according to SI
personnel, because prosecutors are not particularly interested in
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isolated fraud cases. One investigator outlined the prosecutors
preferred case type as the following, ". . .cases that will
give them good press and good results [convictions]. They want
six figure frauds' with conspiracies involving lots of
people-cer tainly not less than a dozen."
Criminal prosecution is most likely to occur when several
different capanies band together and present their case. These
cases usually involve fraud rings defrauding several insurers.
Since no one copany is singled out as the victim of fraud or as
aggressively pursuing claimants, joint actions are often
preferred. By joining together, no one canpany has to fear the
stigma of being victimized nor any negative feedback for
aggressive claims handling.
Investigators often mention the deterrent effect of the SIU
operation. Who is being deterred? Sae say the otherwise honest
policyholder is deterred from making a fraudulent claim.
However, that presumes that most claimants know about the SIU. I
would guess that is far fran true. Others say professional fraud
offenders who might have reason to know of the SIU are deterred
fram subnitting phoney claim with cxmpanies that have special
units. If so, that is limited deterrence at best. If
professionals are deterred fram pursuing claimrs through certain
cxurpanies, it seers reasonable to expect that we would experience
displacerment rather than deterrerce. Professionals could sukmnit
their false claimse through campanies without SILs. In fact, one
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might argue that displacement could actually mean that an even
greater nzrber of frauds remain undetected. Suppose, for
example, that professional fraud offenders no longer pursue
claims through ccupanies that have SIUs. If, instead, fraudulent
claims are subnitted to smaller companies which lack resources to
undertake even the minimal investigations possible in the larger
copanies, we might experience more successful frauds overall
[5].
Not all cases are investigated in pursuit of claim denials.
Scmetimes the SIU referral is used as a bargaining chip in the
claim settlement process. In these situations investigators may
look for ways to disallow certain claim items (interview no.
21).
All SIU personnel interviewed in this research credited the
SIU cncept and organization for improving the lines of
connanication amrng the various insurance claims departments and
between the insurance anrnity and law enforcement officials.
The investigators provide direct points of access for inquiries
about claimants' previous claims filed with other companies. The
informal network has streamlined the cross-company inquiry system
so that information useful to a particular fraud investigation
can be receive] in a timely fashion. In the last year
5. Perhaps one could f ind out whether there have been increases
in the nwznber of small airpany insolvencies since the
intrcxduction of the SIU3 in the larger cxrpanies. The problem
is that insolvency could be related to siMply higher losses
(rot necessarily fraudulent ones) or bad investmnent
strategies.
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Massachusetts has enacted legislation providing insurance
cmpanies with imnunity fran civil prosecution when they exchange
information in the course of an auto theft investigation. SIU
investigators believe that irproved information flow has been the
most important SIU developnent and has, more than any other fact,
cxtributed to their efforts to axnbat auto theft fraud.
Information exchange between ccqpanies is not limited to
individual inquiries about individual claims. SIU investigators
meet regularly to discuss current cases and alert each other to
problem areas. The investigators note that it was just such a
meeting that lead to the arrest of local residents involved in a
large auto theft fraud ring. The investigators met and discussed
similar looking claims, typically involving high priced
automobiles, until they began to see a pattern emerge.
Eventually, the investigators brought their information to the
attention of a lccal district attorney who prosecuted the case.
The SIU network also provides a mechanism through which the
insurance caipanies can share the cost of fraud investigations.
It agpars that the possibility of sharing costs is looked at
favorably by insurance curpanies and may actually encourage them
to pursue investigations which would not have been undertaken by
ane ampany alone.
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Finally, SIU investigators claim that the establishment of
their units has increased ooperation fra local law enforcement.
Again, personal crntact has made the difference. Before police
officers were lucky to get through to a claims person at all.
Now they have a name, number and a face to call should they need
insurance information. Easing police access to insurance
information has eased insurance access to police information.
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2.0 DTNSTRY SUPPOIED ORGNIZATINS
Industry supported organizations providing investigative
services to insurers who suspect that claims are fraudulent are
divided into (1) general claims services which include sane
cnmponents of fraud investigation and (2) organizations which
deal exclusively with the fraud problem. Included in the first
group is the Property Lcss Research Bureau, a non-profit
association of one hundred mutual insurance companies and the
Property Claims Services, a subscription service of the American
Insurance Association. Claims service organizations provide
assistance to insurers faced with potentially fraudulent
situations. In the second category are organizations which act
independently of the claims process. The National Auto Theft
Bureau (NATB) established in 1912 and the Insurance Crime
Prevention Institute (ICPI) established in 1972 are two industry
supported organizations respxding directly to the fraud problem.
This discussion is limited to the two organizations (ICPI awd
NATB) which focus primarily, if not exclusively, with the
problems of insurance fraud and insurance crime.
ICPI aid NATB are supported by insurance cmpanies who pay a
yearly membership fee to cover the cost of the agencies'
operations. Both agencies were established to "br idge the gap"
between insurance campanies and law enforcement and appear miore
connected, philosophically and professionally, with the latter.
In fact, neither agency operates to facilitate the claims process
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directly. ICPI is excluded by its charter fran assisting in
claim settlement. In some states NATB has becoes so integrated
into the motor vehicle registry and law enforcement systems that
insurance capanies are required by law to participate in NATB
activities. Insurance ompanies must report all auto thef t
claims to NATB. (Massachusetts is one such state.)
2.1 Insurance Crime Prevention Institute
The Insurance Crime Prevention Insitute is a nationwide
organization supported by over three hundred and fifty mutual,
stock and independent insurance carpanies. ICPI was established
in 1971 to investigate fraudulent claims referred by menber
insurance ompanies and to determine whether criminal prosecution
is warranted. Headquartered in Westport, Conn., ICPI has
regional offices in New York, Chicago and Los Angeles.
According to its own publicaticn, ICPI was created after
increased fraud losses and associated costs prompted ICPI
organizers to conclude that successful fraud investigation
required full-time attention divorced from everyday claim
negotiations. Ccmpanies recognized that fraud detection and
control required lengthy investigations which often take longer
than the typical claim settlement pericxd allowjed. Removing fraud
investigations from the clams process provided greater
flexibility since investigators were no longer onstrained by
statutory claim settlenent limits.
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Canpanies also recognized that fraud investigations were
expensive, often more than one anpany was willing to bear alone.
By pooling the cost of investigation amg all mrmber crmpanies,
the cost to any one arpany was reduced and became affordable.
Finally, campanies recognized that fraud offenders were not
bound by locale nor by cipany defrauded. Patterns of fraudulent
activity crossed capany lines as well as state lines. A
natinwide organization servicing a larger number of insurers was
thought to be better able to follow fraud than organizations
based within single jurisdictions or companies. ICPI was
established as a national fraud policing organization at a
relatively low cost per ampany.
ICPI serves mnother function, although never explicitly
stated. The organization stands as a symbol that the insurance
industry is taking sane responsible action to reduce fraudulent
claims. Although fraud reduction may be more symbolic than real,
the industry can use the organization to argue that they are,
indeed, "policing their own backyard."
ICPI also can serve as a buffer between the insurance
colTfunity and outside regulators (insurance departments or
police) . Information exchange may be processed through ICPI
rather than directly through individual caopanies. Thus, ICPI
can act as a screen to filter requests for information regarding
insurance acrpany operations.
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ICPI was established to pursue cases towards a criminal
justice outame and is restricted from assisting claims
processing. ICPI public relations material stresses the
organization's role as a bridge between law enforcement and the
insurance caminity. In fact, it would appear that 1CPI is
caught somewhere between a rock and a hard place. ICPI is
divorced fran the insurance carmunity by charter and not
officially connected to the law enforcement network.
Unfortunately, this research did not systematically interview
public law enforcenent officials for their assessment of ICPI
activities. The lore about the relationship between ICPI and
traditional law enforcement, not empirically docunented, is that
ICPI public relations material overstates the positive relations
between the two.
A cursory review of ICPI press releases reveals a
disproportionate number of fraud cases prosecuted under federal
mail fraud statutes as cpposed to local insurance fraud statutes
where they exist. One can speculate that to the extent that any
relationship exists between ICPI and conventional law enforcement
it exists at the federal level and primarily with postal
inspectors. In fact, when asked about preferences for working
with state, federal or local law enforcenent officials, one 1ICPI
official responded that federal jurisdictions were preferred. He
believed that local jurisdictions were more susceptible to
corrupticn by organized interests. The preference for federal
jurisdiction may be uore closely linked to the backgrounds of
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ICPI agents than to any characteristic of state or local law
enforceient agencies. A great many ICPI agents have had prior
experiences as Postal Inspectors, FBI and even Secret Service
agents. Carry overs fram traditional rivalries between law
enforcement jurisdictions and types of agancies may explain
preferences for federal aoperation.
2.1.1 2ICPIMandate -
Although 1CPI began its operations investigating only bodily
injury clains, their mandate soon increased to include
investigation of all types of insurance fraud except workers'
ccnpensation frauds. According to ICPI's eastern regional
manager, the bulk of their work involves same facet of bodily
injury claim. Dotor-attorney fraud organizations creating
phoney or inflated medical bills in support of real or imaginary
injuries are the most typical cases investigated. Slip and fall
claims involving individuals who set up falls in public places
(restaurants, supermarkets,etc.) and then claim against liability
policies in force for those establishments are also typical. In
the last several years ICPI has become more involved in
arson-for-profit and fraudulent auto theft.
It is rot surpr ising that the bulk of ICPI's investigations
involve cases which involve a nuznber of insurance cnupanies
defrauded by an individual or group of individuals. Because 1Q21
is set up as a nationwide support service for the entire
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industry, it can obtain access to the files of any number of
cxrpanies. This type of mandate and access is an advantage over
lczally based investigative agencies.
In addition to prosecuting insurance fraud offenders, ICPI
is mandated to publicize these prosecutions. ICPI organizers
believed that publicity will deter further frauds. To that end
the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute publishes a newsletter
which describes sane of its most successful cases. Public
relations staff disseminate information on ICPI activities to
other news sources, law enforcement and the insurance industry.
ICPI staff also train adjusters to recognize fraud.
Manuals, films, slide shows and helpful hints published in their
newsletters are sane training tools developed by ICPI. The
organization also holds workshops and training sessions for fraud
investigators and goverrment officials.
2.1.2 ICPI Personnel -
ICPI investigators have all had prior experience in same
other facet of law enforomient, typically service in one of the
federal policing agencies-FBI, Secret Service, Postal
Inspectors, etc. Accrding to the eastern regional manager,
investigators have averageC fifteen years investigative
experience before joining ICPI. Although many of the ICPI agents
are nvre senior investigators who have had previous experience In
other types of investigation, ICPI is trying to lure youngei
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staff. They are looking for agents who might make a career out
of insurance investigation rather than simply relying on
individuals who come to insurance investigation only after a
career in something else. Insurance adjusters (including the
special fraud investigators) are not recruited or encouraged to
becane ICPI agents. Difficulties associated with shifting a
person's orientation from routine claim settlement to criminal
processing were cited as reasons for the non-involvement of
former insurance personnel in ICPI activities.
Most investigative training is field training. A two to
three week inhouse training session is held at cnpany
headquarters to familiarize investigators with peculiarities
assciated with insurance fraud. ICPI agents who enter the
organization with only a minimum of investigatory experience
(less than three years) work as partners with more senior agents.
2.1.3 ICPI Case Referral -
Member campanies may submit suspicious claims for review by
ICPI investigators. Generally the entire claim file is reviewed
by a field analyst operating out of ICPI headquaters. If the
analyst believes that further investigation is warranted, the
file is sent to the appropriate regional office. The person I
interviewed could not or would not say what criteria are used to
select cases. Irquiries were rsde at ICPI headquarters but they
were never answered. Public relations material irdicates that in
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fiscal year 1979-80 6,500 claim files were reviewed.
Within the regional office visited during the research, case
assignment is based on workload. Occasionally a case may be
assigned to an investigator because of his or her specialized
expertise. Since many of the fraud cases cross state lines,
sometimes even regions, more than one investigator may be
assigned to a single case.
ICPI agents may also beme involved in an insurance fraud
case at the request of canventional law enforcement or on the
basis of information provided by a private citizen/informant.
Interestingly, ICPI refers to these non-insurance company
initiated cases as "self-referrals" perhaps reflecting their
greater identification with law enforcement than with their
meber cnnpanies.
2.1.4 ICPI Activities And Outcomes -
ICPI agents both conduct their own investigations, turning
the results over to federal or state authorities when prosecution
appears warranted, and participate in on-going law enforcement
investigation providing insurance information as needed [6].
ICPI claims its activities contributed to over 1200 arrests in
fiscal year 1979-80 an eleven percent increase franm the previous
fiscal year.
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NMBER CF ARRESr TO MICH ICPI
cnlRYIUE *
BY TYPE C' IN4SURANCKE CLAIM
Fiscal Year
1972-1973
1973-1974
1974-1975
1975-1976
1976-1977
1977-1978
1978-1979
1979-1980
Liability
221
443
506
511
392
601
798
739
SOJRCE: ICPI Press Packet Received
* The extent of ICPI's involvemnt is not
been actively investigated by ICPI agents.
insurance docunents in others.
known. Sane cases may have
ICPI may simply have secured
2.2 THE NATIONAL AtTlO THEFT BUREAU
Established in 1912 the National Auto Theft Bureau (NATB)
assists insurance and law enforcemenfomtunities in the recovery
6. Although they work closely with law enforcement, ICPI agents
will not involve law enforcement officials until they are
sure they have a case. One ICPI agents officially advise
law enforcement agents or ask them to becane involved in a
case, ICPI personnel become agents of the law enforcement
organization and, thus, are bound by the same constraints as
the public officials. Rather than constraining themselves
unnecessarily ICPI agents will wait to officially inform
public officials. We don't know how often unofficial
ammunicetion circumvents these restrictions.
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Property
36
171
269
489
333
490
Total
221
443
542
682
661
1090
1131
1229
and identification of stolen vehicles and prevention of future
auto thefts. A nationwide organization supported by nearly 500
insurance coapanies NTB acts as a clearinghouse for auto theft
information. NATB maintains a data base of vehicle
identification numbers for every car reported stolen, as well as
information on salvage and stolen parts. NATB is the exclusive
recipient of the "confidential" Vehicle Identification Number
(VIN) used to identify vehicles when their outward appearances
have been altered substantially. This information is available
to law enforcement officials investigating vehicle thefts.
Although established initially as a voluntary association,
NATB's constitutional charter authorized a change to
not-for-profit status in 1979. NATB's change in status helped
pave the way for agents more active participation in the pursuit
and prosecution of auto theft offenders. In addition to their
previous duties, the constitutional change authorized NATB agents
to sign criminal coplaints where
.in the sole and independent judgment of the
cnrporation [NATBJ such action is deemed to be
appropriate." (MATB Annual Report, 1979;8)
By standing as complainants NATB agents help initiate criminal
prosecution in cases where heretofore it was "not practical" for
individual insurance cxmpanies to act as cxrplainants and NATB
could not.
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2.2.1 NATB Mandate -
NATB was established to assist in the prevention of motor
vehicle thefts and related crimes and the prosecution of auto
theft offenders. Five areas of concentration are outlined in
NATB's information packet.
1. suppressing vehicle thefts including heavy
industrial and marine equipnent
2. identification of vehicles or equipnent
bearing altered or obliterated identification
numbers
3 investigation of professional theft rings and
frauds,
4. peace officer education in vehicle identification
and theft investigative techniques,
5. maintaining a modern ccuputerized record system
designed to complement the foregoing objectives.
Several states have enacted legislation which requires
insurers to report all vehicle thefts to NATB. In New York, for
example, the Autanobile Theft Prevention Act of 1979, requires
insurers in that state to report all total vehicle theft losses
(unrecovered vehicles or vehicles recovered with damages
exceeding the vehicle's value-e,g, totally burned, stripped) to
a central reporting agency designated by the Insurance
Ccmnissioner. NATB is the designated agency in New York state.
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NATB also runs training sessions for law enforcement
personnel. NATB agents have particpated in local task forces
formed to assist jurisdictions in ombatting auto theft and auto
theft fraud. Finally, NATB officials have lobbied state and
federal legislatures for passage of laws the agency believes will
reduce auto theft. NATB helped draft anti-vehicle theft
legislation in several states (Massachusetts, New York, Illinois
and Indiana, for example) and particpated in US Congressional
hearing on the Motor Vechicle Theft Prevention Act of 1979. NAWB
officials also have lobbied actively for more stringent and
uniform salvage titling procedures.
2.2.2 NATB Personnel -
Data on NATB agents are extremely limited. Interviews with
NATB officials indicate that a substantial number, if not all,
agents come to NATB with previous law enforcement experience.
The background of its agents emphasizes the law enforcement focus
of NATB activities.
2.2.3 NATB Case Referral -
Inquiries into NAIW's auto theft data base are made by
insurance campany personnel and law enforcement agents. A
typical inquiry might be whether a particular vehicle
identif ication nuber (VIN) has been previously repor ted stolen.
?ATB might also be asked to assist in identifying certain
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vehicles or to conduct an investigation into suspected auto theft
operations. Unfortunately, data on case referral are limited so
that we are unable to speculate on whether the nature of these
requests varies according to source (i.e. insurance or law
enforcemit) .
NATB initiates some cases itself when, for example, NATB
indices are used to uncover fraud rings. Every quarter the NATB
salvage information system produces a list of all salvage valued
in excess of $250. These lists are forwarded to local NATB
agents who work with state registry documents to determine
whether the cars have been re-registered. Acxrrding to NATB, the
procedure can result in the exposure of stolen car rings using
salvage as a cover for stolen vehicles. (informational memo,
undated.)
2.2.4 NATB Activities And Outcomes -
Maintaining the North American Thef t Information System
(NATIS) is the keystone of NATB's activity. The index contains
pertinent information on thefts of passenger vehicles, trucks,
trailors, boats and construction vehicles. Data collected
inrlue identifying nwubers, insurance information and loss
details. Data on active thefts, i.e. non-recovered thef ts, are
stored in the system for five years. Information on thef t
recoveries is stored for two years. An "on-line" aompter
system, whidh by the end of 1979 held 1.5 million records,
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provides innediate access to NATB information by vehicle
identification number (VIM) or MTB record number. NATB agents
receive inquiries fran insurance ampany and law enforcement
personnel twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
In their role as an information clearing house for vehicle
theft, NATB maintains a stolen parts file (reports of stolen
engines, transmissions, and boat engines) for five years. NATB
agents can access manufacturers' production records on
microfiche. Manufacturers' producticn records are the first
chapter of vehicles biography and can be used to verify VINs at
the time of manufacture, to provide information about where the
vehicle was shipped after leaving the assembly plant, to trace
vehicles and/or to verify a claimant's statement about where and
when the vehicle was purchased. NATB also maintains, for four
mncths, information on vehicles impounded to police custody.
This informr n is provided to insurers to assist them in cases
where claimants report losses after the vehicle has already been
impounded.
NATB's nrst important contribution in the area of insurance
fraud is as a clearing house for salvage information. Salvage
reports include information on the sale of late mcdel (less than
six years old) salvage vehicles. Fraud offenders purchase
certificates of title for salvaged vehicles and use then to
insure nn-existent vehicles. Then they repor t then stolen.
Sirce the cars did not exist, they cannot be recovered. Should
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the vehicle identification number of a previously salvaged
vehicle appear on a subsequent theft report, NAT's North
American Theft Information System will "marry" the theft report
with the previous salvage report. This "marriage" prompts
further investigation which might reveal an attempt at paper car
fraud. As an indication of the insurance comnity's growing
awareness of the auto theft fraud problem and the use of
oxxputerized indices to detect their own victimization, meer
cmpanies increased their use of the salvage information data
base by one hundred percent fran 1978 to 1979 (NATB Annual
Report, 1979;6).
NATB maintains limited information on vehicles that have not
been stolen-in particular, vehicles wanted by law enforcement
agencies and exported vehicles. Agents also have access to the
NITSIS,FBI theft data base.
NATB serves the industry and law enforcement by providing
both with information in a timely and concise fashion. As a
central repository for information on motor vehicle thefts, NAM
provides the insurance cumunity with documentation of claimants'
attempts to defraud them. By helping to recover vehicles NATB
agents assist insurance crmupanies in limiting their liabilities
either by reducing claims paid (i.e. it may no> longer be a total
loss) or by the sale of salvage material. Importantly, NATB can
usually provide this information in enough tine to assist
insurance ccmpanies in claim settlement.
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Being able to respand quickly to vehicle theft inquiries is
critical because thieves and the cars they steal are so mobile.
Investigators note that a car stolen in one country can be found
in another in a matter of days. Quick identification can prevent
the fast exits of stolen cars. For example, in Miami, local
police suspected that sane of the vehicles stored in one of
Miamifs docks and slated for export to Haiti were actually
stolen. The police called NATB to help identify the vehicles.
NATB's investigators were able to identify over fifty vehicles as
stolen. Same were stolen fram as far away as New York and
Massachusetts (NATB JCUMNAL Sunmer 1980;9),.
NATB's greatest assistance to law enforcemnt appears to be
the identification of stolen vehicles and parts. In 1980 US
customs agents called NATB agents to examine a number of
autcmbiles awaiting exportation to Kuwait. The NATB agent
discovered discrepancies in the vehicle identification
characteristics which suggested that the VIN numbers had been
altered. As reported in the summrer of 1980, the investigation
has led to the reovery of over 100 stolen vehicles (NATB JOURNAL
Summer,, 1980.) NATB agents worked with Connecticut state police
to break a "chop slop" operation in that state. NATB agents were
able to identify and trace three dismantled stolen cars.
WCLB reports that in 1979 the organization assisted in the
location of fifty-five (55%) percent of the 234,254 vehicles
member ccmpanies reported stolen. They also report that in 1979
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NATB agents participated in the investigation of 402 new theft
ring cases resulting in the recovery of over four thousand
vehicles. Also in that year NATB agents contributed to the
prosecution of 949 individuals on charges of larceny, auto theft
and fraud.
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3.0 PRIVATE INVESTIGM RS
Private investigators conducting insurance fraud
investigations are organized in many different ways ranging fran
lone cperators to complex agencies where fraud investigation is
one of many different functicns performed by organization
mmbers. Unfortunately, this research cannot address differences
amng private firms. Interviews with other private investigators
and caricatures of private investigators in popular journals
confirmed similarities in approach and method, although some
organizational differences clearly exist between the agency
visited and other private agencies. Differences appear to be
ones of size, personnel (background, training, canpetence) and
style. While clearly important, further research is needed
before any informed analysis of cnmparative types of private
investigators can be drawn.
The description which follows is based on thirty days
observation at the offices of one small private investigative
agency and interviews conducted with the agency director before
and after that period. The purpose of my visit was to review
extensive case files of fraud investigations. During that time
informal interviews were anducted with all agency personnel and
inter-office activities were noted. As part of the research
agreement, the name of the agency and personnel involved have
been changed. Case details which might identify either the
investigative subjects or the clients involved have also been
355
danged.
Ferret Inc. is a small firm conducting private
investigations for a variety of clients. Insurance campanies,
private individuals as well as public authorities have requested
Ferret's services. The firm began operating in the
mid-seventies. Insurance investigations canprise a substantial
part of their business. Nearly eighty-five percent of the total
case load up until the time of my visit included insurance
investigations, primarily arson investigations.
The firm's reputation in the field of insurance
investigation is substantiated by its work with other
investigative tniies and by the cczrjany's involvement in training
other investigatory personnel. Agents have worked, on several
occasions as cnsultants to federal law enforcement agencies, for
example, the FBI, and ATF. The principal of the firm has
organized several seminars on arson investigation for public law
enforcament and has run training sessions for insurance
personnel.
Because Ferret investigators work within a highly
campetitive market (there are many firms willing to engage in
private investigation), a firm must be aware of its cxxpetitive
edge, both in terms of investigation quality and cost efficiency.
Trade-off s between cost and quality are often necessary.
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Private investigators must also solicit business. Sane
private investigatory firms take steps to actively advertise
their services and/or build up their reputations. For example,
Pinkertons has a brochure outlining their investigative services
and other, smaller, firms have produced similar materials. A
large security and investigative firm operating out of Boston,
Massachusetts has produced a number of manuals and training
pieces outlining investigatory procedures. These materials are
intended to establish that firm in the property fraud
investigation arena.
While firms that provide both uniformed and, thus, highly
visible guard and investigative service (for example, Pinkertons
and Burns) may be cafortable advertising their services, firms
which engage in more covert investigatory activity may be less
inclined to advertise [7]. Firms which specialize in obtaining
information discreetly may be reluctant to draw attention to
themselves through advertisement. These firms depend on
word-of-mouth reputation for their business.
Much of Ferret, Inc.'s business is generated by its
reputation in the field. Ferret, Inc. obtains its insurance
fraud cases fran one of three major actors, the attorney
7. Hcwever, avertising may he a way to make covert and often
illegal activities look legitimate. O'Toole (1978)
discovered that Factual Service Bureau sales pitch claims
that the campany "specializes in securing medical records and
information without patient authorization." In plainer
language, acrording to O'YLoole, tie f irm steals pr ivate
medical records.
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representing the insurance cnmpany in its defence of a claim
denial, fram claims personnel (either enployed by the capany or
independents) or by a public prosecuting agency.
Looking at cases fran Ferret Inc.'s perspective it is
extremely difficult to determine why an insurance campany refers
a particular case to be investigated. The research reviewed only
cases that were initiated with a minimal amount of information
gathering on the part of the insurance company. Ferret's mandate
was to provide a property scene examination (to determine that
the fire was set) as well as investigation into the motive and
opportunity for fraud.
Although mst cases start at the claim settlement level and
then, if apropriate, becme criminal matters, there are same
cases that are initiated directly by prosecutors. When public
authorities initiate insurance cases there is same precedent for
locating an insurance campany which is willing to finance the
private investigators activity. For example, the fire history of
a group of owners was brought to the attention of the state
prosecutor by a local ammunity group demanding action against
the suspected offenders. The prosecutor asked that investigators
fram Ferret, Inc. be present at the meeting with cxmnunity
leaders since Ferret had been involved in related investigations.
Ferret's future involvement in the case, hcmever, was predicated
on an insurance cup~any's willingness to finance the
investigation.
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In a celebrated Massachusetts arson case which resulted in
the indictments of over thirty individuals on arson related
charges, extensive private investigation was financed by the
Massachusetts FAIR Plan. (Urban Educational Systems, 1980; 7)
According to an assistant attorney general, the insurance
industry gave what amunted to a blank check to finance the
investigation. The mney was used to maintain protective custody
for the goverrment's chief witness, to pay overtime for state
employees and to supplement the attorney general's investigation
through private efforts.
Ferret Inc. provides full investigative services for its
insurance crnpany clients. Typically, investigators provide
ccmpanies with sufficient information to deny claims suspected to
be fraudulent and/or to successfully defend claim denials in
civil suits brought by claimants. Clients detail the extent and
scope of the investigation. Same clients request fire scene
investigations to determine cause and origin of the fire and
nothing further. Other clients may have enough information on
"cause" and want Ferret to develop the motive and opportunity for
the fire. Still other clients want Ferret investigators to start
with the determination of cause and continue investigating the
native and opprtunity for the fire.
Without a client, sameone who is willing to "foot the bill",
Ferret Inc. will not crntinue its investigation, no matter what
stage the investigation is in when the funding stops. Thus, the
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nature of the investigation is determined, in part, by how much
money the client is willing to spend on the investigation, an
amount often negotiated before the investigation begins. As a
result, same investigations are stopped far short of their stated
goals of establishing fraud [8],. For example, in one Ferret Inc.
case, investigators were fairly close to identifying the "torch,"
who they hoped would implicate the insurance claimant as having
arranged for the fire, when funding stopped [9].
In some cases, however, insurance ccpanies will authorize a
minimal aounit of mney to conduct a partial investigation. A
company might finance only a partial investigation if it simply
wanted to enhance its bargaining position with the claimant (i.e.
to increase its adjustment and lower the amunt of claim paid.)
In one case assigned to Ferret, the attorney representing the
insurance company simply wanted Ferret to find out how much a
potential buyer had offered for the claimant's property. The
attorney calculated that if the bid was lower than the potential
payment, the campany could adjust the loss to the lower figure.
8. Of course this could also mean that same investigations are
drawn out to fill out the negotiated amount.
9. Ore caveat must be noted. This case was investigated several
years ago when insurance canpanies were apparently less
inclined to pursue arson investigations. If a similar case
appeared today, it is not clear that one would be telling the
same story. Hcowever , discussions with Ferret investigators
and other close to arson investigation and prosecution could
lead one to speculate that this scenario is possible today
even with all the increased media attention on
arson-for-profit and insurance ocunpany prcmiises to pursue
suspeted fraudulent clainw to the end.
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One might also speculate that campanies invest in partial
investigation because they believe that the true, and larger,
effect is deterrence. The impression that a cnmpany is
investigating is more important than any one conclusion.
Investigators c& not see any systematic patterns in campany
decisions to follow through on any investigations. Although size
of the claim makes something of a difference, other
factors-principally the ongoing relationship between Ferret
investigators and clients seems to play an important role as
well.
Several of the ar sn cases involve a number of property
losses and include the investigative efforts of several private
crpanies. One attorney may represent a company in several
losses and distribute the investigation of those losses to a few
aompanies. On a few occasions these separate investigations have
implicated the saw group of individuals. Then the attorney
might join the investigations tcqether asking each to work in
conjunction with the other. That, too, has its problems. The
firms are often cxmpetitors and working relations are tense.
When a case initiated by an insurance ccwpany turns into a
criminal case, the insurance ocmpany will often direct Ferret to
work in conjurction with public author ities. Thus, Ferret
becxomes an indirect agent for the prosecuting authority. 'There
are other cases when Ferret acts as a direct agent for the
prosecuting authorities. In these instances, Ferret
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investigators work as consultants to prosecutors and are paid
directly by the public authority. The distinction between direct
and indirect agency is base] primarily on the source of payment
and not on any substantive differences in activity. Every
insurance case researched here was financed by the relevant
insurance cattpany.
3.1 PERIEL
Ferret, Inc. is a small outfit employing less than ten
investigators. It is privately owned and individually managed.
The firm is licensed. Individual investigators within the firm
are not individually licensed.
The investigators who now ork for Ferret, Inc. have little
or no public law enforcement experience, although same do have
military training [10]. In addition to Fred, the principal
owner, and his investigative staff, the firm employs, full-time,
an office manager whose responsibility appears to be to keep the
office running smoothly and money caming in. Two secretaries
10. The prior experience of Ferret investigators is quite
different than that of the more institutional fraud
investigators. A majority of agents working for the
Insurance Crime Prevention Institute and the National Auto
Theft Bureau, private organizations funded by member
insurance caopanies, have had previous experience in law
enforcenent either at the federal or local level. The
director of Florida's Division of Insurance Fraud came to
that post from the FBI. All of the Division investigators
have had prior law enforcement exper ience. Special
Investigative Units established in claimrs departments of many
of the larger insurance crmpanies tend to have a mixture of
former claims staff and former law enforcament agents.
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work hard keeping the voluminous amount of paperwork in order.
Other "onsultants" (loosely defined) are brought in to a
case on an "as needed" basis. For example, an accountant might
be called in to go over a "subjects" books. Analysis of fire
scene samples are undertaken by other private firms. Similarly,
voice analysis, undertaken more often in the past than presently,
are contracted out to a related firm. Other actors, whose
primary assets appear to be muscle, are called in when things get
rough.
The Ferret, Inc. approacht
resembles a team approach. A
which are assigned by Fred to
responsible for their piece
investigators "pieces" add up to
they do not.
to investigatory activity most
;ingle case is divided into tasks
his staff. Investigators are
of the puzzle. Scmetimes an
the entire case, but most often,
While tasks are easily differentiated-e.g. interviewing,
surveillance, document research-, the division of labor is not
that precise. Although some investigators are known to be better
at one thing than anotherr and, thus, may be asked to do that
task more often, there is no clearly defined specialization
within the firm.
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3.2 ACTIVITIES AND OCXOMlES
Tasks are assigned, verbally or in writing, to the
investigators on a daily basis. The tasks may be to uncover
general information, for exanple, to run a "city hall check"
(background check) on an individual or quite specific
information, e.g. to find out whether a certain individual has
ever owned a specific piece of property. General information may
be bound by a specific locale, for example a city hall or civil
court. bTo find the answer to a specific question, however, an
investigator may have to search records in a nunber of different
locations. Sane tasks are performed as the situation arises.
The case files were full of tidbits of information jotted down by
investigators during the course of sane other activity in hopes
that the information will prove useful in the future.
Investigators must be flexible enough to pursue any lead that
arises.
Documents are researched for background information on all
subjects of an investigation-both people and properties.
Investigators rely on public records in the early stages of an
investigation. However, at later stages, investigators often
research private records, (e.g. cancelled checks, credit
histories, etc.).
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In same cases recorded information will not provide all the
necessary data to determine or infer that there has been
fraudulent activity, the opportunity for that activity or the
motive. Despite the fact that frauds are never actually
witnessed, observations can be essential to criminal prosecution
of frauds. Observations about the loss (e.g. burn patterns) and
the claimants activities after the loss are often needed to
conplete a fraud scenario.
Interviews are conducted with individuals who can shed light
on the policyholder/claimant and circumstances surrounding the
loss claimed. Public safety officials are interviewed for their
version of events surrounding the loss and for background on
claimants. Insurance principals-agents, claims representatives,
etc.- are interviewed for their impressions of the claimant.
Neighbors, friends and witnesses are also interviewed.
An investigator needs to carefully document his/her activity
in the event that the case file is subpoenaed and/or to establish
appropriate client billing. Investigators take notes during all
activities, even during interviews which are recorded.
Information obtained fran documents is taken down in note form
even though, in sme cases, the dcmnents are copied. Field
notes are organized into memos detailing an investigator's
activities.
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Reports provide the insurance ajany and/or its attorney
with information that can be used in the cnrpany's defense of
claim denials. The reports contain facts only. Conclusions are
rarely developed directly in the body of the report, although
occasionally investigators will include a list of discrepancies
between statements and events.
Ferret investigations produce a variety of outcomes ranging
from determination that claims were legitimate to criminal cases
of fraudulent intent. Surprisingly, Ferret investigators were
not always aware of the final dispositions of their cases. Often
times the firm would produce a report for a client and never hear
another word about the case [11]. In several cases Ferret
investigators turned their information over to federal law
enforcement authorities. The disposition of those cases was not
known [12].
Attorneys might ask Ferret, Inc. to verify sane points in
11. We can assume that these claims/cases were paid or that the
claimants did not press their cases in civil court. If
litigated, it would be highly likely that Ferret
investigators would have to do soe additional investigative
work on the case.
12. Why wouldn't Ferret Inc try to learn about the ultimate
disposition of their cases? Perhaps because they saw no benef it
to doing so. 'They were paid. It is not clear that they would
have any inrentive to spend tine finding out what happened with
their investigations.
My aur icsity alxut case outacre prcmnpted me to ask Fred to
call the federal law enforcement agents who was supposedly
directing the case. He did and we learned that the federal
agents were sitting on the case. It was clear to us that no
further action was anticipated.
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their initial report. Typically requests for clarification are
made right before the cases are ready for trial, anywhere fram
six nths to several years after the initial investigation
began. The lag between initial investigation and trial date
produces serious problems for investigators, particularly when
clarification required re-interviewing witnesses, neighbors etc.
Because people are so mobile, it is difficult for investigators
to track down individuals a year after their original statements.
Memories tend to fade and, after a time, facts beome distorted.
Inconsistencies in statements obtained a year apart may cause
the initial statement to be disregarded [13].
Establishing and maintaining a relaticnship with public law
enforcement is a critical orjNxnent of a private firms
reputation and/or investigatory sucess. Fictional detective
stories are replete with examples of the uneasy and suspicious,
often negative, relationships between "gum shoes" and the local
police lieutenant; a fiction which is apparently not too far
from reality [141.
A solid reputation with public law enforcement, however
makes obtaining that information far easier and, thus, boosts the
13. Ore can see hiow this could wrk to the advantage of the
fraud offender. To the extent that successful cases against
fraud offenders rely on the constructicn of a story that
cxmtradicts the one proposed by the claimant, time lags in
investigation may work against the insurance campany or the
state.
14. Ore ndiers why, if so many pr ivate investigators are former
police officers, the private eyes are so mistrusted by public
law enforcement.
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quality of an investigation. A good relationship with public
safety officials can often mean future business opportunities,
especiafly with respect to arson investigation. Public officials
can be on hand to actively promote one ccmpany or another. Same
of Ferret, Inc.'s cases have been generated after fire officials
advocated for Ferret's services.
Private investigators can invest in securing future,
beneficial relations with public law enforcement by helping to
upgrade the reputations of public officials. They can do so by
providing public officials with information that could allow
public officials to successfully complete an investigation. Or,
public officials can be allowed to take credit for activities
that were actually undertaken by private investigators.
Personal contacts with prosecutors may influence whether
cases will be prosecuted. Cases that are criminally processed
often, but not always, require more investigation than other
cases. Thus, fran the point of view of firms like Ferret, Inc.
these cases are preferred. I examined what, on the surface,
appeared to be two similar arson cases. One ended up in criminal
court, the other did not. When I asked investigators what
accounted for the dif fer ence0 they told me that a large factor
was Ferret's perscnal contacts with the loal prosecutors
involved.
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4.0 SIAME RN FRAUD &UREAUS
Three states have granted legislative authority to a single
agency to devote exclusive attention to the investigation and
eventual prosecution of insurance fraud cases. Florida's
Division of Insurance Fraud, created in 1977, is the model for
the establishment of fraud bureaus within state insurance
conmissioners' offices. The California Division of Insurance
Fraud began its operations in 1979. The New York Fraud Bureau
began its operations in November, 1981. New Jersey has recently
passed legislation calling for the establishment of a fraud
bureau. Three other states, Nevada, Louisiana and Idaho have
proposed bills to establish similar fraud units [15].
In June 1980 the National Association of Insurance
Cnissioners (WAIC) drafted model legislation for the
establishment of fraud units in state departments of insurance.
The purpose of these bureaus, as defined in the legislation is to
investigate per sons and cxpanies suspected to be in violation of
insurance fraud statutes or other provisions of the insurance
15. Massachusetts formed a fraud bureau, now defunct, in the
early 1970s. Informatim on its operations is limited. At
one time, as many as 50 individuals were employed with the
agency. Interviews with insurance executives in the state
revealed that the Massachusetts Fraudulent Claims Bureau
(FKB) was perceived as a dumping ground for political
patronage appoirnents, a perception which has tainted
opinion on the eff icacy of state run fraud bureaus in
general. On several occasions questicns about the efficacy
of state fraud bureaus prcmupted replies such as "rot if it's
set up like the Fraud Bureau we had here in Massachusetts".
The FCB was dismantled in 1975 after the intrcduction of
ny-fault insurance and the beginning of a new state
achinistraticn.
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code.
Accrding to the legislation, fraud division investigators
are granted authority to administer oaths, to serve subpoenas
ordering the attendance of witnesses and to collect evidence.
Evidence obtained through the division's investigative efforts is
confidential and division investigators are not subject to
subpoena in civil matters, i.e. suits filed by policyholders
against insurance conpanies for the recovery of claims that have
been denied. The model legislation grants peace officer status
to division investigators and, thus, grants to them the power to
make arrests and subjects them to all laws applying to peace
officers in their state. In addition, the model legislation
calls for insurance campanies to report suspected insurance
frauds to the divisions and grants civil immiunity to cupanies
and their employees who file such reports.
A key feature of the model legislation is the granting of
law enforceent powers to fraud division investigators. Neither
the Florida nor California Divisions began their operations with
such status, however, it soon became apparent that such status
was necessary for effective enforcement of statutes which made
the filing of false insurance claims a prosecutable, criminal
felony. It was extremely important, the NAIC reported, that
division investigators be allwed to secure their own arrest and
search warrants.
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Although the task force report does not indicate why peace
officer status is so critical to the efficacy of the fraud
divisicr's efforts, one can speculate from Florida's experience.
Convincing local law enforcement officials that filing a false
insurance claim is a serious crime worthy of public attention has
been a large and scmetimes difficult task for fraud division
investigators. Asking an already overburdened local law
enforcement agency to take the necessary action against insurance
fraud offenders is an even greater task since resource
constraints make public investigation into even the more violent
crimes problematic.
Imnunity legislation is a critical component stressed in the
NAIC model legislation. Statutes providing limited civil and
criminal iwmanity to insurance cnpanies releasing information to
law enforoement officials have been enacted in several states,
often states without established fraud bureaus. These statutes
protect insurance carriers fra legal action or punitive damages
regarding any information they provide, in good faith, to law
enforcment agencies. The new "arson-reporting" imunity
legislation is heralded by the industry as the keystone to
combined efforts of the insurance and law enforcement camunity
to combat arson as it allws for the exchange of information,
potentialiy critical to an investigation, which would have
previously been withheld for fear of a civil suit. Rober t
McKenna, director of Flor ida's Division of Insurance Fraud,
reiterated the impjortance of immunity to fraud division su~ccess
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in his assessment of the Florida Division's first year of
operation. He claimed that without the imnunity provision,
insurance industry cooperation would not have been forthcnming.
The legislation, however, tends to be specific to arson related
information and, in many cases, is not generally applicable to
insurance fraud. Prosecution of other forms of insurance fraud
in jurisdictions which have only limited forms of imnunity is,
thus, more difficult.
4.1 FLORIDA'S DIVISICt OF INSURANCE FRAUD
Florida's Division of Insurance Fraud is headquartered in
Miami with field offices in five other Florida cities, Tampa,
Orlando, Fort Myers, Tallahassee and Jacksonville. Nineteen full
and part-time investigators are employed by the agency which
began its operations in April 1977.
Funding for the Division of Insurance Fraud is generated
from insurance canpanies writing business in the state. Each
ampany writing fire and casualty insurance is assessed an
identical amiount to provide for the operations of the Division.
In the next fiscal year (1982-83), however, the division will be
funded through the state's general revenues, an indication of the
state's ccmnittaent to cxombat insurance fraud. Independent
funding has teen strongly advccated by Division personnel.
Detached f ran industry dollars, the Division can assert its
independence f ran the insurance aomywnity. Although never an
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agent of the insurance industry, the Division's dependence on
insurance cmpany assessment may have created the perception of
special interest to insurance cmpanies and limited the
Divisicn's credibility with other law enforcement agencies.
Independent funding, thus, assures the Division of its place as
part of the state law enforcement network. The importance of
independent funding is underscored by the NAIC proposal which
states that the cost for administration and operation of the
fraud units should be borne by the general revenues of each
state.
Efforts toward criminal prosecution of insurance fraud
offenders o not impinge on the civil processes of claim
settlement. The control of fraudulent and criminal behavior is
not directly related to the disposition of specific claims.
Division action cannot be used as a means to hold up payment or
better a occupany's bargaining position with respect to claim
settlement. If a cxrpany requests Division investigation into a
suspicious claim which has not been paid, the ccapany must be
prepared to deny the claim and face a civil suit by the
policyholder or pay the claim. Clearly, if the ccapany denies
the claim and the case then goes to civil court, criminal action
against the claimant would make a stxccessful defence of the civil
suit far more likely. (Note that a case goes through criminal
prcess faster than civil so that the outcwme of the criminal
ation wili nmt likely be knwn at the time the civil case is
tried.) Similarly, if the claim had been paid prior to the
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Divison's investigation and that investigation resulted in a
criminal conviction, a ccmpany can hope that restitution to the
arpany will be part of the sentence imposed on the offender.
4.1.1 Mandate-Florida Division Of Insurance Fraud -
The Division began its operations in 1977 with the authority
to investigate only motor vehicle accident frauds. These frauds
generally included staged accidents, ambulance chasing and/or
doctor-lawyer frauds. The later fraud scheme utilized
unsuspecting accident victims to boost and create doctor bills
for injuries sustained in real accidents. Campensation went
directly to the doctors or lawyers, the accident victims often
knew nothing about the inflated claims made on their behalves.
Within a year the authority to investigate insurance frauds
had been extended to all types of frauds. As of July 1979 the
Division had set up eight categories of fraud based on type of
loss claimed. Fraud categories are assigned by case supervisors
at the time a case is opened for investigation. The eight fraud
categories include: (1) motor vehicle accident frauds, (2)
workers' opcaensation frauds, (3) miscellaneous medical and
health frauds, (4) frauds concerning stolen or damaged
proper ty-auto, hcmeowner and amrrercial proper ty, (5) f ire
insurance frauds (including, but not limited to arson) , (6) life
insurance frauds, (7) frauds by insurance carpanies or agencies
against policyholders, and (8) bond and surety frauds.
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Cases Presented for Prosecution
July 1, 1979-June 30, 1980
which have reached FINAL disposition *
FRAUD CATEGRY N= (%)
Motor Vehicle Accident 8 (14%)
Workmen's Capensaticn 5 ( 9%)
Miscellaneous Medical & Health 7 (12%)
Stolen & Damaged Property 25 (43%)
Fire Insurance 2 ( 3%)
Life Insurance 0 0
Cmzpanies/Agents 11 (19%)
Bcnd & Surety 0 0
'1UML 58 (100%)
* Because classificaticn of fraud cases into one or the other
categories is primarily a matter of judgment and is sametimes
inconsistent, at least for the purposes of research, I found it
useful to re-classify certain cases. For example, I included
certain auto physical damage claims resulting fram motor vehicle
accidents in the first category "motor vehicle accidents" rather
than the fourth category "stolen and damaged property." This was
done in an effort to make the categories consistent within the
sample. Thus, all frauds resulting fran motor vehicle accidents,
despite the nature of the claim (i.e. personal injury or
physical damage) are included in the same category. Similarly, I
considered all frauds by insurance personnel against their
employers and/or policyholders under the category of
"cipany/agent" despite the type of policy used to defraud. As a
result there are some slight discrepancies between my category
statistics and those available fro the Division.
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4.1.2 Activities-Divisio Of Insurance Fraud -
4.1.2.1 Case Processing: -
The major thrust of the Division's activity is the
investigation of fraudulent claims. Investigation into
fraudulent claims is a specialized activity within the state law
enforcement network. Division investigators maintain a separate
"investigative index" for their own use which is not available to
insurance personnel. Standard measures of protection for
information obtained through law enforcement activities applies
to the Division's investigations as well. These activities are
described in greater detail ..n the main text of the thesis.
A second, related activity, hcwever, is the maintenance of
two indices for the insurance industry, a bodily injury index and
a fire and stolen property index, which provide insurance claims
personnel with the prior claim histories of their claimants.
Claim indices provide a mechanism through which repeated attempts
at fraud can be recognized. If a claimant"s name already exists
in the index, copies of information fran the current clata and
information on all previous claims entered into the system are
sent to the current insurer. Instances where claimants are
attempting to obtain payment from two companies, simultaneously,
can be detected. Similarly the indices can detect when
golicyholders try to claim items for which they had been
previously paid-for example, a man claims that a watch was stolen
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in March 1981 and a check into the stolen property index reveals
that he claimed and was paid for that same watch in January 1980.
A cover letter is attached to these "claim histories" outlining
the correct referral procedures should the campany formally
request investigation by the Division.
Division investigators swear to the affidavit of ozmplaint,
thus relieving insurance caTpanies from being on record as
camplainants in any one case. Interviews with fraud
investigators, claims managers and prosecutors in a number of
jurisdiction have disclosed that insurance campany reluctance to
sign omplaints is carrmio and when such reluctance exists the
chance of getting a case prosecuted is greatly reduced.
Organizations like the Fraud Divi-Sioexpedite (both politically
and organizationally) crmplaint signing and, therefore, we might
see a greater propensity toward criminal prosecutions where these
organizations operate [16].
4.1.2.2 Information Brokering: -
Perhaps the most important Fraud Division role is as
advocate for the prosecution of insurance fraud and broker of
insurance fraud information between relevant parties. Division
personnel believe that prosecutors must be convinced that
insurance fraud is a prosecutable cr ine; insurance claimrs
16. May explain why ccmpanies wili support the Division despite
the fact that same of its activity is directed against
insurance ccmpany erployees.
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personnel as well as traditional law enforcement agents must be
shown how to recognize fraudulent situations, what evidence to
collect and where to take that evidence once collected;
prosecutors must be given cases that are understandable and are
presented in a useful format; victims of insurance fraud schemes
must be informed that an agency exists for their protection.
Finally, in order for there to be any deterrent effect to the
division's activities, investigators argue the public has to be
educated that insurance fraud is a prosecutable offence for which
an offender will be punished.
The Fraud Division provides a link between the insurance
ccrrminity (where these "crimes" occur) and prosecutors.
Acxording to the director of the Fraud Division, prior to the
Division's inception, cmiunication between the insurance
industry and the prosecutors was limited at best. Insurance
industry personnel concerned with what appeared to them as gross
incidents of fraud were unable to distinguish what was apparently
fraudulent fran what could be provable fraud. Prosecutors, on
the other hand, were not able to penetrate the insurance jargon
and unorganized claim files which would form the basis for their
cases if they accepted them. The director of California's
Division of Insurance Fraud also noted the reluctance on the par t
of the prosecutor's to go after fraud because
"it's very Jif ficult aid time ccnsuming. . .that's
why, frankly, the new tureau was created-so we could
bricdqe the gap between law enforcement and industry."
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The Fraud Division takes a fraudulent claim story fran the
insurance cmunity and translates it into a cr iminal scenario
which is understandable to the prosecutor. Under the assumption
that a prosecutor, given limited resources, is more likely to
take a case that is strongly presented, the Division has
developed a "prosecutor's summary" which details the division's
case in a standard format and outlines the case, evidence and
witnesses in a manner useful for trial preparation. This summary
is presented to the state attorney who then decides whether or
not an arrest should follow from the Division's investigation as
it has been outlined in the report.
Division personnel believe that if law enforcement agents
are more familiar with insurance fraud schemes and the activities
of the Fraud Division they will be more likely to recognize
possible frauds and more likely to collect information useful for
Fraud Divison investigation. Similarly, prosecutors, given the
proper information, would be more likely to becin criminal action
against suspected fraud offenders.
Since most prosecutors and law enforcement agents are not
familiar with insurance fraud cases, the Division has produced
the "Insurance Fraud Investigation and Prosecution Assistance
Digest" designed to illustrate problems typically faced by
insurance fraud investigators and prosecutors. Problems
addressed irclude: filing a criminal information before the
facts are in; witnesses changing stories during the course of an
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investigation; multi-jurisdictional problems; difficulties with
proving intent, etc. Similarly, the division has produced an
investigators manual, a case manual developed to ". .
.familiar ize investigators and other law enforcement agencies
with the kinds of insurance fraud being committed here in
Florida."
Through the use of "Special Fraud Bulletins", the Division
alerts cnrpanies to be on the lookout for alleged fraud
offenders. Although obtaining information fram the campanies was
the intended use of the Bulletins, insurance orpanies also
receive information on who and what to watch for in their own
operations.
Finally, public relations activity is an important division
function believed to effect the publics wi' ingness to report
criminal activity and as a deterrent. Informing the public that
insurance frauds by and against cronpanies are criminal felonies
in the state of Florida, that people are indeed prosecuted for
these crimes and that offenders are sentenced to jail, can act as
a deterrent to potential fraud offenders and can increase crime
reporting fran those who have been victimized. A standard press
release form is filed after each arrest and conviction.
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4.1.3 Outcxmes-Florida Division Of Insurance Fraud -
During my field visit with Florida's Division of Insurance
Fraud I had the opportunity to review cases that had been
presented for prosecution during fiscal year July 1, 1979 through
June 30, 1980. Only those cases which had reached their final
disposition were subject to review. Cases presented for
prosecution were those investigated by the Division, either
independently or in conjunction with another law enforcement
agency, and formally presented to the state attorney for
prosecutorial coxsideration. Cases that had reached their final
disposition were disposed through criminal action (either a
conviction, acquittal, dismissal or pretrial intervention,) or
finalized because the prosecutor did not wish to prosecute, the
case was dropped by the Division or the offender remained a
fugitive. Cases excluded fran this small study were those for
which criminal action was still pending or cases for which no
decision regarding prosecution had been made by the state
attorney.
Eighty-eight cases were presented for prosecution between
July 1, 1979 and June 30, 1980. 58 (66%) were included in my
sample. The records for two cases presented during that per icd
were sealed by the court upon final disposition and, thus, were
beyond my review. 11 (12%) cases were closed, but unavailable
because the records were at another loation. (Note: All 11
cases were out of the Tampa field off ice.) 17 (19%) cases were
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still pending at the time of my review [17].
Prosecutors decided to proceed with the prosecution of 45
(78%) of the cases presented. Arrests were made on 44 cases, one
alleged offender remains a fugitive. In 12 (21%) cases
prosecution was declined and, thus, no arrests were made [181.
The reasrs for declination were often stated in the case
files. In sare instances prosecutors indicated that justice
would not be served by prosecution or that the case lacked
criminal intent and more properly belonged in civil court. Cases
were declined because victirrVwitnesses changed their stories or
refused, after initially agreeing, to cooperate. In other cases
prosecutors felt that Florida was not the proper jurisdiction in
which to try the case or that the case didn"t fit within the
administrative guidelines of their offices. Prosecutors'
declined to prosecute one case in exchange for information on
other crimes. Finally, the statute of limitations had elapsed
before prosecutors made a decision to prcxeed on another case.
17. Using the Divisions's statistics on the total number of cases
presented, troken down by case number category, I ampared my
sample with the total. Mv sample is fairly representative in
terms of fraud type, although it may underrepresent,
slightly, ccmpany/agent frauds and overrepresent
miscellaneous medical and health insurance frauds. Clearly,
the sample is biased against cases that take a long time to
get fram presentation to disposition.
18. As is true with much white collar cr ime enforcement, (Hagan,
Nagel and Albnetti, 1980) stmnary arrests are not the norm.
Division of Insurance Fraud investigators must get the
approval of a prosecuting attorney before affecting an
arrest.
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Several cases for which arrests were made were never
"officially" prosecuted. Three (7%) cases were dropped because a
victim/witness changed his/her story or because the defendant
cxrperated in another case. Offenders in 6 (14%) other cases
were referred to pretrial intervention programs.
One study of prosecutor discretion to cntinue a case notes
that the decision to drop the prosecution of a suspect already
charged is a visible one, subject to exposure by the media and,
thus, public reaction becMaes a critical variable in the
decision-making process. Public outrage to the visible charging
of a suspect might occur when the public believes that sameone
has been wrongfully accused or when the public identifies with
the accused. In such instances charges might be dropped [19].
Most discussion of public reactions to prosecutorial
discretion ignore the fact that the persons accused need not be
quiet bystanders, and, instead, may take intiatives to influence
public opinion. The media can be used to manipulate their images
so that prosecution appears unjust. Fraud Division investigators
relate a story involving the arrest of an insurance company
executive accused of adding ocverages on policies and hiding the
acst of those coverages in the premiums. After his arrest, the
19. With respect to employee thef t, "Perhaps one of the nost
impjortant reasons for infrequent prosecution of thieving
employees-and one related to the effect of public tolerance
of various types of criminal behavior-is that the rate of
prosecution will vary inversely with the extent of
psychological and social identification of the publ ic with
the offender." (Robin, 1970;124)
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insurance executive made a statement to the press suggesting that
he had been unfairly accused by a group of disgruntled custamers.
The executive noted that out of nearly 100,000 custaiers, the
state had only eighteen cnlainants/witnesses, implying that
eighteen unhappy custcmers was hardly wor thy of criminal
prosecution. In fact, the case was later dropped. The accused
had effectively decriminalized his activities. He did not deny
that his cpany had taken the actions for which he was accused.
Rather, he conveyed the impression that one was dealing with only
few custamer crmplaints. Eighteen unhappy custamers was not a
bad record for a comjany dealing with 100,000 custamers overall.
Cases Presented for Prosecution
July 1, 1979 - June 30, 1980
Dispsition by Referral Source
PROSECTED
Referral Source:
Insurance
Law enforcerent
Citizens
missing values =8
guilty
17
8
3
28
guilty
0
1
0
1
war PIWECUI'ED
declined dropped pretrial
admin. after inter-
closed charge vention
7 2 2
5 1 2
1 0 1
13 3 5
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